Authors
Simona Chiesa - Senior Researcher Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Cultura & Società
Giulia Casot - Junior Researcher Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Cultura & Società
Marco Rizzi - Senior Researcher Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Cultura & Società
Abstract
The Italian summer of 2024 will be remembered not only for its unbearable high temperatures, but also for the record number of suicides committed by detainees. The main reason behind this tragic choice lies in prison overcrowding, which affects penitentiaries on a global scale. Indeed, it results in disrespect of basic human rights enshrined in international foster treaties and national constitutions and, consequently, in either mass violence or single cries of protest. Finally, it fosters recidivism among released people. To tackle this critical situation while guaranteeing national public safety, governments should increase investments in reeducation and job training programmes, hiring the necessary personnel and renovating existing facilities, while working alongside NGOs and citizens. In this way, current and former prisoners would have an effective chance to distance themselves from crime and to rejoin civil society to contribute to its positive development.
I. Introduction
Nation States have held the monopoly on the use of force since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), derived from privates partially surrendering their personal freedom in exchange for security. They turned it into a monopoly on the use of penalty, through which they pursue a dual aim, namely, refraining citizens from exercising private violence and defending their public power from the risk of it being seized by those same privates (Beccaria, 1764).
The notion of penalty or punishment, here employed as synonyms, underwent several evolutions. Some basic principles remain unchanged even as of today, though. First stated in Cesare Beccaria’s work Dei delitti e delle pene, three centuries old and yet a milestone of criminal law, they are now enshrined in national constitutions and international treaties.
For a penalty to be just, it must protect the particular interests founding a civil society. Its content, size and enforcement are decided only by States through legal acts of general scope, providing for punishment proportioned to the seriousness of the crime committed and clearly defining an action as unlawful. Only after their entry into force, laws can be recalled to justify a penalty, always enforceable only to those already finally sentenced; before, they are presumptively innocent (Beccaria, 1764).
Above all, punishment must not be imposed to pursue retributive goals, but to prevent crimes. Indeed, it should not harass the offender merely for its own sake, but aim at preventing criminals from disregarding public laws again. This special-preventive goal of punishment differs from the general-preventive one, that considers penalties to be a useful preventive instrument for society as a whole, simply because it provides concrete examples of the consequences of acting unlawfully (Baiguera Altieri, 2019). In any case, criminal law must be clear, defended by public powers and respected by citizens, while promoting education of the guilty and rewarding his correctness during sentencing execution (Beccaria, 1764).
These tenets eventually work as a bulwark against the illegitimate use of force by public authorities. Not even States presently regarded as the most democratic and liberal carry them out properly, though, as it is evident when examining how the execution of imprisonment effectively takes place. This restrictive measure, perhaps the harshest to deprive a person of her personal freedom, started to be perceived as the only one compatible with the general approach towards the public use of violence in the wake of the Enlightenment (Stone, 1981). Then, both the punitive and the utilitarian idea of punishment left place to a more correctional one and custody occurred in alternative structures such as schools and cloisters, better suited to reeducate wrongdoers while publicly surveilling them (Baiguera Altieri, 2019).
Nowadays, the bulk of these facilities are still used and yet in very bad shape. Buildings are ill-equipped, lacking even basic equipment such as hot water and ventilation. They need renovation just like prison personnel need more human and material resources. Instead, penitentiaries remain generally understaffed and perhaps even managed by ill-trained responsibles, often incapable of handling either usual or critical situations and increasingly insensitive to the duty of respect of fundamental human rights.
Reality proves the soundness of an outwardly generalized picture. Chronicles from different countries provide numerous concrete instances, the latest in terms of time dating to spring and summer of 2024 and concerning Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This year, Global Prison Trends reported the highest number of detainees than ever before, totalling more than 11 billion people, alongside a persisting growth of overcrowding rate and a decrease in healthcare assistance and facilities quality worldwide.
