The EU and Africa's relations from the perspective of the Global Gateway

  Focus - Allegati
  19 June 2025
  15 minutes, 38 seconds

Author: Sara Galetta - Senior Researcher

Introduction

The EU-Africa relationship has recently gained renewed focus, especially with the launch of the Global Gateway in 2021, a major EU initiative promoting infrastructure investment in Africa. Although the EU presents it as a transformative and mutually beneficial strategy, the initiative is criticized for perpetuating neo-colonial dynamics under a new guise. A postcolonial perspective is deemed essential to understand the enduring asymmetries and colonial legacies in EU-Africa relations. This analysis argues that the Global Gateway, while innovative, at the same time it serves EU strategic interests, such as countering Chinese influence, with the aim to rebalance relations with Africa. It will analyze historical EU-Africa agreements and specific projects, questioning whether they truly reflect African development needs or continue to reinforce European dominance.

Historical background

The long-standing relationship between the EU and the African continent officially began with the Treaty of Rome (1957), which institutionalized ties between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the colonies of Belgium, Italy, France, and the Netherlands. The Treaty established the European Development Fund (EDF), marking the start of development aid as a post-colonial tool of influence. In exchange for aid, the EEC gained access to African markets and resources. This cooperation aimed to support the development of infrastructure in former colonies while maintaining European economic interests.

By the early 1960s, European powers began redefining Africa’s role in the new bipolar global order, seeking to keep former colonies within the Western sphere of influence. The Yaoundé Convention (1963) institutionalized trade preferences and market access, formalizing an asymmetric interdependence - where African states opened to European goods but lacked the industrial base to compete.

Despite continued revisions, culminating in Lomé IV (1990), European priorities began to prevail. The emphasis shifted from solidarity and neutrality to conditionality, reinforcing EU objectives. By the late 1990s, aid became more politicized and less generous, coinciding with the EU’s enlargement and the extension of its influence in Africa.

The new millennium opened the door to the ACP countries’ desire to reform the relations with Europe while maintaining the benefits of the Lomé Convention. The Cotonou Agreement (2000–2020) introduced a new dynamic, adding political dialogue as a "third pillar" alongside trade and aid. Based on the 1997 Green Paper, the EU emphasized effectiveness, monitoring, and results.

For some scholars, this agreement has been viewed as a continuation of the Lomé framework, or at least as a gradual evolution in line with the broader developments in North–South relations. The increased emphasis on the political dimension was seen as a natural expansion of the liberal political conditions that had already emerged under Lomé IV in the 1990s. Lomé IV, in fact, reaffirmed commitments to “human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law,” as well as to the principle of “good governance,” which became part of the extended political conditionalities. However, other scholars offered a more critical perspective, arguing that the shift had already begun during the 1978–1979 negotiations, described as “the first nail in the coffin of the Lomé idea – equality and interdependence.” According to this view, European policies had become increasingly prescriptive, dictating acceptable forms of governance in exchange for aid. The core principle promoted by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, namely, “democratic stability”, risked coming into conflict with the foundational principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

The new millennium marks the beginning of a new trend in the European approach to Africa: although the commitment to a balanced partnership was mirrored under Lomé, as well as co-management in the implementation of development cooperation, the asymmetry of the relationship became more evident due to political conditionalities. In addition, performance reviews and evaluation practices more clearly revealed the risk for ACP countries of losing secure funding.

EU-Africa relations in the new millennium

On 15 April 2021, the European Commission published the negotiated version of the Post-Cotonou Agreement, which officially replaced the previous Cotonou Partnership Agreement. For the first time, EU development cooperation has been incorporated into the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027, under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe), the EU’s new single budgetary instrument for external action.

From the EU's perspective, the integration of the EDF into the overall budget increases transparency, efficiency, and parliamentary oversight, allowing both the European Commission and European Parliament greater control over the use of funds. However, from the ACP countries’ perspective, this shift introduces a more conditional funding regime, dependent on EU discretion, with possible consequences for ownership and governance of development aid.

Over recent decades, the EU has consistently demonstrated its intent to maintain close ties with Africa. The adoption of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 was described as the "capstone" of intercontinental relations. However, in 2017, the European Parliament identified major shortcomings in the implementation of JAES, such as a failure to foster high-level political dialogue on key issues such as migration, human rights, and global governance reform; limited collaboration on democracy and good governance; and overly complex and fragmented funding mechanisms.

