Water (in)security and its repercussions on regional stability: a case study of Ethiopia’s GERD within the Nile Basin dispute

  Focus - Allegati
  06 July 2026
  13 minutes, 38 seconds

Water (in)security and its repercussions on regional stability: a case study of Ethiopia’s GERD within the Nile Basin dispute



Abstract

This analysis aims at providing a comprehensive account of the nexus between climate change and geopolitics, highlighting how environmental change exacerbates competition over natural resources.

The Nile Basin dispute will serve as an empirical case in illustrating the complex dynamics between riparian states, rooted in colonial-era agreements and aggravated by water insecurity. Environmental change indisputably compromises water availability. Yet, its role as a conflict multiplier is underestimated. Notions of International Water Law and the Hydro Hegemony Theory will provide the analytical framework for examining the region’s asymmetric power dynamics while providing a necessary legal context.

Monica Gambardella (Junior Researcher – GEO Ambiente)



Introduction

On top of being a vital source of water, the Nile is Africa’s most complex cross-boundary river basin. Nursery to ancient civilisation, the Nile valley has been the object of competitive claims for millennia. (Peguita 2020). With water scarcity already being a defining feature of the African continent, it is expected in the foreseeable future for environmental change to further alter the river’s flows. While lacking common agreement on resource sharing, water politics in the Nile Basin have remained rather stable, until 2011, when the announcement of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam disrupted the status quo. Ever since, tensions have heightened and the Nile Basin has been regarded as one of the major flashpoints in the region. (Freitas 2013).

Climate change and geopolitics: a tight linkage

As availability of natural resources progressively decreases due to harsher climate conditions, competitive claims for their control increase the likelihood of border tensions escalating in open conflicts. Moreover, considering poor environmental global governance and the free-riding behaviour of certain states, the situation is expected to further deteriorate. Most notably, water scarcity is raising increasing strategic concern. An equitable utilization of shared bodies of water is key to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 6 within the United Nations 2030 Agenda, that is to “ensure access to water and sanitation for all” (Peguita 2020). While being essential for human development, water constitutes the foremost prerequisite for human survival and is therefore strongly connected with security (Tensay and Enku 2020). Within the hydro political dimension, cross-border waters are fertile soil for conflicts, enhancing border tensions and creating social instability. On the African continent, the most prominent example of transboundary water dispute is the Nile Basin dispute, between Egypt and Ethiopia (Scheffran 2020).

Geographic and strategic relevance of the Nile Basin

Covering one tenth of the African continent, the Nile is shared by ten countries and is responsible for sustaining the livelihoods of more than 150 million people. Increasing demographic trends and climate-driven reduced water supply, turn water insecurity into an imminent threat. Adding to it, except for Egypt and Kenya, the remaining riparian states are among the worlds’ poorest nations, making them more vulnerable to climate hazards and intensifying the demand for water. (Kameri-Mbote 2007). The Longest transnational river on earth, the Nile has been the object of competing claims for millennia, making its management a delicate issue. The biggest challenge is however represented by the lack of an inclusive legal framework regulating the exploitation of its waters. (Peguita 2020).

Evolution of the Nile dispute: from colonial arrangements to cooperative frameworks

