The complex evolution of Mercosur – EU trade negotiations: external differences, internal obstacles and final outcomes

  Focus - Allegati
  23 July 2026
  28 minutes, 34 seconds

Abstract

On 17 January 2026, the European Union and Mercosur signed the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement and the Interim Trade Agreement, concluding twenty-five years of negotiations and creating the world's largest free trade area. The process was long and troubled: Brazil and Argentina feared excessive liberalization, while several European countries sought to protect fair competition, especially in agriculture. Drawing on political, economic, and cultural factors, this essay examines the evolution of the EU-Mercosur dialogue, highlighting its main difficulties and achievements. Applying Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory, it shows how domestic interest-group pressure, international bargaining, diverging member-state interests, and the role of democracy and culture shaped the talks. It then maps the negotiations from the 1995 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement through the 2000-2004 talks, the 2004-2015 interruption over structural disagreements, and the 2016 restart leading to the 2019 Agreement in Principle, before addressing the European Parliament's role and the situation as of July 2026. Finally, it assesses each bloc's gains and concessions, with attention to the main Member States. The essay argues that the Agreement extends beyond trade to encompass political, national, and cultural dimensions, leaving the EU and Mercosur aligned in some areas yet divided in others, and completing a negotiation process that overcame external and internal obstacles.

1. An introduction to the 2026 Mercosur – EU Trade Agreement

«Dear friends, today, after 25 years of work we make history. We are creating the largest free trade zone in the world, together. A shared market of 700 million people. A rules-based partnership to grow commerce and investment between our two proud regions» (von Der Leyen, 2026). This is what the President of the EU Commission, Ursula von Der Leyen stated in Asunción (Paraguay) on 17 January 2026, the day of the signature of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA) and of the Interim Trade Agreement (ITA). Indeed, the triumphant tone of the statement is justified by the great importance of the two Agreements (that for the sake of brevity will be referred to collectively as “the Agreement” from now on).

The Agreement represents an historical step forward in the relations between these two regional blocs. According to Eurostat data, in 2024 the European Union exported goods for €55.2 billion and imported €56.0 billion from Mercosur, marking respectively +25.1% in exports and +50.3% in imports during the last decade (Eurostat, 2026). Despite being surpassed by China in 2017 as Mercosur’s main economic partner, the EU definitely has strong economic ties with the Latin American bloc.

In practice, the EU will immediately liberalize 74% of its trade with Mercosur and 92% of imports in 10 years. On the other hand, its Latin American counterpart will gradually liberalize 72% of its trade with the EU and 91% of imports in 15 years. Some particular time conditions are applied to certain areas, like electric and hydrogen vehicles (respectively 18 and 25 years), in addition to a preferential access to Mercosur’s agriculture products during the first 5 – 7 years. Moreover, there will be an impact on the industrial goods sector by lowering tariffs on cars (up to 35%), machinery (14 to 20%), pharmaceutics (up to 14%) and other products (European Commission, 2026).

Finally, the Agreement secures sustainable access to fundamental raw materials that the EU imports from Mercosur, such as Niobium. However, many concerns about the possible consequences of its implementation arose during the 25 years of negotiations, resulting in an inconsistent and complex process where many interests clashed and overlapped.

2. Key players and internal discrepancies: the Two-Level Game Theory applied to the Mercosur – EU Trade negotiations

In order to effectively assess the different outcomes achieved by the two regional blocs, it is fundamental to introduce them, highlighting both their different political structures and the diverging interests of their Member States. In this sense, the Two-Level Game Theory, introduced by American political scientist Robert Putnam in 1988, is an effective tool to understand both their internal and external interactions (Veira Nunes, 2024). With specific reference to the 1978 Bonn Summit Conference, Putnam argues that «agreement was possible only because a powerful minority within each government actually favored on domestic grounds the policy being demanded internationally» (Putnam, 1988). As the author suggested, this idea had already been described by German-American political scientist Peter Joachim Katzenstein who claimed that «the main purpose of all strategies of foreign economic policy is to make domestic policies compatible with the international political economy» (Katzenstein, 1978). Consequently, mapping the negotiation process between the EU and Mercosur requires taking a look at both the domestic and international pressures that shaped it. At the same time, given that this Agreement comprises two regional organizations with different structures and goals, their interactions at the inter-regional level must also be considered.