Even the Italian news was swamped by daily stories about riots in several prisons from north to south, often kicked-off by arson and always aroused from detainees’ long-lasting poor living conditions in cells resembling unlivable holes, that the NGO Antigone (2024) foresees to host 15.000 people more than those they are officially designed for. Prisoners usually spend about 23 hours per day therein and had small chances to flee the painstakingly high temperatures of summer 2024, already declared the hottest on Earth since 1880. Prison guards usually stifled turmoil in violence, in stark disregard with domestic and international legal obligations. Overcrowding is recognised as the primary source of this and other critical events within prison walls, ranging from aggression and collective protests to suicide.
Given these data, the Italian government should acknowledge that toughening the hold on crime exacerbates rather than solving the problem. Instead, the measures proposed or adopted since 2022 punish with imprisonment even smaller crimes. Prison overcrowding thus spiked and is poised to further increase, considering the latest governmental law proposal envisages detention for a new range of criminal acts. In addition, the higher the prison population, the more expensive maintaining penitentiaries in order at public expenses, namely, of citizens, often not necessarily collected in sufficient sums nor allocated properly. Those earmarked to prison personnel remain meager, thus favoring their growing frustration and cruelty, unjustifiable and yet tantamount to a last-resort defense against prisoners’ violence (Associazione Antigone, 2024). In such an environment, punishment cannot really pursue the reeducation of the culprit in the society, as set in article 27 of the Italian Constitution.
This paper intends to analyze the causes at the roots of this critical context in Italy and in other national penitentiaries. First, it will highlight the criticalities of the Italian context, focusing on reasons and consequences of overcrowding. Then, the work will shed light on its improper execution worldwide, after a brief description of the international legal framework within which countries should enforce detention. It will examine two case studies in this regard, namely, El Salvador and Ecuador. Finally, the analysis will suggest some concrete measures for governments to stop misusing prisons and punishment in general and instead promoting reeducation and reintegration to hinder further riots and detainees’ suicides.
II. Prison conditions in Italy
This summer, the climate inside Italian prisons has been intense. And not just because of the unbearable heat that has gripped the institutions from north to south of the peninsula in recent weeks, but also due to the protests that occurred therein almost daily. In this terrible Italian summer, the desperation and anger of the incarcerated individuals manifest in various ways. Some, unable to bear the weight of imprisonment any longer, have chosen to end their lives; others have opted to express their dissent, eventually erupted into protests and outright riots.
From north to south of the country, the Italian NGO Antigone, which independently monitors detention facilities, has received increasingly frequent reports of overcrowded prisons in inhumane conditions in recent months (Associazione Antigone, 2024).
Overcrowding: causes, consequences, and structural gaps
The level of overcrowding reaches 130.4% (excluding the officially counted places by the Ministry of Justice, actually unavailable). In 56 penitentiary facilities, representing more than a quarter of the total, the occupancy rate exceeds 150%, with peaks of over 200% in the male prisons of Milan San Vittore and Brescia “Canton Mombello”. This means that 200 inmates occupy spaces designed for 100. An overcrowded prison is a place where even staff face greater difficulties in their work and where many incarcerated individuals with vulnerabilities do not receive the attention and care they deserve. In such contexts, detainees become increasingly anonymous, reduced to numbers rather than being considered as individuals (Associazione Antigone, 2024).
Emergency among minors
For the first time in years, the overcrowding emergency has also affected Juvenile Detention Centers (IPM). In the first months of 2024 (up to June 15), there were 586 admissions recorded in the 17 Italian Juvenile Institutions. In 2023, they were 1,142, the highest number in recent years. By mid-June 2024, 555 young people (including 25 girls) were occupying a total of 514 official places. The numbers would have been even higher if it weren't for the practice, facilitated by the Caivano Decree, of transferring those who have reached adulthood, even if they committed the crime as minors, to adult prisons. A choice that produced also the unfortunate interruption of their educational path. Although the pandemic period temporarily reduced the numbers due to extraordinary measures, the numbers are now rapidly rising: as of December 31, 2019, IPMs housed 369 young people.
Many of the minors are unaccompanied foreign nationals who end up in prison due to the lack of alternative reception facilities, which often forces them to live on the streets. Young people arrested mainly in Northern Italy are transferred to IPMs in the South due to overcrowding, far from the few local references they have. Particularly high is the use of psychotropic drugs among this young population, also due to the high number of inmates which makes personalized care more challenging (Associazione Antigone, 2024).