The Nile dispute is rooted in colonial-era agreements and is a heritage of the imbalanced power dynamics within the basin. The need to regulate the Nile’s waters emerged along with the first establishment of colonial powers in the region. Although not directly addressing the river’s management, the Anglo Italian protocol signed in 1891 and demarcating the zones of influence over the basin is regarded as the first ever international legal tool. While on the one hand, this act signalled the United Kingdom’s commitment in ensuring Egypt’s unobstructed access to water, on the other hand it laid the groundwork for the establishment of Egypt’s de facto and de jure hydro hegemony in the basin (Peguita 2020). Asymmetric hydro political relations within the valley have been cemented by later agreements, contributing to the formation of the current geopolitical configuration. Crucial points on the timeline are the agreements signed in 1929 and 1959. The former was signed between Egypt and the British empire on behalf of its colonies and legitimised Sudan’s and Egypt’s historic rights. This first Nile water agreement received fierce contestation on multiple fronts. Firstly, by Ethiopia, which was not a signatory party to it, and later by Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, former British territories. Such a disagreement led to the 1959 accord for the Full Utilisation of the Nile waters, still standing at the heart of the dispute. The agreement excluded upstream riparian states and institutionalized Sudan’s and Egypt’s claims for natural rights over the Nile, conferring them legitimacy as the only legally backed claims (Cascão 2009). Although the treaty has been repeatedly contested over the years, no concrete action for the exploitation of the river was taken until 2011. It is only with Ethiopia’s announcement of the construction of the GERD, that tensions among riparian nations heightened, sparking deep apprehension of the international community (Kameri-Mbote 2007). Despite the hostilities, riparian nations have agreed on the establishment of a cooperative framework for managing transboundary waters. Converged effort resulted in the launching of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) (Kameri-Mbote 2007). Established in 1999, the NBI is a multilateral institutional mechanism, bringing together ministers of the signatory states charged with water affairs. Originally signed by nine countries and aimed at achieving an equitable use of the Nile waters for the equal benefit of all the parties concerned, the NBI has received wide support from the international community. Despite initial success, demographic and economic factors led to an increase in water demand, which in turn, prompted a reopening of talks to revise the conditions previously agreed upon. Further negotiations led to the signature of the Cooperative framework agreement (FCA), strongly advocated by downstream states, and opposed by Sudan and Egypt, claiming that their water needs would have been disregarded by it. (Freitas 2013).

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and breaking of the status quo

The GERD project and its relevance for Ethiopia must be premised on the country’s massive disposal of fresh waters. Due to the presence of twelve major rivers and eleven lakes, Ethiopia is in fact known as “water tower”. However, despite its significant possession of water resources, it suffers from water insecurity, a condition that is exacerbated by climate change (Legass et al. 2026). Inaugurated in 2011, the GERD offers improved prospects for the country’s future. Backbone of the Ethiopian national development plan, the dam is the largest hydroelectric project on the African continent. Furthermore, it takes on a deep nationalistic value, as it is mostly financed by the Ethiopian people. (Halidu, Joy, and Onochie 2025). Ethiopia’s motivations lie behind its effort to curb poverty, alleviate famine and boost development, particularly considering the projection that its population will double in the foreseeable future. More than half of the Ethiopian people do not have access to electricity and the dam is expected to rectify this situation. (Tensay and Enku 2020). While being a reason of pride for Ethiopians, the same cannot be said for neighbouring nations, first and foremost, Egypt. Ever since the dam’s announcement, Egypt has looked upon it with great suspicion, fearing that it would cause a shortage of water supply - overall understandable when considering that almost the entirety of Egypt’s water consumption depends on the Nile. (Scheffran 2020)

International Water Law’s contribution

While lacking an inclusive legal framework, insightful indications for moderation of the Nile dispute could be found in the foundational pillars of International Water Law, such as the Helsinki rules, the Berlin rules and the UN Watercourses Convention (Peguita 2020). Signed in 1997, the convention is a global framework aimed at regulating the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. To legitimize their claims riparian states often invoke art 5 and art 7 of the convention. The former principle maintains that all riparian states are entitled to an equitable share of Nile’s waters, while the latter obliges states not to cause significant harm to co-riparians. The impasse lies within competing considerations of such principles. Ethiopia calls upon application of the equitable utilization principle, maintaining that although more than 85% of the Nile River stems directly from Ethiopian land, the country has nevertheless been denied benefitting from its flow. On the other hand, Egypt invokes the no-harm principle, linking its historical rights to national security. While the two principles complement one another, states’ selective interpretation prevents hostilities from deescalating (Halidu, Joy, and Onochie 2025).

