The Future of Arctic Governance: the End of Exceptionalism and the Return to Competition
Chiara Malaponti - Junior Researcher G.E.O. Politics
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to give an overview of the main trends in Arctic governance since the end of the Cold War to the present day. Indeed, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has caused a paradigm shift which has put in jeopardy one of the main tenets of Arctic politics, namely Arctic exceptionalism. However, this paper argues that a sudden stop in cooperation between Arctic states, which include the Russian Federation, is not feasible in the long-run, even if politically motivated. Such a development would lead to security concerns and, specifically, to the exacerbation of the climate emergency, that would be detrimental to society as a whole.
Introduction
On March 3rd, 2022, the United States, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland released a joint statement condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and suspending their participation to the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies (US Department of State, 2022). This decision stemmed from their refusal to continue the Council’s work under the Russian chairmanship, which is to last until May 2023.
The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum “promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic Indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic'' (Arctic Council, 2022). It was born out of the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, in which it is specifically written that the Council “should not deal with matters related to military security” (Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996). What may look like a deficiency constitutes, in reality, its main strength. By setting aside hard security issues, the Council was able to promote an effective cooperation on many civil, yet crucial aspects of Arctic governance among its eight permanent members, which include the states aforementioned and the Russian Federation. Moreover, “its collaboration on environmental and scientific matters has fostered cooperation that has led to amicable security arrangements'' (McVicar, 2022). For example, in 2010 Russia and Norway came together to sign the Treaty concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, which was interpreted as a “broader Russian foreign policy effort to reduce possible conflicts with neighboring nations with the intention to improve Moscow’s image as a rule-abiding player” (Nilsen, 2022).
However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has reshaped the Arctic system of international relations, that since the end of the Cold War had gradually become a beacon of multilateralism. The suspension of the activities of the Arctic Council is worrying in two ways. First of all, under a regional perspective, it further disrupts the communication between key players in the area. It fosters a division in two blocs - namely, the Western bloc and a hypothetical “Eastern bloc”, made up by the Russian Federation which thrives on Chinese investment – heightening the risk of a continued militarisation. Secondly, it jeopardizes joint efforts at tackling serious global issues, such as climate change, and at pursuing (and limiting, in case of resource extraction) local development projects that, among other things, have huge impacts on the livelihood of indigenous populations.
2. The decline of Arctic exceptionalism
“Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North Pole be a pole of peace” said Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, as he called for “a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region” (Gorbachev, 1987). His speech in Murmansk indeed laid the foundations for the signing of the Ottawa Declaration in 1996 and the establishment of the Arctic Council. Since then, the idea spread that the Arctic states, despite their differences, could come together in the High North and cooperate on a variety of issues, in a way that, on one hand, was the consequence of the Arctic being somewhat detached from the rest of the world and that, on the other hand, perpetuated the same insulation. “It can be the case that the Arctic is ‘exceptional’ to the extent that the states that comprise Arctic international society have intentionally negotiated a regional order predicated on a more cooperative framework than they pursue with each other elsewhere, and have endeavored, implicitly, to compartmentalize relations there” (Exner-Pirot, Murray, 2017). This can also be explained by looking at the challenging environmental conditions of the High North, which inherently favour interstate cooperation as the best way to pursue national interests.
In the past years, the doctrine of Arctic exceptionalism largely held in the face of a series of international crises. The Arctic Council was able to weather the Iraq war, the 2008 war in Georgia and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The events of late February, though, caused an unprecedented rupture in the Arctic system of international relations, depriving Russia, among other things, of its involvement “in one of its few remaining soft power venues capable of meaningful international coordination” (McVicar, 2022). Moreover, the invasion of Ukraine pushed two Nordic states, Finland and Sweden, to abandon their historical neutrality and to join NATO. These developments constitute a major alteration of the power balances up North. For one, all members of the Arctic Council would now be NATO members, except Russia. Moreover, the Arctic is essential to the Russian political discourse, especially when speaking about economic development and national security. Therefore, that feeling of encirclement which allegedly motivated the attack on Ukraine could become even more heightened by the changing interstate dynamics in the Arctic. Taking on Kiev represented indeed a strategic loss for the Russian Federation. It finally broke the “exceptional” status quo in the Arctic, causing a spill-over effect of unseen magnitude since the fall of the Soviet Union. The shift from collaboration to competition constitutes a dangerous development, in that it could lead, even by accident, to a military escalation between nuclear powers. It should then be accompanied by a new system of deterrence and agreed red lines. “[...] the NATO states will remain concerned to avoid any international escalation. But the Arctic region will also be part of a robust and networked containment strategy against Russia – and in future China” (Paul, 2022).
