Abstract:
Among the countries that re-emphasized their wish to join NATO in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is Bosnia and Herzegovina. This paper will analyse the potential benefits of the country’s entry into the Alliance while also assessing the possible negative consequences given the country’s peculiar political situation. Indeed, in spite of the Dayton Peace Agreements and efforts by the international community, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state where inter-ethnic tensions are still high and memories from the war in the 90s are still alive thus influencing political decisions. In such a scenario, the country’s entry into the Alliance is looked favourably and actively pursued by the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats but is opposed by Bosnian Serbs who see NATO as an anti-Serb instrument, given their interpretation of the Alliance operations in Yugoslavia in the 90s. The paper will also focus on the stance of external actors with regards to Bosnia’s entry into the Alliance such as Russia.
Authored by Jovan Knezevic, Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O., Defense&Security Division
As the Russian Federation continues its aggression towards Ukraine, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina re-emphasized their membership application to the Atlantic Alliance (Filseth, 2022). Along with the events in Kyiv, the unstable powder keg derived by Milorad Dodik and his entourage’s attempts to disrupt the unity designed by the Dayton Agreements (1995), is raising serious concerns over the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moskow’s support to Dodik’s secessionist plans represent an important halt, aiming at undermining the Western support to Bosnia’s NATO and EU path, and eventually leading, as some authors might fear, to the “disintegration of the country” (Čančar, 2022). Bosnia and Herzegovina plays a pivotal role in the Balkans’ chessboard, and its willingness to become a NATO member state might represent a game changer in the international arena. The current analysis aims at better understanding the role of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stability within the international arena. From an overview of the current political situation, and a brief summary of its relationships with NATO, this analysis will later discuss how a further decision to join the Atlantic Alliance might present benefits and challenges.
The current political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
26 years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia has experienced, according to the High Representative of the OHR, the “most serious existential threat of the post-war period” (Giffoni, 2022). The catalyst for the crisis were Milorad Dodik’s, the Serb member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency concrete steps toward secessionism of Republika Srpska, the mostly Serb-populated autonomous entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other one being the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by a Muslim and Croat majority. In December 2021, the regional parliament of Republika Srpska voted in favour of initiatives aimed at pulling out Bosnian Serbs from central-level institutions such as “tax authority, the judiciary and the armed forces” (Hajdari, 2022). These moves were coupled with Dodik and his party’s highly nationalistic rhetoric and divisive discourses centered around ethnic elements. What makes the situation even more alarming is that Dodik’s nationalistic moves and secessionist attempts receive public support among the Bosnian Serbs who, back in 2021, celebrated the Day of Republika Srpska, a banned holiday, singing nationalist and Islamophobic songs, carrying the Serbian tricolor flag and banners with Ratko Mladic’s face, one of the Bosnian Serb generals in the 1992-1992 war in Bosnia, convicted of genocide (Hajdari, 2022). Nonetheless, while this crisis alarmed the Federation and the international community, Dodik has been calling for Republika Srpska’s secession for years now and this is partly due to the political arrangement that was envisaged in the 1996 Dayton Agreement which granted a significant degree of autonomy to the autonomous entities and their institutions. Indeed, the political system of today’s Bosnia was a result of the Dayton Peace Talks, signed in 1996 after the war in Bosnia. According to the provisions agreed upon in Dayton, , two autonomous regions were created in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a mainly Bosnian Serbs-inhabited Republika Srpska and a mostly Muslim and Croat populated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In doing so Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty was preserved while power was to be shared between the central government and the autonomous entities (Ruge, 2020). As decision-making at the central level was concerned, the Dayton Agreement introduced a system along “consociational principles” in which all the three ethnic groups enjoy representation in all the branches of the government as well as a collective three-member presidency with a rotating chair. Moreover, each of the ethnic groups enjoys a veto power in case vital national interests are at stake both in the presidency and in the chambers of the legislature (Ruge, 2020). However, after a “magic moment” between 1999 and 2006 due to “the consequences of the international commitment to the Balkans with NATO […] the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe […] and the EU’s new Foreign and Security Policy” (Giffoni, 2022), today, “the Dayton arrangements are associated less with peace than with dysfunction” (Hamilton, 2020). Indeed, the complex system of power-sharing envisaged in Dayton, albeit needed and effective in the short-term, “froze in place the warring parties and rewarded their commitment to ethnically-based control of territory” (Hamilton, 2020). Quite soon, ethno-politicians were able to take advantage of Dayton’s provisions and adapt them to the interests of the ethnic groups they represented but also and especially, to their own. As a result of such manipulation, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system emerged as weak and divided with a clear asymmetry between the central institutions, often paralyzed and ineffective and the autonomous entities, in the hands of ethno-nationalist parties and leaders. Indeed, “the problem of Dayton in practice stems from the fact that nationalist parties are primarily interested in consolidating their political grip over institutions” (Ruge, 2020). To strengthen their power, ethno-nationalist parties such as the Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata (SNSD) and the Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ) with their respective leaders often resorted to nationalist-charged discourses keeping inter-ethnic tensions alive. Nevertheless, while Bosnian Serbs and to lesser extent Croats, have been calling for secession, this has never been the case for the Bosnian Muslims. Indeed, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the oldest and most consolidated Bosniak Party in Bosnia, has always tried and still is trying to preserve the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In turn, these parties and their leaders receive support from external actors.