Importance of the Nile for Egypt

While both downstream and upstream states, respectively early and late developers are entitled to enjoy the shared waters, it is relevant to point out the different extents to which, each of them depends on it. As declared by the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1979, “the only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water”. This statement alone suffices to illustrate the prominent role that the Nile Basin plays for Egypt. Unlike most of the other riparian states, relying on different sources of fresh water, Egypt exclusively depends on the Nile as its only access to water (Peguita 2020). Furthermore, Egypt lacks groundwater resources and experiences very little precipitation. Given this premise,it is therefore reasonable to argue that projects, such as the GERD, whose impact could significantly obstruct the flaw of water, are perceived as threatening to Egypt’s existence.

On a different note, Egypt has traditionally drawn legitimacy from the Nile. Since the establishment of the Answan High Dam in the 1960s, Egypt has embraced an aggressive hydro-political strategy to gain control over the water flows, cemented, by the aforementioned 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements, that entitled it with veto power over upstream projects. This led different governments to frame water scarcity as a security issue, essential for state consolidation and expression of Egypt’s political sovereignty (Halidu, Joy, and Onochie 2025).

Power asymmetries: Egypt’s hydro-hegemony in the Nile basin

Hydro political asymmetry is among the factors contributing to regional tensions and within the Nile basin, Egypt’s exercises de facto and de jure control over the other riparian nations. Hydro-hegemony is a dimension of water conflict, that presupposes the use of covert power on behalf of a riparian state to establish hegemony by having full control over the water regime within a territory. Hydro-hegemony explains how power asymmetries sustain unfair and inequitable allocation of transboundary waters (Woodhouse and Zeitoun 2008 ). Applied to the Nile dispute framework, the theory maintains that the construction of the GERD challenges Egypt’s traditional position as hydro hegemon in the region (Halidu, Joy, and Onochie 2025).

Broader implications of the conflict and international response

Given the Nile basin’s geopolitical significance and its proximity to the Middle East, the dispute has generated deep apprehension within the international community. This is why external actors have personal interests in preserving the status quo of the region to prevent the conflict from further escalations (Kameri-Mbote 2007). To secure diplomatic support in countering Ethiopia’s stance, Egypt exploited several international and regional frameworks, such as the Arab League, the African Union and the United Nations Security Council. Despite Egypt’s best effort to internationalize the conflict, members of the UNSC argued that the dispute should be addressed within regional framework rather than supranational arbitration (Halidu, Joy, and Onochie 2025). As it is in many cases, the Nile basin dispute is not merely about water management but is about weighing divergent political and economic ambitions. Furthermore, with the increasing rise of multipolarity, the involvement of external actors in the region further reshaped regional dynamics. (Freitas 2013). China’s involvement in the region is of utmost relevance. The Asian giant has in fact been showing an increasingly assertiveness in Africa. Sino-African relations have been institutionalized in the early 2000s with the establishment of Forum On China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a multilateral framework promoting dialogue and cooperation between the two countries. Even before that, Africa has occupied an important position in China’s foreign policy, receiving extensive financial support for infrastructural construction, including the funding for hydric projects like the GERD. (“FOCAC: In Perspective,” n.d.).



Conclusion:

As a concluding reflection, the present analysis illustrated how climate change is indirectly responsible for triggering geopolitical conflicts. The construction of the GERD represents a prominent threat for Egypt’s access to water and for the overall regional stability. Through the lens of the Nile Basin dispute, it has been argued that any action on behalf of one of the riparian states heavily affects the interests and livelihoods of the others, with whom transboundary waters are shared. In conclusion it is reasonable to say that, while severely impacting the availability of natural resources, environmental change is tightly linked with international security. Furthermore, the involvement of external actors in the region is evidence of the extent to which a regional conflict can easily evolve into a transnational phenomenon, ultimately reinforcing the universal burden of climate change (Cascão 2009).







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