Suicide: the leading cause of death in italian prisons
In addition to the issue of overcrowding, 2024 is also becoming known as the year of the suicide emergency. Of the 810 deaths recorded between 2020 and 2024, 340 were suicides (42% of the total). In 2024 alone, 72 individuals have already committed suicide within a penitentiary institution (as of September 17), including 10 in July and 12 in June. At this rate, there is a risk of surpassing the negative record of 2022, when there were 85 suicides in prison by the end of the year (Garante Diritti dei Detenuti, 2024).
We are talking about extremely high numbers. Compared to the usually relatively low suicide rate among the general population, the number of suicides in Italian prisons is almost twenty times higher. This represents a failure for those responsible for safeguarding individuals in custody. Instead of addressing the structural issues, the government responds by criminalizing every form of protest, including peaceful demonstrations, and disobedience (Associazione Antigone, 2024).
Increasing recidivism rate
An overcrowded prison does not contribute to collective safety. It is therefore not surprising that the recidivism rate in Italy is extremely high. As of December 31, 2021, only 38% of detainees were experiencing their first incarceration, while 62% had previous detention experiences, with 18% having at least five prior incarcerations (Associazione Antigone, 2024).
In response to events often referred to as “emergencies,” the current government has adopted securitarian and repressive measures through legislative decrees or proposals aimed at addressing perceived social insecurity with the introduction of new crimes and increased use of pre-trial detention. These measures, some purely symbolic and others with strong repressive impact, primarily affect the most vulnerable segments of the population (minors, drug addicts, ethnic minorities) and further exacerbate both overcrowding in prisons and the already precarious living conditions (Associazione Antigone, 2024).
Overcrowding is therefore not a natural phenomenon but the result of governmental policies. In the first two years of the Meloni government, these policies have contributed to an increase in the number of incarcerated individuals, the penal system is exploited to gain short-term political consensus, and the situation could worsen further if the security bill currently under scrutiny at the Senate after the approval of the Chamber of Deputies, which includes numerous new criminal regulations, is adopted.
Urgent measures are needed to significantly reduce overcrowding and improve the quality of life in prisons. Measures that cannot be minimalistic as provided in the prison decree but must be more courageous: increasing special early release days; decriminalizing certain offenses (and withdrawing the security bill); liberalizing phone calls; hiring both police and civilian staff including educators, psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and cultural mediators. Not even building new prison complexes can solve the issue, since it has left anything but delays and judicial inquiries for corruption over the years (Associazione Antigone, 2024).
Complaints from the International Community
The prison system has long been facing a structural crisis, repeatedly highlighted by the European Court of Human Rights, with heavy condemnations against our country. Over the years, attempted reforms reached partial results and more or less urgent interventions aimed at temporarily addressing the critical overcrowding conditions of the facilities (Gianfilippi, 2024).
An additional indicator of worsening quality of life and dignity in overcrowded institutions is the number of appeals made by detainees and accepted by surveillance courts. In 2023, just over 8,000 appeals for violations of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits inhumane and degrading treatment, were evaluated, and 57.5% of them were upheld.
The European Court of Human Rights already condemned Italy for violating Article 3 of the ECHR in the "Torreggiani" ruling of 2013 (CEDU, 2013). On that occasion, Italy eventually introduced a compensatory remedy for those who had suffered treatment in prison in violation of that legal provision. Detainees who have spent at least fifteen days in inhumane conditions now have the right to receive a reduction of their remaining sentence, equivalent to one day for every ten days of violation (De Stefani, 2013).
Most of these appeals concerned the lack of a minimum living space of three square meters per person, a dehumanizing condition that forces inmates to remain confined in overcrowded cells, often lacking adequate ventilation, for over 20 hours a day. There is a shortage of psychiatrists, psychologists, cultural mediators, and social workers, who are essential for addressing psychological issues, addictions, and social and health difficulties of detainees (Associazione Antigone, 2024).