NATO - Bosnia Relations
On the 25th of May, NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, met in Brussels with the Chair of the Tri-Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sefik Džaferović. On the one hand, Mr Stoltenberg stressed the Alliance’s support on Bosnia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, emphasising at the same time the need for further cooperation, especially with the EU and its Operation ALTHEA. On the other hand, Mr Džaferović clarified the importance of the membership application submitted by Bosnia, labelling NATO as “safeguard of the Dayton Peace Agreement”, and asking to raise the issue in the upcoming Summit in Madrid, especially with regards to the current threats posed by Moskow’s influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina (NATO, 2022c). The current paragraph will try to analyse the relationship between these two actors, along with a brief historical background related to BiH.
The 1990s
The war in Bosnia from 1991 to 1995 has been one of the most controversial and brutal conflicts in the European continent, that reached its peak with over 100 thousand casualties in the conflict (Mullins, 2020; and Kaldor, 2012). Within its population, BiH was characterised by three main ethnic groups: Muslims (43.7%), Serbs (31.4%), and Croats (17.3%) (Kaldor, 2012; Ramet, 1994). Peace initiatives from the European Community and the UN were initiated, but failed in their objectives (Beriker & Demirel-Pegg, 2000). In 1994 the United States decided to intervene, strongly pushing for the creation of a “confederation of the Muslim-Croat regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, leading to an initial plan to divide the territory, favouring the new Muslim-Croat Federation (Beriker & Demirel-Pegg, 2000). However, it was only after the Srebrenica massacre that a response from NATO paved the way to the Dayton Agreements. NATO’s intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s was the first attempt from the Alliance to act outside its own borders, as the chain of events expressed the need for the Alliance to act as a regional stabiliser. In fact, the NATO-led Implementation Forces (IFOR) and later the Stabilization Force (SFOR) represented important symbols of a cooperative approach towards a regional crisis.
From 2004 until today
The Alliance’s peacekeeping effort lasted until December 2004, until the European Union took over the responsibility for military aspects through its EUFOR Operation, ALTHEA (name derived from the Greek goddess of healing). Nevertheless, NATO continues to support the EU-led mission through its HQ in Sarajevo, in respect of what is known as the “Berlin Plus” agreement, an essential element of the EU-NATO cooperation, which guarantees access to the Alliance’s resources and “classified intelligence under reciprocal security protection rules'' (Rittimann, 2021). In 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, one of the main initiatives of NATO, aimed at projecting stability and promoting international cooperation beyond the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO, 2021). Bosnia gained the opportunity to develop its relationship with NATO, by sharing insights and lessons learned related to common areas of interests or concerns, as well as receiving support while reforming and strengthening its defensive capacities. Moreover, it broadened its opportunities by accessing new projects, aimed at building stronger cooperation, not only militarily, but also through enhanced public diplomacy. Later in 2010, BiH submitted its application to NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), formalising its willingness to join the Alliance. Within this project, BiH structured a Reform Programme, which outlines the government’s intention to further cooperate with NATO. However, this does not guarantee an immediate membership to NATO. Rather, it further increases the cooperation between the two actors, as the plan provides advice and support on the annual national programmes that aspirant countries submit in order to show their progress through reforms (NATO, 2022b).
Currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s cooperation can be outlined within three main areas of cooperation. First, BiH is working towards the development of “fully professional armed forces that are interoperable with NATO forces” for multinational training, along with stronger interoperability initiatives in support of crisis-management operations. Secondly, it contributed to NATO’s missions in Afghanistan, through the deployment of officers in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the Resolute Support Mission (RSM). Finally, considering other initiatives, BiH strengthened its cooperation with NATO also in other important areas, such as disaster management operations, by developing an efficient crisis information system, for better coordination; information and communication, trough renewed strategies against disinformation campaigns; cyber defence, advanced technology development, through important projects such as the Science for Peace Security (SPS) Programme; and more recently during the COVID-19 pandemic, in which Bosnia received continued support from NATO through its assistance packages (NATO, 2022c).
What are the opportunities from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s possible membership in NATO?
In December, a recent survey from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) showed divisive results among Bosnians, with 66% of total support for NATO's membership. More into detail, the poll clearly identifies the difference among the three multiethnic groups, with stronger support from Bosniaks (90%) and Bosnian Croats (92%), and high levels of opposition from Bosnian Serbs (82%) (NDI, 2022). As the current events might represent an important wake-up call in the Balkans, it is possible to break down the benefits that BiH would enjoy by being in NATO.
The first core element is represented by collective defence in countering an aggression, enshrined in Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty (1949): if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, every other member of the Alliance will consider it as an armed attack against all members. Clearly, being a member of a military alliance provides a protective umbrella, with collective defence working as a deterrent (Tertrais, 2016).
The second benefit related to the “Open Door” policy. NATO represents an important forum where to enhance international cooperation, in which to promote common values and interests between different countries. Consensus and consultation are key elements of the Alliance, which express a collective willingness to act as a group. Clearly, Bosnia would improve its influential role in the international arena, sharing useful information with allies, and raising awareness over issues that other countries might not consider.
Finally, being a member of the Alliance offers further opportunities in terms of economic benefits (see the NATO Security Investment Programme, for example), with a “more stable political environment that attracts and increases foreign direct investment” (Advisory Council for BiH, 2010).
As these benefits represent important gains for a possible admission to NATO, it is important to underline how other actors stress their interest in the Balkans. As Moscow's strategic interests in the Balkans represent a relevant obstacle to Bosnia’s MAP, further delays providing an opportunity to join the Alliance would increase the chances of anti-Western attitudes (Bechev, 2019). Thus, it will be important for the Alliance to consider new ways of cooperation, encouraging BiH to proceed with its MAP; focusing on the main principles behind democracy and the rule of law, as well as supporting the development of a free media environment, “balanced by independent journalism” (Bechev, 2019). Such a strategy might gain further importance, especially considering that in November, the UN Security Council will vote on the extension of EU forces’ mandate. Hence, as many argue, a renewed NATO strategy towards the Balkans prior to the UNSC meeting would raise “the costs on the Kremlin for its operations in the Balkans [...] send[ing] the message that the Balkans won’t be left to fend for themselves against Moscow and that Putin will not determine the future of NATO” (Stradner, 2021)
Who opposes Bosnia and Herzegovina’s entry into NATO and why?
As mentioned above, different actors perceive Bosnia’s entry into NATO as beneficial for the security of the state but also for regional and international security. On the contrary, some local, regional and international actors strongly opposed Bosnia’s possible entry into NATO. Among these is Milorad Dodik, member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and leader of the SNSD party in Republika Srpska, the mostly Serb-populated autonomous entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leader of the SNSD stressed already back in 2017, that “Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity will not get involved in any activities to implement Bosnia and Herzegovina’s NATO Membership Action Plan” (Kovacevic, 2017). These declarations were followed by a resolution adopted by the Bosnian Serbs’ entity assembly insisting on the military neutrality of Republika Srpska. Such a resolute posture vis à vis Bosnia’s entry into the Alliance is linked to historical and political reasons. Firstly, NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force was, back in 1995, a way to pressure Bosnian Serbs to cease hostilities and proved successful in this sense (Miller, 1997). Moreover, in 1999, NATO launched “Operation Allied Force” against Milosevic and the then Yugoslav forces to halt the ethnic cleansing regime that was introduced against Albanians in Kosovo. Because of the two events, Serbs in Republika Srpska and Serbians in Serbia and Kosovo started to see NATO not as a defensive alliance but rather as an offensive one through which the US and its allies pursued their geo-political objectives undermining and weakening the Serbs’. Moreover, in a political system