The aftermath of Kursk

  Focus - Allegati
  31 October 2024
  6 minutes, 42 seconds

Abstract

For the first time since the Second World War Russia is engaged in defending its own territories. The Kursk offensive seeked to reshape the perception of how the conflict is evolving and, ideally, alter its trajectory. However, after more than two months, there is no shortage of critical issues. This analysis aims to explore the implication of the offensive within the broader context of the conflict.

Author

Gabriele Junior Pedrazzoli - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics

A new strategic horizon

Indubitably the Kursk offensive represented a humiliation for the Russian army. Gerasimov's party was not prepared and the very first internal backlash was difficult to absorb. More than 112.000 internal displaced are now expressing their frustration over the inaction of the authorities and Governor Smirnov's cabinet reshuffle (which established a special “Ministry for Borderderline Restoration”) does not appear to be satisfactory.

Furthermore it is to consider the imaginative meaning of the operation. In Kursk, in 1943, the Red Army achieved a decisive victory, halting the German offensive and shifting the momentum of the war. This defeat weakened the German military significantly and led to a series of Soviet counteroffensive. The battle of Kursk is often viewed as the turning point on the Eastern Front and it was often referred to as the symbol of soviet resistance.

Some analysts believe that the Kursk offensive has demonstrated Kiev’s ability to bring about a new phase of the war (Beardsworth, 2024). Targeting Russian society could turn the inhabitants against the Kremlin and undermine the support the central government enjoys. This position is debatable. As the situation appears more and more threatening, it would be logical to expect the population to seek refuge in the institution and stand with them rather than against them.

Despite this, the aftermath of Kursk shows surely something new, even though it’s not the war phase: the strategic horizon.

Zelens’kyj has repeatedly referred to the occupied territories as “exchange funds”. This might seem just reasonable, but implies a change of logic in the approach to the conflict. To “exchange” an interlocution is mandatory. In other words, and for the first time, the Ukrainian President is implicitly admitting that the new horizon is of a negotiating nature. The days of the much-vaunted "victory on the field" are over.

There are two things to consider though: the extent of the portion of Russian territory occupied by Kiev's troops is extremely limited and does not include any settlements of significant size (the largest settlement, Sudza, had about 6000 inhabitants). Furthermore the front is very far from the city of Kursk, which could be an interesting strategic target, but it’s dangerously close to the Ukrainian city of Sumy.

Before the operation there were two battalions to garrison Sumy. Now these battalions are of course still there, but there are four more deployed within the occupied portion of the Oblast, for a total of six immovable battalions.

Consequences in Donbass

What initially was a humiliation for the Russians, risks turning into a strategic success in Donbass.

The movement of troops to Kursk has weakened the Ukrainian resistance possibilities in Donetsk and the Russians are advancing: Novohrodivka was taken in just three days. It was not like in Avdiivka, where the conquest occurred after long and difficult fighting, the city was taken easily because the Ukrainians retreated to organize the defense of Pokrovs’k.

It’s not conceivable to lose Pokrovs’k: behind it there is nothing. It is the last defensive line left to the Ukrainians, so if that city falls the Russians could easily reach Pavlograd (Dnipropetrovsk’s Oblast) which is the last big city until the river Dnepr.

It is no exaggeration to say that the outcome of the upcoming battle of Pokrovs'k could determine the fate of the conflict.

If the Ukrainian intent attacking Kursk was to divert Russian troops from the Donetsk Oblast, that’s not working. In widening the front, the part that is most penalized is the one least endowed in terms of resources. Russia can either move troops from the Charkiv front or it has eleven different time zones to draw from and, moreover, we must not forget the recent deployment of North Korean troops.

Conclusion: was the Kursk offensive a strategic necessity?

Every war, this more than others, clouds the vision of those who fight it on the field but also in the waves of propaganda. The perception of reality suffers, replaced by excessive excitement and flashy communications.

Russian public opinion has metabolized the events in Kursk very quickly, while Western public opinion has not. From a media point of view, the offensive has left its mark.

Although strategically the fact turns out to be a complication of an already very complex scenario, Syrs’kyj had already demonstrated in other occasions his tendency to prioritize the visible dimension of the conflict rather than the substantial one.

A territorial compromise is feasible, the idea (even if only outlined) of the exchange fund insisted by Zelens'kyj helps in this sense. However, it is essential to stem the Russian advance in Donbass.

For Kagan (Washington Post) the Ukrainians had no alternatives. The conflict as it had been imposed could only lead to the wear and tear of Kiev. The idea of ​​transforming it into a war of movements would therefore have been correct, even though from this perspective it did not achieve this objective.

It is difficult to say whether Kursk was a necessity or not, what is certain is that from a narrative point of view, when the conflict is over, both sides will have to invent a victory. For the future Ukraine this will be a worthwhile starting point.

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