The two regional organizations share both cultural and political aspects, yet the two blocs’ mandates and priorities differ. On the one hand, the European Union acts as both a supranational and intergovernmental organization, with different power relations between Member States and the central authority depending on the subject. On the other hand, Mercosur is a trade bloc built upon decades of attempts at creating a regional economic market in Latin America, characterized by the absence of supranational mechanisms.

Even if Mercosur may appear to behave as an incomplete custom union rather than a common market (Nascimento Lima, 2023), it is clear that the role model behind this process of regional integration was the EU. An example is represented by Article I of the 1991 Treaty of Asunción, the founding document of this organization. According to this very part of the agreement, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay affirmed their commitment to promote free movement of goods, services and factors of production among the countries, the establishment of common external tariffs and the adoption of a common policy with respect to relations with third states. Furthermore, the 1994 Additional Protocol of Ouro Preto to the Treaty of Asunción paved the way for a closer relationship with the European Union. In addition to defining the international legal personality of the Organization, it connected the decision-making process with the democratic stance, establishing a consensus-based procedure.

The democratic nature of Mercosur members is clearly one of the elements that make it closer to the European Union and that helped reach such an important agreement. However, at the base of this result there is not only the well-consolidated idea that democracies cooperate and trade better with each other (Mansfield et al., 2002). Since the 1980s, there has been a tradition of European investment to develop democratic institutions in Latin American countries (Youngs, 2002). Therefore, the nexus between democracy promotion and economic trade is one of the key factors that made the Agreement possible.

In this sense, the 2026 V-Democracy Report is an effective tool to evaluate the current status of Mercosur democracies. All four Member States perform well, falling under the label of “democracy.” In particular, Uruguay stands as the only liberal democracy, whereas the others are considered electoral democracies. Nonetheless, according to the report’s classification, Brazil could belong to the liberal democracy group. Even the comparison between these countries and the rest of the world seems to display a positive situation. According to the Liberal Democracy Index, Uruguay (13th), Brazil (28th), Argentina (56th) and Paraguay (83rd) are all in the first half of the ranking, which evaluate the status of democracy in 179 countries. At the same time, the development is not uniform, and the situation may not be as encouraging as this data conveys. For instance, Brazil is experiencing a phase of democratization, while Argentina is autocratizing. Unfortunately, the Argentinian trend is not isolated: seven EU Member States (Italy, Croatia, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary) and two of their main allies (Uk and Usa) are witnessing the same phenomenon. It is still uncertain whether the mass worsening of the democratic fabric in the European Union could lead to severe problems in trade with the Latin American region.

Nonetheless, the slow deterioration of democratic institutions is not the only difficulty that the two blocs are encountering. Following the Two-Level Game Theory, it is possible to affirm that the lack of supranational institutions in Mercosur (a common feature of Latin American regionalism) makes internal imbalances even more evident, marking a predominance of Brazilian interests.

«Brazil is a big country, and Brazilian businesspeople have “big country” ideas. They think big and act like Portuguese-speaking Texans» (Seeber, 2001). This quote simplifies the Brazilian way of conducting negotiations and interacting with bordering states. As a matter of fact, the prominent Brazilian role in Mercosur’s internal power relations has been one of the main drivers of the agreement with the EU, as proposed by Former Brazil Desk Officer of the European Commission Andy Klom. In his 2003 work “Mercosur and Brazil: a European Perspective” published in International Affairs, he argues that «Brazil uses Mercosur as a political and economic alliance to confront other powers,» such as «the EU in the EU–Mercosur context and in the WTO» (Klom, 2003). A practical example of its predominance in the Latin American bloc is represented by the Brazilian share in total EU trade (imports and exports) that in 2024 was €89.5 billion, accounting for approximately 82.8% of the total (Eurostat, 2024). In the specific context of the Agreements with the European Union, Mercosur Member States had quite a heterogeneous spectrum of opinions, in which Brazilian voice emerged as the louder one.

