Abstract: Malaysia, a country defined by its multiculturalism and multi-confessional population, is witnessing a surge in conservative Islamist parties. This recent development is set to alter the nation’s legal, economic, and societal landscape. The variegated ethnic composition of Malaysia is woven into the constitution of this South-East Asian state and permeates various aspects of citizens’ life. The purpose of this paper is to enquire the recent political upsurge of a conservative Islamist party, the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party), exploring the reasons behind its electoral success and the trajectory that traditional Islamic doctrines might have on the state.
First and foremost, due to Malaysia’s complex ethnic composition, the initial chapter will be dedicated to analysing and explaining historical demographic trends. Next, the idea of “Malayness” and the role of Islam in the country will be looked at, in relation to the electoral growth of PAS. Finally, it will be considered how such a political force might impact the country’s legal system and its economic prosperity.
Andrea Licini - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Politica
Ethnic diversity in Malaysia
According to the Federal Constitution, a Malay is “a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom” (Art. 160.2). To Malays is bestowed by the Constitution the connotation of “natives” of the land. Namely, they are -and were- the original population of the Malaya peninsula, to whom special privileges are legally granted due to this specific status (Art. 150). Beside ethnic Malays, other groups are recognised as native: the Borneo-based “natives of Sarawak” and “natives of Sabah” (Art. 161), as well as the aboriginal people (Art. 150).
These groups fall under the umbrella definition of “Bumiputera” (sons of the soil), a term that does not appear in the Constitution but broadly describes the native population of the Malaya Peninsula and Borneo. To better understand the kind of privileges enjoyed by the Bumiputera, the solutions proposed by the constitution are similar to affirmative action policies, in support of groups that also started as disadvantaged, on average, after the country gained its independence.
The great bulk of the population is indeed composed of Bumiputera, now standing slightly above 70% of the total citizens. However, Islamic faith is ascribed only to Malays, along with converted members of other ethnic groups and Muslim immigrants. According to the latest census, those who adhere to Sunni Islam constitute the absolute majority of the population, 63.5%, and this number is growing (Malaysian Government Census, 2020). The rest of the population constitutes a mosaic, composed of Chinese and Indian Malaysians, professing religions such as Buddhism, various denominations of Christianity, Hinduism, and atheism.
Malay identity and the role of Islam
The question for a national identity arose strongly following the British departure from the peninsula. Malaysia ought to create a modern state from a territory that had served as a trade outpost, seldom ruled by politicians but by trade companies. The Malays were the most numerous group. Local politicians thus envisioned a state where A) Islam would have been the main religion, but for the others an official recognition would be granted and B) the Malays would be lifted out of poverty through affirmative action politics, mainly to contrast the richer Chinese middle class (D. Lim, C. Hale, 2023).
Aside from the obvious majority position where the Malay political leadership arose, the justification given for the new state system was based on the indigenous status of Malays. However, this is only partially true. While Chinese and Indians have been forcibly brought by the British or voluntarily immigrated to work mainly on plantations and mines, established communities existed even before the coloniser’s arrival. For example, in Penang, a commercial outpost, in 1812 Chinese constituted 28% of the population (K. Sagoo, 2006), followed by a slightly lower Indian community. Moreover, some of the immigrants also came from Java and Sumatra and, due to similarities in religion and language spoken, these individuals were classified by the British as Malay, hence contributing to the growth of this group by immigration.
Since independence, the Bumiputera position has been safeguarded by UMNO, a Malay nationalist party that governed the country through coalitions until recently (D. Lim, C. Hale, 2023). As a union of Malay nationalists, anti-colonialists and anti-communists, UMNO made the interests of the majority group its political program, granting the Bumiputera the privileges as stated in the constitution.
Under UMNO, Malaysia remained an overall stable democracy, and even though Islam has been promoted, its most radical schools of thought have been kept at bay. Most importantly, political Islam was not able to encroach upon the government. By maintaining a pragmatic approach to religious matters, ethnic confrontations were reduced, and this stability contributed to the dynamic economic growth of the Southeast Asian country.