Anyway, it must be noted that attitudes were changing even before the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, which acted as a multiplier factor. According to a 2021 report by the National Intelligence Council, states were already expected to heighten their competition as a consequence of increased access due to global warming. Such competition was to take the form of commercial and economic rivalry, with a modest increase in the risk of miscalculations by 2040 (National Intelligence Council, 2021). “[...] climate change is acting as an accelerant for activity in the region. Those activities, particularly fossil fuel extraction, in turn are speeding up the transformation of the Arctic” (Irfan, 2022).
Then, as one of the most fragile and difficult regions on Earth, international coordination in the Arctic continues to be necessary. The Arctic Seven (that is, all members of the Arctic Council except Russia) seem to have realised it. After abandoning the workings of the Council, they tried to extend their collaboration on those projects that saw no involvement on the part of Moscow (Schreiber, 2022). However admirable, this course of action is destined to be only partially effective. That is because of a hard fact: Russia comprises over half of the Arctic coastline and it is home to 40 indigenous peoples and the majority of industries (McVicar, 2022; Arctic Council). Dialogue with Russia ought to resume, then, sooner or later, especially as the region is warming three to four times faster than the rest of the globe (Voosen, 2022; The Economist, 2022) and data sharing between Western and Russian scientific hubs has been heavily compromised due to the ongoing conflict (Witze, 2022; Paul, 2022).
3. The future of Arctic governance
As Norway takes over the Arctic Council chairmanship in 2023, the members of the forum will need to define their next step towards the re-establishment of a solid system of governance in the Arctic. Since Russia will no longer guide the workings of the Council, it is likely that the Arctic Seven will resume their activities under the leadership of Oslo. Nevertheless, it is yet to see whether and how Russia will be reintegrated into the Council’s architecture. This largely depends on an unpredictable factor, namely the future developments of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and its economic consequences. “A bilateral agreement would offer a better basis than a militarily “frozen” but unresolved conflict in Ukraine. Nobody can know when the time will be opportune for the Arctic Council to resume its normal functions” (Paul, 2022). Moreover, even if cooperation between the Arctic Seven and Russia was to be reinstated, the Council would be confronted with two other issues: what would be productive or reasonable to discuss with Moscow and the question of the Kremlin’s credibility. “The Arctic Council will lose legitimacy and goodwill and its agenda will shrink in both scope and size as future Russian statements on Arctic cooperation will likely be met with more skepticism from the other seven members than ever before” (McVicar, 2022).
For this reason, a new institutional framework for the Arctic has been proposed, the Nordic Plus, which would exclude Russia. Such a body would be rooted in Western liberal culture, specifically on “values that are shared between Europe and North America” (Kirchner, 2022). The logical premise behind the theorisation of the Nordic Plus is that “cooperation in the Arctic requires a higher degree of resilience than the Arctic Council has had until now. This requires a solid fundament on the basis of shared values. Such a fundament already exists among the A7” (ibid.). Nevertheless, the current, limited cooperation among the same Arctic Seven on matters that do not include the Russian Federation is still very far from the establishment of an alternative forum (Schreiber, 2022). Moreover, the latter would not solve a primary issue: that Russia remains the largest Arctic power and, therefore, coordination with Moscow is needed if the aim is to make an impact.
As channels of communication with the West close, Russia is turning East. The Kremlin needs funding both for its energy projects in the Arctic, which have been hampered by Western sanctions, and for the overall development of regional infrastructure - notably, the Northern Sea Route. At the present moment, it is still unsure whether the Asian market will be able to replace the European one. Nevertheless, when it comes to Arctic governance, “the new Arctic, much like the new world order, looks set to pit NATO members against China and Russia” (The Economist, 2022).
4. Conclusions
For the first time since the end of the Cold War, tensions resulting from a non-Arctic conflict spilt over into the North Pole. The result was a sudden shift from collaboration to competition, that put one of the regional governing bodies into jeopardy. Even though formally no Arctic state left the Arctic Council, the suspension of its activities will have far reaching consequences in Arctic governance for years to come. It raises questions of whether coordination among the concerned states will resume and, if so, in which format. Furthermore, these developments are unfolding in a region that is per se extremely difficult to navigate. Such an environment should foster, in principle, international cooperation that would lead, in turn, to a win-win scenario.
However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine changed things. And while the Arctic, as other international arenas, is bound to reflect the shifting power dynamics in respect to the world order - that is, further polarisation and confrontation between established and emerging players - it could still remain an avenue for cooperation on civil and soft security projects. It is imperative, given the fragility of the region and the worsening of the climate emergency, that this does not remain a missed opportunity. Institutional creativity will be needed to accomodate the political necessities of those involved in order to keep working towards the common social good.
Sources
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4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
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A | Trustworthy | No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness |
B | Normally trustworthy | Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases |
C | Sufficiently trustworthy | Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past |
D | Normally not trustworthy | Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past |
E | Not trustworthy | Lack of authenticity, reliability or competence; history of invalid information |
F | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
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