From a political perspective, Latin American regionalism has always been boosted or limited by the political orientation of national presidents. This phenomenon is called inter-presidential diplomacy: when there is convergence of political ideas regionalism increases, whereas when there is divergence, it decreases or stops. This dynamic is reflected inside Mercosur, as Brazil and Uruguay have center-left governments, Paraguay has a right-leaning coalition and in Argentina Milei’s libertarian far-right won the latest elections. Hence, the relevance of the political dimension must not be underestimated. At the 67th Mercosur Heads of State Summit held in Foz do Iguaçu on 10 December 2025, Brazilian President Lula stated that «Without political will, it will be impossible to conclude a negotiation that has dragged on for 26 years» (Lula, 2025).

From an economic perspective, conflicting interests arise with relation to Mercosur’s mandate and integration process. If both Brazil and Argentina fear that increasing liberalization could make foreign competition too strong to be handled for the bloc’s market, Uruguay and Paraguay welcome a larger number of free trade agreements, as shown by bilateral Uruguayan talks with South Korea, China and Turkey (Folonier Muxí, 2023). The huge imbalance of the size and population of Mercosur Member States, together with the similarity of the products that they export, makes these conflicting interests even sharper. Brazil prefers a slow openness to foreign markets, Argentina favors liberalization only in specific sectors, while Uruguay and Paraguay have to push for further integration given their limited possibility to export products inside the bloc due to their small size. The multiple clashes caused by structural geographical, political and economic differences within the Mercosur bloc were one of the main reasons for such a slow negotiating process with the EU.

However, the Latin American bloc’s internal frictions have not been the only factor that slowed the progress, as shown by the fragmented situation on the other side of the Atlantic. Actually, European countries displayed divergent positions with respect to the Agreement, going from enthusiastic approval to strong reluctance.

The majority of them (nineteen out of twenty-seven countries) welcomed the Agreement, with a big “coalition” that brought together, among the others, Germany, Spain, Portugal and the Nordic States. Spanish and Portuguese support did not come as a surprise, given their closer cultural ties with the Latin American bloc. For instance, Spanish Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Luis Planas, recalled multiple times the strategic importance of the treaty, especially for the wine sector (La Moncloa, 2025). For Germany, the main driver behind the Agreement were German carmakers, which face heavy tariffs in Mercosur countries, whereas Denmark, Finland and Sweden respected both their long tradition of friendly relations and their will at pursuing new trading opportunities. The Netherlands supported the agreement after the Cabinet’s confirmation in November 2025, with this decision being endorsed by the newly formed Parliament.

Belgium abstained due to internal frictions and Austria had to oppose after the Parliament’s almost unanimous contrary vote in 2019. Further and sharper opposition came from Ireland, Poland, Hungary, and France: while asking for more safeguards for European farmers, they also expressed their fear of unfair competition. For instance, Polish President Karol Nawrocki opposed the Agreement with a post on X saying that it could «flood Poland and destroy Polish agriculture and other industries, » as «the proposed safeguard clauses for a dozen or so product groups will not change a thing. It is like putting up a windbreak in front of a tsunami» (Nawrocki, 2025).

Finally, the most ambiguous stance has definitely been the Italian one. Even if Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani declared that «Italy has never changed its position: We have always supported the conclusion of the agreement,» (Tajani, 2026), in the months before the vote doubts had arisen on the lack of stricter safeguard clauses. Eventually, Italy supported the implementation.