The current conservative surge does not stem from a dire economic situation or tense ethnic rivalries. Indeed, Malaysia has the highest GDP per capita among ASEAN countries (World Bank), leaving aside the city-states of Singapore and Brunei, and has never experienced the same dramatic rise in Islamic terrorism as the neighbouring Thailand or the Philippines. The lucrative oil industry tricked down its revenue, creating a widespread wellbeing across different strata of the population and, more recently, the government was able to diversify the economy, developing a solid high-tech semiconductors export sector.
PAS surge could then be explained by two main factors: the unpopularity of UMNO and the growing identification of the younger generation with their religion. The former point involves the 1MBD scandal, a corruption case implicating UMNO leadership and leading to the imprisonment of former PM Najib Razak. This scandal provided PAS an anti-corruption platform and shifting general Malay dissatisfied voters to the other Islamist party (S. Rahman, 2023). The second reason is the most significant. With the youngest cohort of the electorate swinging to Islamic conservatism, Malaysia is set to become a more sectarian country, divided along religious affiliation. A recent survey directed at young voters unveiled how 87% of young Muslims regard religion as a key identification marker, more than citizenship, 93% disagree with the possibility of Muslim changing religion, and 43% would like to see Shariah Courts empowered as civil ones (Merdeka Center, 2022). More broadly, a consensus seeing Islam and the Quranic teaching as the fundament for public and private life is brewing, and ethnic affiliation is strengthening.
Malaysian political landscape and PAS program
PM Anwar currently leads the Malaysian government. His formation, the Pakatan Harapan, is a progressive and multiethnic party, coalescing liberal and reformist Bumiputera with Chinese. They control the highest number of seats in the lower chamber and dominate a large but loose coalition formed by the Barisan Nasional (where UMNO is situated), which was significantly resized in the last elections, and the Sarawak Party Alliance. Outside the government formation, the only opposition force is represented by the Perikatan Nasional, a coalition headed by PAS and its junior partner, BERSATU, a nationalist indigenous party. Despite the coalition having liberal-nationalist connotation, on some issues the government has been dragged on the right, fearful of losing the necessary support of the Malay Muslim population. In particular, the nationalist UMNO has been extremely sensible to prevent PAS gains within its electorate, a preoccupation made even more pressing due to the detrimental effect that the participation in an unnatural alliance might cause.
Describing PAS as a simple political party might be reductive; indeed, the organisation has long been rooted in some Malaysian regions, acting beforehand as a cultural, social, and religious group. Its stronghold is in the north of the country, the most religious and underdeveloped part of the nation. PAS controls the government of four regions: Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis. Since the 1980s, PAS supporters actively established private kindergartens (J. Chin, 2022), and the party maintains a firm control over religious schools, universities, and mosques in those regions (A. Rabasa, 2006). The party also collaborates with local organisations providing support for rural communities. This approach constituted the grassroot base for the party, transforming the less economically influential north into the political and ideological powerhouse of the coalition.
The political aim of the members is to turn Malaysia into an Islamic State and, therefore, to use the Quran as the source of national laws. The harshest confrontation with the other parties and the Constitutional Court exactly reflects the utmost importance given by PAS to sharia law. Indeed, the party promulgated “Hudud” in the region governed (Neo J., Shah D., 2015); leading to legal disputes with the Supreme Court. Another significant issue is Malay nationalism, promoted through symbolic initiatives, such as the promotion of the use of Bahasa Malaysia instead of English. Overall, religion holds a more prominent position than ethnicity in PAS’s ideology, making it more accurate to classify the party as theocratic rather than nationalist.
While these battles have solidified the party in its historical constituencies, an electoral campaign fought over corruption yielded PAS the historical results of 43 seats out of 222. As scandals were undermining UMNO, the Islamist party was the only credible alternative for many Malays, seeing with distrust even the progressive coalition due to its significant Chinese presence in it (E. Sunarso, 2023).
Lastly, the rise of PAS will surely not be a short-lived phenomenon due to the composition of its electorate. The formation polls high among young voters, and the historic result in the last election is a consequence of the lowered vote threshold age (S. Strangio, 2022). It should also be noted that while the rural youth back the party, the regions controlled by PAS are also those with the highest fertility rate, suggesting that these areas will become increasingly influential in the country’s future political life (Malaysian Government Census, 2020).
