South China Sea: The Cases of China and Japan Amidst Disputes, Energy Dependence and Future Trends

  Focus - Allegati
  17 February 2022
  21 minutes, 5 seconds

Written by Marco Zecchillo, Senior Researcher G.E.O., Economics Area

Abstract

This analysis aims to highlight the main factors that make the South China Sea area relevant for global trade scenarios, in addition to the major military implications and geopolitical movements at stake in the area. Recent history shows how multiple actors play a key role in this intricate stretch of sea. There are, in fact, disparate reasons that push powers such as China and the United States to preserve some almost existential economic interests, especially in the case of Beijing.

Two main reasons that make this sea almost indispensable for the maintenance of global commercial and economic balances will be discussed within the publication.

First of all, international trade will be analyzed, as it is estimated that 5.3 trillion dollars of goods transit through the South China Sea (SCS) on an annual level. In addition, many nations, even geographically distant ones, see a significant portion of their exports pass through the region.

Second, a degree of attention must be paid to the resources in the region; although it is not a quantity of crude oil and natural gas capable of sustaining economies like Japan's or China's for decades, accessibility to these resources would allow Beijing to more easily meet growing energy demand, reduce the risk of supply shocks, and buy time for an inevitable reduction in the GDP growth rate. As a competing actor to China, the dependence that Japan accords to Beijing's claimed sea will be analyzed.

In conclusion, possible future trends will be outlined: different long-term trends in imports and energy consumption of the two countries seem to presage different degrees of dependence on the shipping lanes of the SCS in the immediate future.

1. The Context of the Region: History and Territorial Disputes

The South China Sea has represented and is still identified as a key area for regional balances within the macro-area defined as the "Indo-Pacific". The presence of various state actors and the dependence of their economies on the resources and trade routes established there make the area particularly volatile, even from a military point of view. In this context, six major regional players are interacting with each other in a scenario of apparent competition to assert their presence and competitive advantage in the management of trade flows and resources in the area. These states are the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (known as Taiwan, a state not recognized by most of the members of the United Nations, except for a dozen or so nations, including the Holy See), the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia (Feng, He, 2018)

Given the extreme importance of the choke point of Malacca (Malacca Strait), the South China Sea assumes, a characteristic of mare clausum (defined, in International Law, as a body of water under the potential or effective jurisdiction of one or more states) as far as trade and naval operations towards the Indian Ocean and the Western World are concerned. On the contrary, the relative openness of the area towards the Pacific places the region in close relation with the economic-security interests of the United States of America. Since the first decades of the foundation of the USA, which took place in 1776, there has been a natural proximity of what, in the jargon of international relations, is defined as the largest thalassocracy of the modern world and, probably, of all times in terms of absolute capacity. Relations with the Philippines, which came under U.S. auspices once Spain was defeated in the closing years of the nineteenth century, exemplify the U.S. effort to ensure free trade and freedom of navigation (Yahuda, 2018).


The map shows the intertwined EEZs of some of the countries in the region. An EEZ is an Exclusive Economic Zone, an area delimiting the space within which a state can perform fishing or drilling activities. Source: The Economist.

Against the backdrop of the military and political rise of the People's Republic of China, there has been an intensification of patrolling activities and the construction of artificial islands equipped with airstrips. China, in fact, claims the area that it defines as the Nine-Dashed Line, or "Line with Nine Tracts", the definition of which, although still ambiguous, dates back to the times of Zhou Enlai, right-hand man of leader Mao Zedong. In recent times, amidst the conjunction of increased Chinese assertiveness and the salience that energy resources and the reduced risk of supplying them have acquired for global trade and the Chinese economy, there is a situation ripe for escalation. Beijing claims the right to the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones, projecting 200 nautical miles from the present islands. However, according to UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in 1982), it appears that reefs or submerged islets do not possess the power to project an EEZ given the impossibility of independent sustenance of human activities. Artificial islands, according to Movaghar, allow for the creation of a 500-meter safety zone but not the identification of an EEZ (Movaghar, 2020).

