Abstract:
Ethiopia has been in the grips of a political crisis since the 2018 merging of the 4-party, ethnic-based coalition government, as the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), highly influential in the previous coalition government, have accused PM Abiy Ahmed of illegitimately centralizing power. This political conflict has, in the past year, evolved into a full-scale ethnic and military conflict, with both sides being accused of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including the artificial creation of famine-like conditions throughout several rural regions of the country.
Now, with the TPLF rebels approaching the capital and Ahmed calling citizens to arms, the only actor who seems to be capable of potentially negotiating the conflict, due to cultural, geographical, and political reasons, is the African Union; the AU, however, being headquartered in Addis Ababa, will encounter numerous difficulties in brokering a successful negotiation. No matter the potential outcome of the conflict, however, Ahmed--a Nobel peace laureate--will not be able to retain the political and reputational legitimacy he possessed before the outbreak of the conflict.
Author: Kaitlyn Rabe, Research Director- Mondo Internazionale, G.E.O.
The security situation in Ethiopia
On November 16th, 2021, The US Department of State released a Press Briefing urging US citizens to depart from Ethiopia “while commercial options still exist” (US Department of State, 2021), while Denmark and Italy have since also requested that their citizens leave the country (AllAfrica, 2021). The motive behind the urgent evacuation and creation of the task force is the declaration by the rebels of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that they are approaching the capital; although the Ethiopian government has officially denied such claims, current Prime Minister Abey Ahmed has also called upon the citizens of Addis Ababa to take up arms against the rebels, demonstrating the concrete reality of an approaching civil conflict (BBC News, 2021). Ahmed’s call to arms on the part of the citizens follows heavy losses by the Ethiopian army--once one of Africa’s strongest and most respected--to the TPLF rebels and their allies, mainly due to the TPLF’s successful hit-and-run guerrilla tactics (Chothia, 2021). Furthermore, as of November 29th, Ahmed has transferred power to his deputy Demeke Mekonnen in order to personally lead and coordinate the counter-offensive of the TPLF, most likely in a desperate, nationalistic attempt to rally ordinary citizens to the cause to fight (Pedde, 2021).
Meanwhile, the UN Human Rights Office and The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission have found both sides of the conflict to be guilty, to various degrees, of violations of international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law, including acts of sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, and forced displacement of civilians, in particular in the rural regions of the country (UNOHCHR, 2021). Furthermore, the TPLF, in the early days of the conflict, accused the Eritrean government of sending mercenaries to fight alongside the Ethiopian government, an accusation which both the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments have denied. The veracity of the accusation was, however, confirmed by on-the-ground humanitarian workers, and has also been recognized by the US Department of State, the EU in Ethiopia, and the German Embassy of Addis Ababa (DW, 2021). On the other side of the conflict, Abiy Ahmed and other governmental figures have also accused the rebels of fighting with ‘whitemen’ foreign mercenaries, a claim which Ahmed has not yet been able to substantiate (Ethiopian Monitor, 2021).
Sub-note: Food Security
Furthermore, since the summer of 2021, dire reports of acute malnutrition and famine have been emerging from Tigray (de Waal, 2021). This region, which is the northernmost of Ethiopia and which shares a border with Eritrea, has always been historically susceptible to conflict (CIA World Factbook, 2021). Abiy Ahmed, winner of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to resolve the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, is now being accused of instigating violence and creating an artificial famine in the Tigray region through a blockade of aid routes, and the UN Famine Review Committee declared that, as of September 2021, a majority of the Tigray region was in an “Emergency” food security situation. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification has also documented increasing levels of ‘stressed’ and ‘severe’ levels of food insecurity around the capital, as these phenomena, which originally afflicted only rural areas, have now arrived in Addis Ababa (IPC, 2021).
Explanation
Ironically, it has been the border deal and the reshuffling of government which have reignited tensions between Ethiopia’s northernmost region and its current government (BBC, 2021). The merging of the 4-party coalition government into a single party, the Prosperity Party, was interpreted by the TPLF (which had been influential in the previous government due to its role in the 1991 toppling of the socialist state and the creation of a coalition government) as an attempt to centralize power and dissolve Ethiopia's federal system (CIA World Factbook, 2021). The conflict came to a head as the TPLF held local elections in defiance of orders by the central government, leading to accusations of illegitimacy by both sides (BBC, 2021).