The civil and Islamic legal systems
The public debate on religion and how it should be regulated moves around the dual legal system of the country. Malaysia operates two distinct legal systems: one based on common law and the other on Islamic law. Sharia courts, which are independent of the federal government and state-controlled, enforce Quranic legislation only in respect to Muslim citizens. While the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the legitimacy of the Sharia Courts originates from the codes passed by the singular states according to their interpretation of Islamic Shaira law.
Sharia legislation applies only to some aspects of Muslims’ personal lives, such as marriage, illicit sexual intercourses, and apostasy. Despite having defined boundaries relative to common law, the application of Sharia legislation has sparked controversies within the Malaysian legal system. The most pressing issue is indeed the demarcation between the common law and the Islamic codes. Under UMNO the situation remained balanced, with the different coalitions in the Malaysian parliament unofficially agreeing to smooth the tension that such a confrontation might stir. Therefore, the debate was generally silenced for good, an issue “not to be talked about”, with the harshest sharia legislations remaining confined to northern states. Nonetheless, following the rise of PAS, the debate has been brought to the forefront, as the Islamist party craves for enlarging the limits of religious legislation.
Now, it is fundamental to clarify the party doctrine, which is in line with the original interpretation of the Quran, prescribing specific crimes and their corresponding punishments (L. Jaclyn, et al., 2015). The progressive interpretation of the Muslim holy scripture regards the punishment for the listed crimes already included in the common law system without further expansion of special religious courts. On the other side, the conservatives consider the text as “given”, not leaving margins for interpretation and to be enacted exactly as stated. Following the latter interpretation, PAS members pushed for strengthening sharia courts and passing states’ codes derived directly from the Quran. The original Code spells out six hudud crimes: theft, robbery, unlawful sexual intercourse, slanderous accusation, consumption of alcohol, and apostasy. Applicable to Muslims only, the code contemplates corporal punishment (already present in Malaysian criminal justice) and, in the most extreme cases, death penalty and mutilation.
Following the growth of the Muslim population, the balancing act of the mainstream Malaysian political forces started to fade in an attempt to court the potential PAS voters. After failed attempts by PAS to insert a Sharia criminal code in the states’ legislation of Kelantan and Terengganu, UMNO started to tilt in favour of Islamist authorities, thus creating with success the Malaysian Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM) and the Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding (IKIM). With this move, the government coalition tried to out-Islamise PAS. Again, in 2017, Najib Razak-led government allowed the PAS’s bill to empower the sharia courts to be voted favourably. More recently, even the progressive Anwar government gave the possibility of further empower Sharia courts (S. Shukri, N. Saat, 2024).
The Supreme Court remains the sole actor backing secularism. In February 2024, the highest judicial body ruled in favour of two women from the state of Kelantan, overruling the state’s Sharia code that violated the federal law. The backlash from society has been fierce, as the ruling was regarded by many as an attempt of undermine the whole religion of Islam (J. Rachman, 2024).
Another significant problem arising from the Malaysian dual courts system is the absence of the possibility to opt-out for Muslim-born citizens (J. Nazri, 2020). This point has been illustrated in the emblematic case of Lina Joy, a woman who converted from Islam to Christianity in order to marry her future husband. Although the woman sincerely renounced Islam and started practicing another religion, she was not able to obtain recognition of it from the state; in particular, her identity card could not be changed, thus keeping labelling her as “Muslim”. After filing the case to change it, the civil court refused to consider the issue under its jurisdiction, deferring to the Sharia Court. Lina Joy should have at this point filled the case there, something she never did due to the obvious outcome. She was forced to flee the country, not only to get married but to safeguard her life, being the target of intimidation and possible investigation over apostasy allegations (Becket, 2007). Her case set a strong precedent in Malaysian law: a Muslim-born citizen has no choice to opt-out of Sharia legislation given the impossibility of abandoning the status of “Muslim” even after going through a real and proven conversion.
What will be the future of Malaysia?