as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina where political decisions are heavily influenced by ethnic elements as well as memories of the past, considering Bosnia’s entry into NATO or failing to prevent it may weaken Dodik and his party’s popularity among the Bosnian Serbs. Most importantly, a possible accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina into NATO may complicate Republika Srpska’s relations with its most important allies: Serbia and Russia. Indeed, Serbia has always been an important player for Bosnian Serbs as during the 1990s crisis and war in Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs forces received diplomatic and military support from Slobodan Milosevic and his troops. Moreover, as in the case of Republika Srpska, the public opinion in Serbia sees NATO as their archenemy because of NATO’s 1999 bombing of the then Yugoslavia for 78 days with the aim of halting Milosevic’s operations in Kosovo. Operation Allied Force led to Milosevic and his troops withdrawal from Kosovo and paved the way for Kosovo’s independence, a region which Serbia has always considered as the “cradle of Serbian culture” (Walters, 2021). Hence, both Serbia and Republika Srpska benefit from their respective military neutrality and have no incentive to alter the status quo. For its part, Russia strongly supports Republika Srpska’s efforts aimed at preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession into NATO as part of a broader Russian effort to counter NATO’s perceived aggression while also carving out a sphere of influence in the Balkans. In fact, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are the only countries in the Balkans not having joined NATO yet. Unsurprisingly, they are two of the countries where Russia’s influence and interference has been significantly high in the last two decades. More recently, Putin has been supporting Dodik’s steps aimed at seceding from BiH in return for Republika Srpska’s efforts against BiH accession into NATO (Čančar, 2022). Consequently, Putin’s interference has added an international dimension to the 2021 crisis in Bosnia, making the prospect of the secession of Republika Srpska even more likely. Such interference alarmed analysts and observers in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine who feared that Bosnia may be dragged into another conflict which Russia could exploit as “a new front in Moscow’s confrontation with the West” (Cancar, 2022). Whether this is an exaggeration or not, what is evident is that a possible entry of Bosnia into NATO will not be welcomed by Russia. Indeed, the Russian ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Igor Kalabukhov, has already warned that should Bosnia decide to enter NATO, it “will have to react to this hostile act” (Al Jazeera, 2022; Trkanjec, 2022).
Another relevant international actor that emerged only recently in the Bosnian scenario is China. Moscow and Beijing announced, back in August 2021, that they would not recognize the new High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and asked that he be deprived of his powers to make binding decisions and dismiss officials and judges within BiH. However, while Moscow has openly disagreed with Western’s initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Beijing [...] has not been involved in the peacekeeping disputes in that country so far” (Petrovskaya, 2021). The fact that China has joined Russia in undermining the role of the international administrator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus encouraging Dodik separatism, has made many suspicious of a possible Russian-Chinese alliance against the West. However, “unlike Moscow, Beijing does not oppose the expansion of NATO and the EU” (Petrovskaya, 2021). Instead, it seems that Chinese goals in BiH are more geo-economic in nature as “China sees the Balkans as a bridge to the EU, their most important trading partner” (Shwartz, 2021). Indeed Chinese energy, mineral, and transport investments in Bosnia and Herzegovina amounted to $3 billion back in 2020 (Hamilton, 2020). Most of these investments are part of the One Belt, One Road Initiative, the so-called “New Silk Road”, a commercial corridor connecting China with Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Due to these diverging interests, according to some analysts, a “Russian-Chinese alliance in the post-conflict region has no clear prospects” (Petrovskaya, 2021). Still, China’s recent actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina have had significant implications in Bosnia and Herzegovina and have fueled Dodik’s quest for separatism thus further destabilising the country.
Conclusions
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s request to enter NATO has resulted in mixed reactions both at a regional and international level. Considering the current situation in Ukraine, and its repercussions in the international community, it is important not to forget other theatres, where many interests are at stake.
NATO’s relationship with BiH has changed over time. Currently, NATO’s mission aims at supporting peace and stability in the region. Through its HQ in Sarajevo, the Alliance’s presence in BiH represents an important symbol of NATO’s commitment in the Balkans. In practice, its partnership do not only open up parts of its processes, procedures and structures to the participation of partners, but also engage on specific needs, within different key areas for cooperation, such as political consultations on regional issues, interoperability, cooperation in NATO-led missions, and support on defence reforms, institution and capacity building. Bosnia still commits to its MAP, submitted in 2010, and the latest meeting between Sefik Džaferović and Jens Stoltenberg confirms BiH’s willingness to join under the NATO security umbrella. By becoming a new member of a regional military alliance, Bosnia will have the opportunity to be inside a new international forum, where to raise many regional security issues, that Allies should be aware of.