The Court acknowledges that Italian legislation provides detainees with accessible means to contest deficiencies in treatment. However, it denies that such appeals are effective in practice. Indeed, their execution is subject to the decision of prison authorities and, essentially, depends on the physical availability of free cells. Overcrowding in almost all Italian prisons renders ineffective the judgments that uphold detainees' complaints. The Torreggiani case represents a firm stance by the ECHR against Italy regarding the problem of overcrowding in prisons and, more generally, the penitentiary condition (De Stefani, 2013).
III. Beyond the Italian border: the prison systems in the European Union and in Latin America
The international legal framework
The international criminal legal system as a whole results from provisions included in several documents, signed mostly by Western nations especially after the Second World War. Indeed, the cruelty and atrocities then unjustly suffered by civilians raised public awareness about the need to fix stronger bulwarks than past ones to protect human dignity. A basic right from which other fundamental ones derive, such as those to personal freedom, to fair and due process and to freedom of expression, just to mention but a few. Here, only those relevant according to the topic covered are considered.
The right to “life, liberty and [...] security” of all people is protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which also forbids slavery and servitude; torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary subjection to arrest, detention or exile; and penalty without due process or before final conviction, let alone with measures not existing or heavier than those in force at the time of the crime. These guarantees reappear in other international treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and related Protocols, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the funding treaties of the European Union (EU) and the Charter of the European Rights. More specifically, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuam or Degrading Treatment or Punishment expressly prohibits to submit anyone to “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted [...] for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”.
Several international judicial bodies contributed to build the legal apparatus so far described too, ruling on the correct interpretation and actualisation of laws submitted to their authority. Particularly relevant is the Torreggiani v. Italy case, in which the European Court of Human Rights (ECoHR) ruled that living in detention does not deprive imprisoned people of their right to human dignity. Conversely, the State may find itself obligated to ensure a higher degree of protection to these vulnerable subjects. The Court also recalled two Recommendations of the Council of Europe related to the topic: that on prisons overcrowding and inflation invites State parties to prefer alternative measures of execution of deprivation of personal freedom to detention and to decriminalize specific actions; while the so called European Prison Rules sets minimum decent living standards, such as proper aeration and illumination; a personal night cell per prisoner; and limits to cohabitation.
Data on the international prison system malfunctioning
Unfortunately, Italy showed a low rate of responsiveness to the calls of the ECoHR and of other international judicial bodies, as analyzed above. Even if sentenced for violating the prohibition of torture, as of today Italian detention facilities remain structurally inadequate to ensure basic human needs and to avoid unnecessary sufferings. Not even on a global scale prisoners are effectively guaranteed the rights entitled to them in international legal conventions. The Council of Europe reported that in 2023, 48 out of 51 Member States overcrowding remains persistent and according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) this situation affects more than 60% of countries. The inobservance of international laws and sentences is due to the lack of effective means for the international judiciary to enforce its decisions, which thus remain unheard, because States fear retribution from their peers and do not give up their exclusive enforcing power.
Furthermore, national legal scholars often claim the supremacy of domestic law over the international one to avoid undue interference from the international judiciary, thus risking undermining the path towards a sounder and more systematic global legal system even with regards to justification for lawful punishment. Within the European Union, national theorists are generally divided between absolutist justifiers of the penalty and relativist ones, the latter believing in reeducation through penalty and perhaps even embracing the notion of “positive” general prevention, that is, the prison system can help reinforce social cohesion, because it consolidates citizens’ loyalty and trust towards the government. Many Italian legal experts marry the utilitarian perspective, justifying imprisonment depending on the positive outcomes it produces on and for the civil society. Scandinavian ones rather opt for abolitionist or reductionist positions, either doubting detention legitimacy or justifying its retributive nature only if carried out in alternative structures. On the other side of the Atlantic, retributive justice patronizes: any moral or personal contextualisation of wrongful acts is usually avoided, because penalty does not perform any educative function. (Baiguera Altieri, 2019). This conception resounds particularly in El Salvador and Ecuador, where punishment and detention in particular are indeed employed to guarantee public safety, yet without respect for the fundamental rights accorded to detainees as human beings by international law.
a. Case study: the prison system in El Salvador
El Salvador’s prison system has become an extreme and contentious example of the intersection between authoritarian governance, mass incarceration, and widespread human rights abuses. Under the administration of President Nayib Bukele, the country has shifted toward punitive criminal justice policies, particularly in its war against gang violence. These policies have drawn sharp international criticism, as they have led to severe overcrowding, inhumane conditions, and the erosion of due process. The situation in Salvadoran prisons reflects a broader trend of using incarceration as a tool of political control, while neglecting the fundamental rights of detainees and the need for genuine rehabilitation.