Consequently, in the light of the external political differences between the two blocs and the diverging internal interests of the respective member states, it is not difficult to understand why it took so long to reach an Agreement. From this perspective, the metaphor used by research associate Detlef Nolte and by PhD student Clarissa Correa Neto Ribera and based on René Magritte’s famous surrealist painting “The False Mirror” is particularly useful. In this piece of art, the eye is the real subject as it provides different plausible interpretations, while «the viewer both looks through it, as through a window, and is looked at by it, thus seeing and being seen simultaneously» (MoMA, 2015). This intertwined flow of false perceptions can be applied to EU-Mercosur relations, characterized by «optical illusions, misperceptions, wishful thinking, deception and lack of substance» (Nolte and Neto Ribera, 2021).

3. Mapping the negotiation process: waves of advancements and sudden stops

The 1995 “Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and Mercosur” was the cornerstone of the entire negotiations process. Based on the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental rights, it laid the foundations for an Interregional Association between the two blocs (EUR-Lex, 2020). This first Agreement set the practical goals of the joint effort, such as exchanges of information on services, liberalization of trade and respect for WTO rules. Moreover, it also listed the sectors where cooperation would take place such as energy, transport, environmental protection and telecommunication and information technology. At the same time, it went beyond the economic matter, comprehending other mandates like fighting drug trafficking, education, and promotion of culture. As a matter of fact, the multifaceted nature of the Agreement was explicitly conveyed by the presence of three pillars, focused on trade, cooperation and political dialogue. In order to achieve these goals, effort was put into using democratic means through the work of a Bi-regional Negotiations Committee.

The Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement came into force in 1999, and two more main events happened in that year. In March, at the EU Summit in Berlin, whose main objectives were to select a new President of the Commission and to reach a compromise on budget, EU powers failed to reach an agreement on the Common Agricultural Policy. In particular, France managed to block the bold reforms proposed by Germany, which would have facilitated the negotiations with Mercosur (Klom, 2003). Moreover, in June, the First Meeting of Heads of State and Government of the European Union and of Mercosur took place in Rio de Janeiro. The goal was to start negotiating about the creation of a free trade zone between the two blocs and the initial talks concerned mainly the access to the market of goods (in particular in the agricultural and industrial sectors) and the movement of capital, services, intellectual property and competences (Suanzes-Carpegna, 2006). During the Summit, the two parties agreed to postpone the debate on tariffs and services to July 2001.

The two blocs tried to give a new impetus to the process at the Second Meeting of Heads of State and Government of the European Union and of Mercosur that took place in Madrid in May 2002. In addition to recognizing the outcomes made by the Bi-regional Negotiations Committee in the previous years, it tried to strengthen the political bonds by establishing annual meetings at the level of senior official and at ministerial level during the UN General Assembly in New York (European Union, Mercosur, 2002). Moreover, the two parties «agreed that the ultimate objective of the trade negotiations is the achievement of further effective access to their respective markets, on the basis of progressive and reciprocal trade liberalization in accordance with GATT/WTO rules» (European Union, Mercosur, 2002).

However, because of the sharp agricultural and industrial asymmetries, especially regarding exports and imports of wheat and beef, negotiations stopped in 2004 (Enciso Cano, 2016). During the following six years there was no particular advancement and the process restarted in 2010, following the stalled Doha Round at WTO. It eventually came to a standstill in 2012 because Venezuela joined Mercosur, Paraguay was suspended from the Organization and Argentina and Brazil pursued different agendas (Grieger, 2019). New indirect efforts by the European Union were made in 2014 with the “Development Cooperation Instrument 2014-2020: Multiannual indicative programme for Latin America” that assigned a budget of 925 million euros to promote both continental and sub-regional activities during seven years (Cienfuegos Mateo, 2016). However, its impact was limited and the impasse lasted until 2016, as Brazil promoted the relaunch of negotiations prioritizing investments and technological cooperation. It is not a coincidence that this happened as soon as liberal leaders such as Macri (Argentina) and Temer (Brazil) won the elections.