Meanwhile, the current levels of famine and food stress have been rising in Tigray due to deliberate government actions; reports include Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers, as well as civilians from the neighboring region of Amhara, engaging in the destruction of livestock, farming equipment, and crops in Tigray, a region where 80% of citizens rely on subsistence farming (Gebregiorgis, 2021). Furthermore, due to a government-imposed blockade, no humanitarian supplies have arrived in Tigray since mid-October 2021, while fuel has not been delivered to the region since early August (UNOCHA, 2021). Thus, the current famine is a ‘man made’ one, deliberately created by the Ethiopian government, casting doubt upon Ahmed’s legitimacy as a Nobel Peace Laureate (Gebregiorgis, 2021).
What to expect
The likelihood of a ceasefire grows more unlikely with each passing day, as Ahmed steps up his bellicose actions and the TPLF continues to make gains toward the capital (AllAfrica, 2021). According to the International Crisis Group, “both sides have decided to resolve the issue militarily”, and, given the potential consequences of a loss, it is unlikely that either side will autonomously relent to a ceasefire (Schwikowski, 2021). For this reason, Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian President and AU's special representative for the Horn of Africa, declared that “The time is now for collective actions in finding a lasting solution to avoid further escalation of the situation, which may have a direct effect on the strategic Horn of Africa region as a whole”, implying that the window of opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the conflict is closing rapidly (Besheer, 2021). The African Union, due to its socio-economic, cultural, political, and geographical ties to Ethiopia, certainly holds the greatest amount of power in being able to mediate the conflict, especially compared to the ‘shuttle diplomacy’ thus far carried out by the United Nations and Western states (Schwikowski, 2021). Nevertheless, the ironic disadvantage of the African Union is that it is headquartered in Addis Ababa itself; thus, the AU is a guest of the Ethiopian government and will only be able to mediate the conflict insofar as its host is satisfied with the peace negotiations (Hamza, 2021).
In any case, there is no outcome in which Prime Minister Ahmed retains the legitimacy, albeit fragile, that he possessed before the outbreak of the conflict. One possible scenario is that of a successful negotiation guided by the African Union; in this case, a successful negotiation will consider and adjudicate the violations of humanitarian and human rights law committed by the Ethiopian government--such as blockading and occasionally detaining humanitarian workers--for which Ahmed, and several of his members of government, are directly and/or indirectly responsible (not to imply that the TPLF and its leaders are innocent of such violations and thus suitable for leadership, either).
An alternative scenario is that of no successful negotiation by the African Union, whether due to logistical issues related to the presence of the AU headquarters being in Addis Ababa or due to a sheer inability to quell political tensions. In such a case, the TPLF would maintain the momentum and tactics necessary to enter the capital before a humanitarian intervention may be organized. In the case of a TPLF victory, Ahmed, if he survives his time at the frontline of the conflict, will be forced to step down, as the TPLF do not recognize him as the legitimate PM of the country (Schwikowski, 2021). Alternatively, Ahmed would emerge victorious from the conflict in the short term, taking back his powers as Prime Minister, but tensions over his legitimacy will still remain throughout Tigray and the regions of its allies. In any given situation, Ahmed will not emerge with his reputation--or perhaps even his livelihood--intact.
Furthermore, the food security situation will probably degenerate for as long as the African Union is unable to broker a peace negotiation, and the ‘emergency’ situation is likely to evolve into total famine as the Ethiopian military and its allies continue to blockade aid and destroy agricultural products and equipment in the rural regions of the country (IPC, 2021). This blockade, however, will also bring households in the capital under alimentary stress, as Addis Ababa is heavily reliant upon these rural areas for food imports (Wolle, Hirvonen, de Brauw, Baye, and Abate, 2020). Thus, the well-being of the entirety of Ethiopia and the stability of the Horn of Africa are dependent upon successful intervention, negotiation, and political reorganization by the African Union.
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4 | Uncertaint | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
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Bibliography
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