The rise of gangs and state responses
El Salvador’s prison crisis cannot be understood without first recognizing the historical and social context in which it exists. The country has been plagued by gang violence for decades, with two major gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18, controlling significant portions of the country. These gangs, which originated in Los Angeles and spread to Central America during the U.S. deportation waves in the 1990s, have been responsible for widespread violence, extortion, and murder (Wolf, 2017).
The Salvadoran government has long struggled to contain this violence. Beginning with Mano Dura (Iron Fist) policies in the early 2000s, successive governments have focused on tough-on-crime measures, which have emphasized mass arrests and long prison sentences. These policies have been criticized for being reactionary and ineffective, exacerbating the cycle of violence rather than mitigating it (Cruz, 2016).
Under Bukele, this punitive approach has intensified. Following his election in 2019, Bukele launched his Plan Control Territorial, a comprehensive security strategy aimed at reclaiming control of gang-dominated areas. However, this plan, which initially focused on improving security infrastructure and increasing police presence, soon shifted toward more authoritarian measures. In March 2022, after a particularly violent weekend in which 87 people were killed, Bukele declared a state of emergency - a decision that would have profound consequences for the country’s prison system (Human Rights Watch, 2023).
Mass incarceration and overcrowding
The state of emergency allowed Bukele to suspend key constitutional rights, including the right to legal representation and the prohibition of arbitrary detention. Over the next several months, more than 60,000 people were arrested, most of them accused of gang membership without formal charges or trials (Amnesty International, 2023). This rapid influx of detainees overwhelmed an already strained prison system, leading to severe overcrowding. By mid-2023, Salvadoran prisons were operating at more than 200% capacity (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2023).
The overcrowding crisis in El Salvador’s prisons is not a new phenomenon, but Bukele’s policies have exacerbated the situation to unprecedented levels. As of 2024, the country’s prison population exceeds 100,000, despite the official capacity being less than half that number (Penal Reform International, 2023). The country’s largest prison, La Esperanza, commonly known as Mariona, holds more than 12,000 inmates in facilities built for 4,000. Similar conditions prevail in prisons across the country, where inmates are often forced to sleep on floors, share a single toilet with dozens of others, and receive inadequate food and medical care.
The Mega-prison known as the Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT), inaugurated in 2023, is Bukele’s latest attempt to address overcrowding by constructing massive detention facilities. With a capacity of 40,000 inmates, CECOT is designed to house gang members in near-complete isolation. While the government has promoted the facility as a solution to gang violence, human rights groups argue that it represents a further deterioration of basic human rights. The prison operates with minimal oversight, and reports suggest that detainees are denied contact with their families, access to legal representation, and even basic health services (Human Rights Watch, 2024).
Human rights violations: torture, arbitrary detention, and denial of due process
The conditions inside Salvadoran prisons have drawn widespread condemnation from international human rights organizations. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have all documented instances of torture, inhumane treatment, and denial of due process. Detainees are routinely held in pre-trial detention for extended periods, often without formal charges. Under Bukele’s emergency measures, the right to a fair trial has effectively been suspended, with thousands of prisoners languishing in detention without the possibility of appeal (Amnesty International, 2023).
One of the most egregious aspects of the Salvadoran prison system is the rampant use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. According to reports from Human Rights Watch, prisoners are subject to beatings, electric shocks, and prolonged solitary confinement. In many cases, they are held in “punishment cells” where they are confined for 23 hours a day with little to no access to sunlight or fresh air (Human Rights Watch, 2023). These conditions clearly violate Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both of which prohibit torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (United Nations, 1966).