Nevertheless, throughout the Cold War, especially in the concluding section of the bipolar conflict, the confrontation regarding territorial disputes was mitigated by a preference towards a pragmatic and peaceful economic relationship. This is exemplified by the stance of Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, who tended to reject confrontational dialectics and leaned toward greater pragmatism, given China's dire economic situation after the Cultural Revolution and the volatility of power in the immediate post-Mao period. On the other hand, with Xi Jinping's presidency, there has been a renewed "assertiveness". The People's Republic defines as non-negotiable any international agreements that would harm the so-called "Core Interests". Among these, there is certainly economic growth, the interruption of which would produce a chain reaction on party leadership, in a potential crisis of legitimacy (since the post-Mao period, it is rooted in economic success and double-digit GDP growth). Therefore, Chinese proactivity in the area could derive from, or at least be interpreted through this lens: the reduction in risk derived from imports from the Middle East and Africa and the immediate availability of seafood and energy resources such as oil or hydrocarbons represent an important opportunity to secure one of China's Core Interests (Zhang, 2015).

2. The Importance of the Region in Global Trade

It is estimated that 80% of global trade flows depend, in some way, on the use of the sea as a transport route (ASPI, 2020). The South China Sea represents a strategic area for the sustainability of international maritime flows. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) refines the previous analysis, confirming the above estimate, adding that in terms of economic-financial value, 70% of the total economic value of global trade uses a maritime transport route (UNCTAD, 2016). Meanwhile, the value of trade conveyed by shipping in the South China Sea assumed a value of $3.37 trillion in 2016 (CSIS, 2016). In 2021, the monetary magnitude of these flows was estimated to be around a substantial $5.3 trillion, an upward trend from the previously announced value. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, 40% of the trade in natural gas in liquid form transited the South China Sea through the course of the year in 2017.

A key factor in the analysis of this data is the relevance that the South China Sea possesses states even vastly distant from the region. China is, if not the largest, among the largest export destinations of goods for dozens of countries thousands of miles away. The South China Sea, especially for African countries and Europe, represents an obligatory route in this scenario. As the People's Republic of China is the main trading partner of many African countries, the Malacca Route and passage through disputed maritime areas are certainly crucial points that closely link geography to the economic growth of a country. The dense interactions, including institutionalised ones, between Beijing, Africa and the Middle East and the importance in terms of energy that China accords to these areas make the South China Sea fundamental for the sustainability of flows between the western and eastern hemispheres of the planet (Zhang, 2011).

Other regional actors, like Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, entertain substantial interactions with the SCS. Their membership at the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) makes them inherently more inclined to cooperate in the economic realm (see the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Agreement with New Zealand and Australia in 2010) and, in this respect, theoretically opposed to China’s claims. Vietnam, from this standpoint, is one of the countries in which heated territorial disputes have had a negative spillover in the economic and political realm, forcing the country to enact a hedging strategy between the USA and the PRC (Shekhar, 2012).

China, however, still is the first trading partner of Vietnam and Malaysia. Respectively, Beijing’s weight in overall imports sits at 35 and 23 percent. Despite this data, there has been a revamp of the economic relations with the USA in both states even though the United States are Vietnam’s 4th and Malaysia 3rd trading partner, while China places first in both cases. Thus, it is misplaced to affirm that South-East Asian nations are verging their attention to the US and neglecting the economic presence of China. It is more specific to assess the predominance of a hedging strategy, making these ASEAN members lie on a spectrum of possibilities between 100% adherence to the US and 100% vicinity to China in different trade domains. For example, imports from China in the electronics sector to both countries are undergoing a phase of stagnation, while those coming from the US are experiencing a phase of significant expansion (COMTRADE, 2021).

3. China and Japan: The Two Major Economies and Interactions within the SCS

3.1 Chinese Interactions

Core Interests are defined as those issue areas that China considers vital for the sustainability and territorial integrity of the state; among them is the need to sustain a booming economic growth. Itis there closely dependent on the supply and satisfaction of the demand, constantly rising, of energy sources in China.