During the 6th Africa–EU Summit held in Brussels in 2022, a renewed partnership was proposed through the Joint Vision for 2030, that prioritized vaccine provision, investment in health and education, sustainable infrastructure, cooperation on peace and security to address instability and terrorism, and joint action on irregular migration.

The Post-Cotonou Agreement is also presented as a vehicle for advancing the UN 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Indeed, the NDICI – Global Europe instrument explicitly aims to “contribute to achieving the international commitments and objectives that the Union has agreed to, in particular the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement” (European Commission). In this sense, the EU has adopted the 2030 Agenda’s emphasis on “financing for development and means of implementation”, seeking to mobilize both national and international resources.

Recent EU strategies further underline this focus, particularly on mobilizing public and private investment for sustainable development. The Global Gateway, first announced in December 2021, is the clearest expression of this ambition. It seeks to increase infrastructure investment in partner countries while also promoting democratic values, high standards, good governance, and transparency in international cooperation.

The Global Gateway: properties and priorities

The Global Gateway is a standalone strategy implemented by Team Europe and is therefore not explicitly included in the definition of the Post-Cotonou Agreement, but it reflects the EU’s strategic priorities, particularly in its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. In the "Joint Vision for 2030," published two months after the Global Gateway was first announced, it was explicitly stated that the strategy would “boost public and private investment building on existing initiatives and partnerships, […], supported by Team Europe Initiatives, with due consideration to the priorities and needs of the African countries” (European Union & African Union, 2022).

Although its primary function is that of an investment facility with the goal of mobilizing €300 billion in global projects, the Global Gateway presents features that are complementary to the current EU–Africa relations framework. It may assist the EU in maintaining influence in target countries by promoting investment in critical sectors.

Specifically, the Global Gateway (GG) is an EU strategy designed to mobilize up to €300 billion in public and private investments in infrastructure, green energy, education, and research for sustainable development worldwide between 2021 and 2027. Announced in 2021, it was presented as a principle and value-based offer from the EU to partner countries to address infrastructure deficits and support green and digital transitions. By addressing the needs of partner countries while pursuing its own strategic interests, the GG reflects a significant shift in how the EU conducts its external action in an increasingly competitive global environment. It embodies the EU’s effort to assert its socio-economic model more prominently, especially in Africa, which is set to receive half of the total investment.

It is projected that €135 billion of the GG will be mobilized through additional public and private investments, while €145 billion will be leveraged from Member States’ financial and development institutions. Including the €18 billion in grants, the European Commission aims to reach the target of €300 billion in total investment.

The main objective of the Global Gateway is to enhance both the quality and quantity of infrastructure in partner countries, directing investments to areas where infrastructure gaps have become particularly evident in recent years. Key priority sectors include digitalization, climate and energy, transport, health, and education and research. The European Commission annually reviews a list of Global Gateway flagship projects. According to data from 2023, projects related to climate and energy made up the majority, accounting for over 50 percent of the total in both 2023 and 2025. In contrast, investments in education and research represented only a marginal share in 2025.

The two graphs highlight a strong concentration of Global Gateway projects in Africa, with a particular emphasis on the energy and transport sectors. This continent has seen the largest growth both in the number of projects and in investments within these two priority areas.


Source: European Commission, GTAI

The Global Gateway in Africa

GG flagship projects aim to combine investments in hard infrastructure (such as roads, cables, and solar plants) with investments in the enabling environment (such as education, skills, research, regulatory frameworks, and good governance) to support human development and strengthen the institutional capacity of partner countries.

GG flagship projects are currently being implemented in 37 out of the 60 countries classified as fragile by the OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework. Among the key priorities in Africa are various transport corridors, as highlighted by the European Commission. These corridors aim to “facilitate trade and mobility within Africa as well as between Africa and Europe,” and “support investment in sustainable, efficient, and safe connectivity between the continents, thereby developing value chains that benefit industries both in Africa and Europe.” The notion of "benefit to Europe" is particularly relevant and will be critically addressed later in this paper through the question: who is really benefiting from the Global Gateway?

Africa represents the primary geographical focus of this financial strategy. Through Team Europe, €150 billion in investments will be delivered. This means that the EU, its Member States, and key European financial institutions will jointly support projects in priority areas that have been mutually identified. According to official documents released by the European Commission in November 2022, these priority areas include energy and the green transition (with a focus on hydrogen production), digital transition, sustainable growth with decent job creation, strengthening health systems, and support for sustainable financing.