In 2018 negotiations about the pillars of cooperation and political dialogue ended, and the general sentiment was that also the economic one would have benefited from that (Quezada Padilla and Alvarado Guzmán, 2026). In order to achieve the result as fast as possible, the two parts acknowledged that it was impossible to reach an agreement that could satisfy every actor involved and they tried to find the best compromise possible.

When the 420 pages Agreement in Principle was reached in July 2019, there were winners and losers. Nonetheless, the ratification expected in the same year did not take place because of tensions caused by former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who prioritized relations with the Usa and criticized the environmental stances of the EU (Passarinho, 2019). Consequently, the process suffered another stop. On 6 October 2020, the European Parliament passed a resolution in which it emphasized that, despite the fact that «the association agreement between the EU and Mercosur represents the largest ‘bloc to bloc’ deal of its kind,» it «cannot be ratified as it stands.» (European Parliament, 2020). During the vote particular attention was given to the importance of ensuring fair competition and respecting the sustainability clause.

In 2023 a new resolution of the European Parliament opened to new advancements, affirming that he Agreement could be ratified «provided that pre-ratification commitments on climate change, deforestation and other concerns are satisfactory» (European Parliament, 2023). Despite the difficulties, negotiations were relaunched in March of the same year when an EU draft aimed at increasing Mercosur’s commitment to respect sustainability clauses leaked. However, alignment was found as Brazil tried to get greater policy space for its industrial reforms. Then, a delicate political agreement was reached in December 2024, as a result of exogenous structural changes of the world power balances. The War in Ukraine, the energy crisis caused by the European dependence on Russia, the difficult trade relations with China and the aggressive US foreign policy of the second Trump Administration, made the Treaty a priority for the Europeans (Grieger, 2025).

On 3 September 2025, the European Commission adopted a proposal of the Council that would split the final Agreement into two separate elements: the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement and the Interim Trade Agreement (ITA), both signed on 17 January 2026 (European Commission, 2026). Before the final approval of the European Council, they needed to be approved by the European Parliament as well as ratified by Mercosur Member States; the EMPA also needed national ratification by the single EU Member States. However, further events complicated the process. If Mercosur countries managed to ratify the Agreement, on 21 January 2026, with 334 votes in favor, 325 against and eleven abstentions, the European Parliament adopted a resolution asking for a legal opinion from the European Court of Justice (European Parliament, 2026). Both the EMPA and the ITA will be subject to the analysis of the Court, which will have to evaluate their legal basis. Moreover, on 10 February 2026, the European Parliament approved a bilateral safeguard mechanism for agriculture products, whose main feature is the possibility of suspending the tariff preferences established in the Treaties if import cause critical harm to EU producers, especially farmers. Eventually, the ITA entered provisionally into force on 1 May 2026, with the bilateral safeguard agreement applying to it.

4. A final assessment of the distribution of gains and losses in the EU – Mercosur Agreement

In order to effectively conclude this paper’s analysis, a final assessment of the result achieved is essential. Drawing on the internal and external power dynamics already described in section 1, it is possible to see not only which regional bloc gained the most, but also which national countries managed to prevail. Therefore, using the content of the Agreement, this section will now evaluate the outcomes of the main actors involved.

Starting from the Latin American Organization, particular attention must be given to Brazil, considering its role as a major Mercosur power and main trader with the European Union. A 2026 report by the Brazilian research center Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea), shows positive but limited results. By using a series of simulations about the possible gains for Brazil in the years following the Agreement, it shows an average growth of Brazilian GDP between 0.09% and 0.15% in the short run, and between 0.20% and 0.40% in the long run. Moreover, the report points out possible negative consequences, with the worst one being an even more severe process of deindustrialization in the country (Martinez, 2026). It is also interesting to see how the situation changes at the national level by looking at Brazilian five macro-regions. Data elaborated by the Brazilian Government show higher gains in the Center-West region (as it is the main producer of meat, sugar and ethanol), moderate and mixed gains in the South and South-West regions (respectively for the wine and automotive sector) and low to no gains in the Northeast and North regions (Colaço, 2026). Nonetheless, the future of the Agreement is not to be taken for granted. In October 2026, the general Presidential elections will be held in Brazil, and the race is mostly between current President Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro, former president Jair Bolsonaro's son. The latter would still be in time to block the Agreement if elected this year, but a recent scandal regarding a possible financial fraud may cost him the elections (De Bolle, 2026).