Chinese searches in the area, intensified during the 90's after the end of the Cold War , have highlighted the presence of huge energy resources, in terms of hydrocarbon. According to a document published by the EIA, the Energy Information Administration of the United States, the reserves would amount to about 11 billion barrels of crude oil and 190 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Although the latter figures are hardly conceivable, they should be compared to current Chinese consumption of crude oil and natural gas. At a theoretical level, 100% exploitation would allow China to sustain and meet its demand for about one thousand abundant days, taking into account Worldometers' 2016 estimate and assuming a continuation of the upward trend in consumption. In 2016, the People's Republic of China consumed roughly 12.8 million barrels per day (one barrel is roughly equivalent to 119.24 liters of crude oil), ranking it second in the world after the US. More recent analysis reveals a daily consumption in November 2021 of 14.3 million barrels per day, a sharp increase from 2016 (World Data Atlas, 2021).

However, the South China Sea is not the richest area of unexplored resources in the world. In fact, from this point of view, the crude oil resources that cannot yet be used (but which are technically accessible and usable, according to the definition of Undiscovered Resources provided by EIA) are mainly concentrated in the Caribbean, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. In these latter areas, the presence of Undiscovered Oil Resources exceeds one hundred billion barrels, values higher than the resources present in the South China Sea (EIA, 2021).

The most crucial import assets for the People's Republic of China belong to the electronics sector (548.7 billion dollars in 2020) and, secondly, to the fuel and oil sector (267.6 billion dollars, in 2020). Realistically, a substantial portion of these enter Northeast Asian markets via the South China Sea routes, considering data from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). It is estimated that 80 percent of international trade is conducted by sea and 22 of the world's total trade volume uses the South China Sea as its main channel (UNCTAD, 2016).

The full usability of the energy sources present in the territories claimed by the People's Republic would allow a time advantage of a few years and the reoccurrence of the problem of the gap between supply and demand in the medium term. Access to resources could, at this level of analysis, provide a temporary solution to buffer the growing Chinese demand and the internal energy gap. It turns out, therefore, that the relevance of energy supply for the sustenance of the Chinese economy in the long term is less crucial, which puts the South China Sea energy issue at a level of criticality that does not immediately concern the very existence and maintenance in power of the CPC (Zhang, 2011).

It remains crucial, however, that China finds a balance favourable to itself: a worsening of economic relations with its neighbours, due to an increase in military assertiveness, could be counterproductive to the goal of sustained growth that Beijing's leadership aims to pursue. Potential future sanctions and an increased degree of isolation from the ASEAN states and Japan would impose on China the need to develop a strategy balanced between assertiveness and the need to strengthen economic ties with the economies of the region.

In this perspective, therefore, a possibly greater Chinese presence in the SCS area is emerging for both economic and military policy reasons in a fluid and constantly changing international system. The analysis brings to light, taking into account the data collected (which would require an in-depth econometric analysis in order to verify possible causal links), that the exploitation of 100% of the resources of the SCS would bring only a temporary solution to the growing demand for energy in China, aimed at supporting its growing economy (albeit, with rates in sharp decline since the beginning of the decade) (EIA, 2021).

3.2 Japanese Interactions

Japan, employed in this analysis as an actor theoretically competing with the rekindling of Chinese interests, also sees an important degree of dependence on the importation of oil and fuels. The Japanese archipelago has a domestic production of crude oil which is largely inferior to its consumption. According to data provided by the United Nations agency COMTRADE (Commodity Trade Statistics Database), domestic output is subject to relative fluctuations, which in the last five years has never exceeded 5000 barrels per day (COMTRADE, 2021). Consumption, according to estimates from the aforementioned World Data Atlas database, amounted to about 3.5 million barrels on a daily basis (World Data Atlas, 2021). One aspect that seems evident is the reduction in crude oil consumption after the peak of the last ten years, reached in 2012 at a value of about 4.7 million barrels per day.

The value of imports in the Mineral Fuels, Oils and Distillation Products category has been estimated, in 2020, at about $105.5 billion on an annual basis (COMTRADE, 2021). In order to understand the trend as a whole, it is necessary to look at whether the 2020 value is part of an upward or downward trend. In fact, there has been a downward trend over the last ten years in imports of this category of goods. In contrast, the total value of imports shows an upward trend over the period of the last five years, with a particularly pronounced increase starting in the second half of 2020. In this context, we note a reduction in the flow of trade from Japan and a growth in the volume of imports from the United States. With regard to the production sectors and of the most in-demand goods most in Japan, there has been a drop in imports of hydrocarbons and a growth in imports of electronic equipment and electrical energy products (COMTRADE, 2021).