Moreover, the state’s mass incarceration campaign has disproportionately affected marginalized communities. Young men from poor, urban neighborhoods are often targeted in sweeps, with little distinction made between actual gang members and innocent civilians. This form of collective punishment has led to numerous cases of wrongful imprisonment, as police and military personnel operate with virtually no oversight (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2023). The lack of legal representation for detainees further compounds the problem, as many are unable to contest their detention in court.
The impact of incarceration on gang dynamics
While Bukele’s policies have succeeded in reducing the homicide rate - El Salvador reported its lowest murder rate in decades in 2023 - experts warn that mass incarceration may actually exacerbate gang violence in the long term. Salvadoran prisons have long been recognized as incubators for gang recruitment and organization. Inmates from rival gangs are often housed together in overcrowded facilities, where violence is rampant, and gang leaders retain significant control over prison life (Cruz, 2016).
In addition, the lack of rehabilitative programs in Salvadoran prisons makes it unlikely that detainees will be reintegrated into society upon release. The Salvadoran government has devoted little attention or resources to educational or vocational training, which are essential components of successful rehabilitation. As a result, many former inmates return to gang life after their release, contributing to the cycle of violence that Bukele’s government seeks to eradicate (Penal Reform International, 2023).
The failure to address the root causes of gang violence - such as poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion - means that incarceration alone is unlikely to provide a sustainable solution. Instead, Bukele’s policies risk perpetuating the very conditions that gave rise to the gang crisis in the first place. Scholars and human rights advocates argue that without a comprehensive approach that includes prevention, rehabilitation, and social reintegration, El Salvador’s prison system will continue to function as a revolving door for gang members (Wolf, 2017).
International responses and the way forward
International organizations and human rights bodies have been vocal in their condemnation of Bukele’s prison policies. The United Nations Human Rights Council has called for an independent investigation into allegations of torture and arbitrary detention in Salvadoran prisons. Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has issued precautionary measures against the Salvadoran government, urging it to restore due process and improve prison conditions (IACHR, 2024).
Despite these calls, Bukele has shown little interest in reforming the country’s prison system. Instead, he has doubled down on his authoritarian approach, using his popular support and control over the legislature to push through laws that further erode civil liberties. In 2024, the Salvadoran government passed legislation that grants the military expanded powers in managing prisons, a move that critics argue will only deepen the crisis (Amnesty International, 2023).
In conclusion, El Salvador’s prison system under Bukele exemplifies the dangers of mass incarceration and authoritarian governance. While the government’s hardline policies have succeeded in reducing violence in the short term, they have come at a high cost to human rights and the rule of law. The overcrowding, torture, and denial of due process in Salvadoran prisons highlight the urgent need for a shift toward a more rehabilitative and rights-based approach to criminal justice.
b. Case study: the prison system in Ecuador
The state of prisons is appalling in Ecuador too. Here, the presence of powerful criminal organizations has put national public safety at risk for decades. The situation derailed at the beginning of 2024, when two prominent detainees successfully escaped from their cells in January: José Adolfo Macías, alias Fito, leader of the powerful drug criminal organization Los Choneros; and Colón Pico, renown gangster convicted for presumptive attempted kidnapping, with whom 38 other detainees flee the Riobamba prison. Then, the country's President Daniel Noboa declared a national state of emergency to ease their re-catch, even useful to intensify the government fight against narcotraffickers and organized crime, on the one hand, and corrupt public officers potentially helping them, on the other hand.
After Fito’s getaway, violent insurrections spread to numerous national prisons, and the presidential decree did not help stifle them. Many videos showed hooded detainees in control of the facilities, threatening the life of prison guards, and declaring to be “ready to turn prisons into battlefields”, because “they consider themselves to be already dead”. The state of war expanded to the whole country and criminals even live broadcasted their irruption in the offices of the national TV channel TC Televisión in Guayaquil. In May, Noboa extended the state of emergency in 7 out of 24 counties, where fundamental rights such as freedom of movement and of free assembly are still suspended. Police and military forces can trespass private properties without prior justification and detain whoever founded on the street over curfew. In the bill, the President acknowledged the state of armed conflict within national borders and the Chief of Joint Command of the Army Force of Ecuador, Jaime Vela, stated that the criminal organizations listed therein have become military objectives.