The impact on the other Mercosur countries is destined to be less influential. The effects on the Argentinian market are expected to be limited and focused mostly on agriculture and food. Argentina is a consistent partner of the EU and aspires to triplicate imports and exports to and from the EU, which in 2023 amounted respectively to 14.5% and 10.24% of the total (Scarpetta, 2024). Therefore, the main hope is to strengthen the existing ties with the EU, despite being far away from the Brazilian level. In Uruguay the expected domestic outcomes are a reduction of the poverty rate (-8.4% with respect to 2023) and of the unemployment rate (-2.0% with respect to 2023), as well as an increase of private consumption (+2.5% with respect to 2023) and of overall the trade with the EU (Uruguay ministry of Foreign Affairs 2026). Finally, Paraguay will experience limited, but positive results, with at least 95% of its current exports expected to enter the European Market with preferential or null duties (Paraguay Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026).

In Europe the gains are expected to be higher. Exports for EU farmers from the Agreement by 2040 in the food sector are set to increase in the following sectors: beverages (+54%), fruit and vegetables (+37%) and dairies (+104%). Moreover, security measures have been adopted to prevent Mercosur from imitating authentic EU products by “securing branding and market exclusivity” (European Commission, 2026). In addition, imports of beef and poultry are capped at 1.3% and 1.5% of the total annual production. Among the strongest European economies, Germany will benefit the most from the liberalization measures in the automotive sectors, whereas opposition in France remains high due to fear of loss of competition. Furthermore, by increasing trade with Mercosur, the European Union is likely to benefit from a potential inclusion of Bolivia in the Latin American organization, as this country’s share of the global lithium reserves is 21% (Ganter, 2026).

However, it is possible to argue that another major gain of the European Union is connected to the political and cooperation pillars. As a matter of fact, the EU welcomes a diversification of its ties with other countries and regional blocs and aims for a spillover effect that could strengthen democratic institutions in Latin America. This does not mean that the European integration process could be applied to this region, but rather that the cultural and democratic link between the two organizations is developed enough to progress.

To conclude, it is possible to say that the Agreement is not going to have a decisive impact on the two blocs. Following twenty-six years of troubled negotiations, changes in presidencies and in economic and geopolitical strategies decreased its potential effectiveness, facing pressures at regional, domestic and private levels. The multifaceted nature of the Agreement itself, represented by the number and role of the actors involved, led to heterogeneous and partial results. The first clear winner is the European Union, which managed to expand its trade, reinforce its position in the Southern American continent, while establishing security measures to prevent negative effects on the internal market. Inside this bloc, the powers that backed the Agreement since the beginning (Germany, Spain and Portugal among the others), managed to gain from the increased trade in certain sectors. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Agreement resulted in a partial victory, as the European Union achieved more favourable conditions. However, inside the bloc asymmetries are evident. Brazil imposed itself by leading the negotiations and, as the main trading partner with the EU, it is going to benefit the most from the new conditions. Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay will all experience positive results, but in a far less consistent way.

Despite the limited economic results that the Agreement is likely to have, achieving a compromise is definitely an impressive result. The end of negotiations showed how both blocs are willing to expand their strategic autonomy and to operate in the global scenario overcoming their internal frictions. While the international order rapidly transforms and new powers try to emerge, this Agreement must be seen as an attempt at reinforcing integration and avoiding subordination, in an effort to survive growing global anarchy.

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