On the other hand, Republika Srpska, Serbia and Russia see Bosnia’s entry into the Alliance as a threat to their security and interests. For the Serbs living in BiH and in Serbia, Bosnia’s entry into NATO is deemed unacceptable because of historical, political and geo-political reasons. From an historical point of view, Republika Srpska and Serbia conceive NATO as an ‘enemy' because of the 1995 and 1999 NATO Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively, aimed at halting the Serb military campaigns and ultimately leading to their defeat. As for political reasons, Bosnia’s entry into NATO would, in Dodik’s perspective, weaken Republika Srpska’s power within the BiH political system. Geopolitically, should Bosnia join NATO, Serbia would remain the only non-NATO member in the region, apart from Kosovo, but Kosovo’s independence and status as sovereign country is still a matter of debate internationally. For its part, Russia is committed to prevent Bosnia from joining NATO as part of a larger project of ‘perceived’ eastward expansionism of the Alliance, especially after the 2022 war in Ukraine and Finland and Sweden’s forthcoming accession. What the reactions of these actors will be should the accession be completed, is difficult to predict. As for China, it is still difficult to understand its position vis à vis the question as its interests in the Balkans are mainly economic and as such do not clash, at least, not directly, with a possible NATO membership of BiH. In light of the 2021 crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to Dodik’s concrete secessionist moves, a possible undesired effect of the country’s entry into the Alliance is indeed, the acceleration of the process of secession of Republika Srpska. Moreover, because of their common posture vis à vis NATO and their regional interests, such a process may be supported and fuelled by Serbia and Russia.
NATO should carry out a cost-benefit analysis before allowing Bosnia to join the alliance. As a matter of fact, even if 25 years passed since the end of the conflict, nationalism and identity politics are still a disruptive force in Bosnia and Herzegovina which may drag the country and its population into further instability.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official positions of NATO or any NATO institution.
Information Content | ||
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
No basis to evaluate the validity of the information
Trustworthiness of the source | ||
A | Trustworthy | No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness |
B | Normally trustworthy | Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases |
C | Sufficiently trustworthy | Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past |
D | Normally not trustworthy | Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past |
E | Not trustworthy | Lack of authenticity, reliability or competence; history of invalid information |
F | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
Bibliography
Beriker-Atiyas, Nimet, and Demirel-Pegg, Tijen (2001). ‘An analysis of integrative outcomes in the Dayton peace negotiations’, International Journal of Conflict Management. Vol 11, No. 4. pp. 359-378. [A-1]
Kaldor, Mary (2012), ‘Bosnia – Herzegovina: A Case Study of a New War’, in Kaldor, Mary, New and Old Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, pp. 32-70. [A-1]
Ramet, Sabrina Petra (1994). ‘The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of Accommodation’, Current History, 93 (586), 380-385. [A-1]
S. Hamilton, Daniel (2020), ‘Fixing Dayton: a new deal for Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Wilson Center, Nov 2020 (A-1)
LGen. Rittimann, Olivier (2021), ‘Operation Althea and the virtues of the Berlin Plus Agreement’, NDC Policy Brief, NATO Defense College, Research Division, No. 2, January, NDC Publications. [A-1]
Tertrais, Bruno (2016), ‘Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: Its Origins, Meaning and Future’, NDC Policy Brief, NATO Defense College, Research Division, No. 130, April, NDC Publications. [A-1]
Online Resources
Advisory Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2010), ‘Benefits of NATO Membership for BiH’, Advisory Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 24, available at https://www.acbih.org/benefits-of-nato-membership-for-bih/ . [B-2]
Bassuener, Kurt, and Vogel, Toby (2022), ‘Bosnia’s Dangerous Path’, Foreign Affairs, May 18, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia-herzegovina/2022-05-18/bosnias-dangerous-path.[A-2]
Bechev, Dimitar (2019), ‘Russia’ strategic interests and tools of influence in the Western Balkans’, Atlantic Council, December 20, available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-strategic-interests-and-tools-of-influence-in-the-western-balkans/ . [A-2]