The most recent available data about the Ecuadorian penitentiary, provided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the report “Personas Privadas de Libertad en Ecuador”, are reliable but incomplete due to difficult data collection. They refer to 2021, when prison population amounted to approximately 40.000 people and one quarter was squashed in Penitanciaría del Litoral, the prison complex from where Fito escaped - but numbers could be higher, considering there is no comprehensive photographic or numeric database allowing to assess not even prisoners’ identity. Only there, prison overcrowding was 62%, considerably higher than the national rate (55%). The most violent uprising in the history of the country occurred in this facility too, with 186 detainees killed and 80 more injured in just two months. The ratio of one prison guard, often corrupt and colluding with prisoners, to 27 detainees, favored this context of chaos and fear could easily flourish, eventually resulting in 327 detainees victims of internal fights.
This situation is the outburst of an already well known critical context related to the overall control on prisons exercised by criminal gangs, as even the government acknowledged. Drugs and arms are thus easily smuggled in and detainees are usually more dangerous at the end of penalty execution than when they entered, turning into proxies of the criminal gangs.
Several proposals were advanced to tackle this dire situation. One of the most effective would be to separate ordinary criminals from those jailed for organized crime, in the wake of article 41 of the Italian penal code. It may appear an undue connection, considering the state of Italian prisons, and yet it could help reduce former detainees’ dangerousness and hinder using prisons as enrollment spots for new drug traffickers and gangsters. Also, it was suggested by the European Union experts who offered help to the local government of Guillermo Lasso, in charge at the time of the report, and asking for the help of the international community. Indeed, the EU promoted EL PAcCTO programme, from “Europa Latinoamérica Programa de Asistencia contra el Crimen Trasnacional Organizado”, operative since 2017 to reinforce classification and treatment of detainees while imprisoned and provide technical assistance in collecting, analyzing and managing data to create a reliable prisoners register. From a practical viewpoint, the EU sent a team of national experts to Ecuador and appointed a task force to propose an adequate criminal and penitentiary reform. From the institutional perspective, EL PAcCTO favored the creation of two international cooperation networks: the REDCOPEN for criminal information and data exchange; and the RAP, unifying European and Latin American academies, on prison personnel training. The latter is an expression of the EU capacity building, while the former manifests the institutional one. EL PAcCTO promotes consensus building too, acknowledging the importance of involving civil society in the path towards the recovery of national safety as well as of respect of human rights and rule of law principles when it called on civilians to partake in the Conference of Consensus held in May 2022 to foster inter-institutional coordination and active civic participation.
Although commendable, the programme failed its objectives and Lasso’s actions negatively contributed to creating the context now in the hands of Noboa. The former too declared a state of emergency alongside its will to build an intelligence system to monitor the situation within penitentiaries and form a Commission for Pacification in prison. Lasso also pardoned people convicted for specific crimes and suggested abolishing early release for promoters of insurrections to lower overcrowding. Finally, he announced a new plan of public policies to promote detainees’ “true social rehab” and the intention of hiring 1.400 new security agents. None of his words turned into reality and Ecuador currently lives under siege.
IV. Concluding remarks
This work was born from the terrifying number of suicides chronicled on Italian news during last summer. It raised the urgent need of analyzing the causes of such a tragic personal choice and of the general dire situation undergone by the national prison system. The data and case studies provided demonstrate that this condition affects penitentiaries worldwide. Despite few local differences, detention is executed in obsolete facilities lacking basic furniture and in violation of both international and constitutional laws and of prisoners’ human rights. Unsustainably overcrowded penitentiaries favor violence outburst as well as detainees’ increasing dangerousness. Finally, prison personnel are understaffed at least, when not also improperly trained to face both ordinary and emergency situations.
The international prison system malfunctioning grounds on the wrong conception of the penalty, namely, conceiving it as a punitive rather than educative instrument that hinders prisoners’ social re-inclusion. Changing this approach should be the kick-off to reform the whole system starting from law building, that is, updating the legal framework within which penalty execution occurs. Then, institutional and capacity building should be implemented through education programmes and job training within and outside prison walls, to build an environment where detainees would develop new skills or sharpen those already possessed.