In the prospective analysis of the Rising Sun's increasing or decreasing dependence on South China Sea trade flows, there are conflicting factors that make the overall effect extremely difficult to pinpoint. Although the overall volume of imports is increasing (in 2021, it reached an all-time high), the growth in the total trade value of traded goods has increased in favour of countries whose exports do not necessarily require passage through the South China Sea (e.g., in the case of the United States of America). However, it remains to be taken into account the massive flows that link the exports of countries to the west or south of the South China Sea (positions that make, therefore, a passage through the SCS almost inevitable). Respectively, 16%, 7% and 1.4% of imports arriving in Japanese ports come from Europe, Oceania and Africa. Overall, roughly one in four of the goods entering Japan could depend on the South China Sea, assuming a clear prevalence of sea transport over other modes of product transfer given the UNCTAD data, above.

In addition, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia are some of Tokyo's most crucial trading partners. The value of the volume of imports from these nations has been estimated at about $24 billion, $22 billion, and $15 billion, respectively, on an annual basis in 2020. Significant, moreover, is Japan’s partnership with European Union countries such as Germany (21 billion USD), Italy (10 billion USD) and France (9 billion USD). It is interesting, however, to state how many of these commercial relationships show a downward trend or are in a stationary phase. A partial explanation for the negative trends could be inferred from the Covid-19 pandemic, which has produced values well below average or unexpected observations. Such outliers have resulted in a lowering of the annual moving average of imports from certain countries (COMTRADE, 2021).

Conclusions

Based on the macroeconomic movements with the internal and external political situations of China and Japan, it is clear that China sees continued economic growth as its main ‘Core Interest’, along with continued Communist Party leadership and territorial integrity. However, excessive assertiveness in the region could prove counterproductive, in a general tendency of Southeast Asian states and Japan to isolate China through sanctions, creating the basis for possible escalation, including military operations. The resources present in the analysed sea, certainly instrumental to the satisfaction of Beijing's growing energy demand, would only provide a short-term solution. A balance is, therefore, fundamental for China in the search for diversified energy sources and the maintenance of a general peaceful situation in the South China Sea to avoid retaliation from the main regional partners. However, it appears unlikely that the People's Republic will reduce its assertiveness concerning the disputed territories for several historical reasons previously discussed. Moreover, it has been assessed that demonstrative operations in the SCS take years to complete, creating an incremental effect on the overall number of active operations as new ones are added. A complex picture of conflicting trends emerges in this context, making a forecast for the future difficult.

Furthermore, Japan's fuel production has been in a state of sustained decline over the last ten years and the value of imports has followed a similar trend. These factors could portend a decline in the degree of dependence on the South China Sea flows. This is further exemplified by the predominance of imports from China and the US, the first- and second-largest sources of import goods for Tokyo, respectively. However, Japan has considerable trade links with Thailand, Australia, Vietnam, and Germany, towards which there is a growing trend (but with a growth rate that has been falling to zero over the last 5 years) of imports of electronic products. The declining figure should therefore be interpreted as a direct consequence of the abnormal values (outliers) produced by the Covid-19 pandemic. The hypothesis of a possible "v-shaped" rebound of hydrocarbon imports would therefore be outlined, given the recent growth of imports of electronic devices following the annus terribilis of the pandemic, 2020. However, given the continued downward trend in the period leading up to the outbreak of the epidemic, this view remains unlikely.

Realistically, it is to be expected that a considerable portion of these goods will transit through the shipping lanes in the South China Sea.

In this respect, there are two constraining effects on Japanese interactions with the SCS. On the one hand, a possible reduction in dependence on the sea in question is foreshadowed due to the increase in commercial ties with the USA and China and the reduction of hydrocarbon imports. On the other hand, a growth in imports of other goods, such as electronics, and the rebound of trade ties with Southeast Asian and European partners after 2020, is noted. The effects of these trends, however, are subject to temporal lags. It is therefore critical to maintain a level of focus on trade interactions with the South China Sea as a major communication and transportation route.

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