Čančar, Ismet Fatih (2022), ‘Russia’s New Front with the West in Bosnia’, RUSI, Commentary, 21 March, available at https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-new-front-west-bosnia . [A-2]
Corruption Perception Index 2021, Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/bosnia-and-herzegovina [A-2]
Giantin, Stefano (2022), ‘Crisis deepening in Bosnia, Dodik threatens a “peaceful” breakup’, NATO Defense College Foundation, Balkans & Black Sea, 31 May, available at https://www.natofoundation.org/balkans-black-sea/crisis-deepening-in-bosnia-dodik-threatens-a-peaceful-breakup/ . [A-2]
Giffoni, Micheal (2022), ‘The triumph of insufficient will’, ISPI, Apr 2022, available at https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/triumph-insufficient-will-bosnian-crisis-international-dimension-34532 [A-1]
Hajdari, Una (2022), ‘Secessionist threats and nationalist strife shock Bosnia as EU offers limited response’, Politico, Jan 2022, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/secession-threat-bosnia-milorad-dodik-eu-limited-options/ . [A-2]
Ivo H. (1998), ‘Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended’, Brookings, December 1, available at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/ . [A-2]
Filseth, Trevor (2022), ‘Kosovo and Bosnia Reiterate Interest in NATO Membership’, The National Interest, April 6, available at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/kosovo-and-bosnia-reiterate-interest-nato-membership-201683 . [A-2]
Karcic, Harun (2022), ‘Why NATO Should Worry About the Balkans’, Foreign Affairs, 30 March, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/30/bosnia-russia-nato-ukraine-war-dodik/ . [A-2]
Kovacevic, Danijel (2017), ‘Bosnia Serbs Vow to Bloc NATO Accession Plan’, Balkan Insight, Dec 2017 available at https://balkaninsight.com/2017/12/15/bosnia-serbs-oppose-nato-acession-bid-12-15-2017/ [A-2]
Mullins, Lisa (2020, December 15), ‘How Diplomacy Forged The Dayton Accords That Brought ‘Uneasy Peace’ To Bosnia 25 Years Ago’, WBUR, available at https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2020/12/15/dayton-accords-agreement . [A-2]
National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2022), ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Poll’, National Democratic Institute, May 13, available at https://www.ndi.org/publications/bosnia-and-herzegovina-poll . [B-1]
NATO (2022a), ‘Enlargement and Article 10’, NATO, June 10, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm . [A-1]
NATO (2022b), ‘Membership Action Plan (MAP)’, NATO, 14 May, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm . [A-1]
NATO (2022c), ‘NATO Secretary General meets with the Chair of the Tri-Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sefik Džaferović’, NATO, News, 25 May, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195739.htm?selectedLocale=en . [A-1]
NATO (2022d), ‘Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina’, NATO, 23 May, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49127.htm . [A-1]
NATO (2021), ‘Partnerships: projecting stability through cooperation’, NATO, 25 August, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm . [A-1]
NATO HQ in Sarajevo (NHQSa) official mission statement, available at https://jfcnaples.nato.int/hqsarajevo/nhqsa-mission . [A-1]
Petrovskaya, Yulia (2021), ‘Russian-Chinese Crisis Alliance in the Balkans, Riddle, Oct 2021, available at https://ridl.io/russian-chinese-crisis-alliance-in-the-balkans/ [A-2]
Ruge, Majda, ‘Hostage State: how to free Bosnia from Dayton’s paralysing grip’, European Council of Foreign Relations, Nov 2020, available at https://ecfr.eu/publication/how-europe-and-the-us-can-take-bosnia-beyond-dayton-25-years-later/ . [A-1]
Schwartz, K.Peter (2021), ‘Power games in the Balkans’, GIS Reports Online, Nov 2021, available at https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/power-balkan/ [A-2]
Stradner, Ivana (2021), ‘Russia’s Is Playing With Fire in the Balkans’, Foreign Affairs, December 27, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2021-12-27/russia-playing-fire-balkans . [A-2]
Trkanjec, Željko (2022), ‘Russian Ambassador says BiH can join NATO, but Moscow will react’, EURACTIV, March 17, available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/russian-ambassador-says-bih-can-join-nato-but-moscow-will-react/ . [A-2]Walters, M. Elizabeth (2021), ‘A Tantalizing Success: the 1999 Kosovo War’, The Strategy Bridge, July 2021, avilable at https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/7/9/a-tantalizing-success-the-1999-kosovo-war [B-1]