Guaranteeing imprisoned people the effective right to work would allow them to provide for their own survival without recurring to crime, reducing their dangerousness and consequently recidivism rate. Data collected and published by the Italian National Council of Economy and Labour (CNEL) show that this rate lowers from 68,7% to 2% when people can work in and out of prisons. Less than 5% of detainees are employed in external facilities, yet a positive trend is taking place and the number of university enrollment and national enterprises recruiting former prisoners is increasing, for instance in companies such as Tiscali, Cisco and Sky Italia. Recruiting agencies preparing ad hoc education programmes and smoother conditions to microcredit access are helpful in this regard too. Involving civil society and private stakeholders in the reform of penitentiaries is fundamental too and promotes value dissemination (Tartaglia Polcini, 2022). Considering their requests helps build a more cohesive and collaborative environment where former detainees can feel part of a bigger project, that is, maintaining a peaceful social environment by lawfully employing their skills.
The fight against recidivism must start from adopting legal measures to reduce overcrowding rate. During the Italian Conference “Zero Recidivism. Study, education and working in prison” held on April 16th, 2024, the CNEL President stated that “it is possible to zeroing recidivism through job inside and outside penitentiaries, with fair retribution and education”; and the Italian Ministry of Justice asserted the government is committed to support civic organizations and volunteers “to realize a programmed, homogenous, rational synergy”. The aim is creating a permanent Secretariat for social and working inclusion entrusted to coordinate the already existing public and private initiatives; and a digital platform to collect all data referring to people executing the penalty in prison, to who does it in alternative structures and to those waiting for the execution after the final sentence.
These may be viewed as updates to the proposals laid out in law n. 354 of 1975 or “Margara reform”, tailored to reform the national prison system and ensure detention execution in respect of humanity and dignity of people. Implementing an effective personal path towards social re-inclusion of any detainee should be the next step and authorities have the duty to carry it out with absolute impartiality in apt structures, without discrimination or restriction of fundamental rights not justified by judicial purposes.
Nonetheless, the goal will not be fulfilled until the national praxis assimilates “pottery painting courses” and “bolt dolls assembling internship” to working skills, just like doing cleanings and canteen serving inside prisons for a few hours. They are all meaningless activities, useless to help prisoners develop social or job-related skills and conversely forcing them to be stuck in the only living condition they know, that is, committing crime to survive. Instead, detention execution becomes “the syndrome of final exclusion” and prisons turn into “places of rage, namely, the anteroom of recidivism” (Baiguera Altieri, 2019).
Scandinavian abolitionism appears better suited to foster prisoners’ social reintegration: it distinguishes between the crime and its social construction and acknowledges that criminals need a reason to sincerely and spontaneously collaborate with authorities and behave lawfully once back in society. There is no one-size-fits-all solution for this purpose nor to reeducate all detainees, therefore education and job programmes should be adjusted accordingly to their personal inclinations and to the social context of re-inclusion (Baiguera Altieri, 2019).
Realizing this objective demands for more human and material resources than those presently at disposal of national governments, that anyway do not seem prone to follow this route. Despite the Italian government's declarations included in the latest “safety” bill proposal, prison personnel remain insufficiently funded or improperly educated, without instruments to guarantee both their personal and detainees’ safety. Implementing law capacity in this way is tantamount to lack of foresight at least, and prison overcrowding rate cannot but increase, leading to more frequent and harsher uprising, as it happens in El Salvador and in Ecuador. The Italian government seems unreceptive to lessons from its peers, since it is enlarging the range of crimes susceptible to imprisonment instead of reducing them and wants to build new penitentiaries. But filling jails up is not the best answer to crime perception (Rizzo, 2024).
Rather, national authorities should execute the penalty in alternative, more hospitable and better equipped structures. Implementing law building capacity in this way could promote the creation of a global penitentiary system where positive behaviors are adopted spontaneously and eventually systematically, in which future prisoners would follow former examples. This virtuous cycle would ultimately result in a lower recidivism rate. To reach this aim, it is of the utmost importance to effectively change mindset on the function of penalty and turn into practice the blueprint pictured by the Italian Ministry of Justice and CNEL President: not only it is possible, but also it would demonstrate that positive changes can really occur.
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