The success of the country derives from its pragmatic approach to law, economy, and culture. While the country has been under the rule of a conservative Islamist party, UMNO, its approach has given priority to economic growth and shared prosperity (although with differences between the ethnic groups). The country has adopted Malay as the official language since its independence, but English remains widely spoken, particularly in the communication and economic spheres. The country also adopted the legislation of its former coloniser, England, which fostered investments and the enhancement of the private sector vitality, similar to other common law countries. Finally, nationalist measures such as the advantages granted to Bumiputera and the existence of a parallel Sharia legislation have not completely overshadowed the other ethnic and religious groups that constitute the economic engine of the country.
The rise of PAS might signify the end of the equilibrium between ethnicities and halt the balancing of religion with pragmatism that characterised Malaysian governments. More precisely, the driving force underlying all this phenomenon is the consistent rise of conservative views of Islam among the voters. The widespread adherence of young people to strict Quranic interpretations and the demographic advantage of the northern region will significantly alter Malaysia’s electoral landscape. As a further demonstration beside the recent solid results of PAS in the general election, all the political parties have also tilted toward an understanding with an increasingly conservative electorate.
Through the aforementioned JAKIM, the ideas of political Islam made an inroad into the government bureaucracy. The agency has become increasingly autonomous and deviated from the initial function envisioned by UMNO: from being a trusted department to placate conservatives’ demands and support the party, to proselytise the vision of PAS within the government (J. Chin, 2021). JAKIN now oversees the regulation of Islam in the media, finance, courts, education, and food (through the Halal certification). Nonetheless, its real authority stems from the unofficial power to interpretat the endorsed national Islam. In the last decade, private think-tanks, universities, and NGOs have sprung up, contributing to spreading an intolerant vision of religion. Islamic banking is also on the rise (T. Lun, 2022). Lastly, Malaysia seems now to be more susceptible to international political events, viewing them through religious and ideological lenses. As an example, the war in the Middle-East sparked serious demonstrations in the streets of Kuala Lumpur, where mainly young people protested the military response of Israel and expressed their support for the Palestinian cause (D. Hutt, 2024).
Conclusion and forecasts
As Lee Kuan Yew, former president of Singapore and also a former Malaysian citizen, once said: “In multiracial societies, you don’t vote in accordance with your economic interests and social interests, you vote in accordance with race and religion. [In a democracy,] Malays would vote for Muslims, Indians would vote for Indians, Chinese would vote for Chinese.” (Der Spiegel, 2005) This has been the case in Malaysia up until today: votes broke down along ethnic lines, thus granting the nationalist coalition, Barisan Nasional, headed by UMNO, to de-facto govern the country without interruption, down to a minor partner only after the last elections. As a consequence, the interest of Bumiputera has been safeguarded, but affirmative action policies aimed at this group have also produced great disadvantages for the country’s minority. In spite of the differences within the electorate, the social fabric has not broken apart: the equilibrium between the parties was regarded as paramount, and, because of that, Malaysia enjoyed a relative economic prosperity compared to the south-east Asian region.
The shift from a nationalist Malay-ruled government to a religious Muslim one might have dire consequences for the whole country. Firstly, PAS aims to transform the federation into a Muslim state, thus altering the balance of the judiciary in favour of Sharia courts. This would not only reduce civil liberties but pose a real threat to the economic stability of Malaysia, with a reduction of the benefit of a common law system and a business-friendly environment. Secondly, the balance among the ethnic group interest would be ceased, substituted by a Muslims/non-Muslims confrontation, clearly to the advantage of the former.
In the short term, Anwar’s government will safeguard the stability of the country, even though the formation is clearly unstable, because of its unnatural composition. UMNO is constantly brought toward a fierce competition with PAS to gain the heart of Malay’s majority vote, resulting in declaration and demonstration from both parties. Yet, leaving aside parties’ propaganda, real steps further in support of conservative Islam are unlikely due to the ideological outlook of the executive. In the medium term, it is difficult to foresee a future government coalition with PAS, given its ideological radicalism, making it not probable for the party to gain real power.
In the long term, young voters’ identification with political Islam and the demographic advantages of the northern PAS-controlled region would likely lead to a profound change in the political organisation of the federation. Regardless of the future governing formations, if the current trends persist, Malaysia is set to shift from a multiethnic society to a state with a Muslim religious majority.
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