A notable omission is the limited emphasis on education and training, which is presented as one of the last priority areas and lacks detailed elaboration. The African investment package allocates €970 million to the "Youth Mobility for Africa" programme, which aims to promote youth exchanges and mobility both within Africa and between Africa and Europe. This raises a critical question: why is education relegated to the background? If promoting development and economic transformation is the objective, shouldn't this begin with education and training that empower people to change their socio-economic and political realities? Instead, much of the EU’s focus remains on energy and the green transition. The reason may lie in the EU’s stated goal to "develop value chains that benefit industries both in Africa and Europe” (European Commission).

The EU’s strong emphasis on energy is further demonstrated by the initiative "Scaling up Renewables in Africa," described as “a global campaign to mobilise investments for accelerating renewable energy projects in Africa”. Launched at the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro in November 2024 by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, the campaign aims to generate new policy and financial commitments to expand energy access. Currently, 600 million people in Africa lack reliable access to electricity, despite the continent possessing 60% of the world’s best solar resources. The World Bank has also joined this campaign, following a joint announcement in March by Von der Leyen and World Bank President Ajay Banga, aligning “Scaling up Renewables in Africa” with the Bank’s “Mission 300,” which aims to provide energy access to 300 million people.

What, then, is the EU’s true intention behind the Global Gateway strategy?

One key motivation for the Global Gateway is to provide a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013. Although the financial scale of the GG is significant, it remains smaller than China’s expansive BRI investments. The idea of the GG emerged from a growing awareness within the EU that it had become a “payer but not a player” on the global stage, particularly as China extended its influence in the Global South through large-scale infrastructure investments and control over critical raw materials. Thus, the Global Gateway also serves as a means for the EU to enhance its global influence while responding to the needs of developing countries. However, the strategy risks incoherence due to the broad range of scattered projects across regions. In contrast, China's approach appears more cohesive, aimed at expanding global linkages through a mix of soft and hard power. While China uses the BRI to expand its export markets and address industrial overcapacity, the GG proposes a development model based on shared values and sustainability at the core of infrastructure projects.

Another challenge is that the Global Gateway is limited in time, with an expiration date set for 2027. This limits its potential for long-term investment, in contrast to the BRI, which has operated since 2013 and enjoys broader international backing. For now, it seems unlikely that the GG can fully compete with the BRI; at best, it might complement it.

A second possible interpretation of the EU’s intention is that the strategy may benefit European actors more than their African counterparts. To better assess this perspective, it is worth mentioning Kenya’s case, a country often portrayed as a digital frontrunner in Africa.

While the Global Gateway aligns with Kenya’s Ten-Year National Digital Master Plan - supporting digital infrastructure and human-centered digitalisation through Team Europe Initiative - the dynamics reveal an asymmetry of benefits. On paper, both sides gain: Kenya upgrades its digital systems, while European actors secure access to a growing tech market and test grounds for regulatory export. However, concerns over digital sovereignty arise, as the EU frequently promotes its own standards, particularly in data governance and AI ethics, without sufficiently adapting them to local contexts. Moreover, despite Kenya’s innovation potential, EU funding continues to favour foreign-led initiatives, marginalising local entrepreneurs and reinforcing existing structural inequalities. Education and training once again receive minimal attention: though programs like Youth Mobility and some TVET schemes exist, they remain limited in scope and insufficient to address the digital skills gap, especially among women and rural communities. This reflects a broader pattern in the Global Gateway: while it presents itself as a partnership for sustainable development, its priorities often tilt toward European geopolitical and economic interests, leaving behind the foundational needs, such as inclusive education and digital literacy, that are essential for lasting transformation.

Conclusion

In light of the evidence examined, the European Union’s Global Gateway emerges less as a transformative development strategy and more as a strategic rebranding of long-standing asymmetries in EU–Africa relations. While it introduces novel mechanisms and rhetoric grounded in sustainability and shared values, its implementation reveals critical contradictions. The initiative prioritizes European commercial and geopolitical interests, often through opaque processes and with limited involvement of local actors, while neglecting foundational elements such as education, digital inclusion, and human rights safeguards. The Kenya case illustrates how EU investments risk reinforcing digital dependence rather than fostering sovereignty or inclusive growth. These dynamics, echoed in the Oxfam-Eurodad-Counter Balance report, expose the persistent gap between discourse and practice. Rather than establishing equitable partnerships, the Global Gateway risks replicating neo-colonial patterns under a new guise. Without greater transparency, inclusive governance, and genuine commitment to local needs and ownership, the strategy will not be able to dismantle those inequalities that it claims.

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