IL SAHEL: LA SFIDA RUSSA ALL’UNIONE EUROPEA E ALLA NATO

While European public debate tends to frame the confrontation between the West and Russia almost exclusively in terms of the conflict in Ukraine, the centre of conventional military confrontation, a second strategic front of equal importance has emerged in recent years. The Russian Federation is in fact pursuing a profound reconfiguration of geopolitical balances across the African continent, with particularly strong implications for the Sahel and West Africa. Through the deployment of state-backed paramilitary actors such as the Africa Corps, which have taken over from previous French- and US-led missions, Moscow has gradually filled the gaps left by the decline of the so-called “Françafrique”. This projection of power is driven not only by extractive and diplomatic interests, but also allows the Kremlin to exert direct influence over logistical hubs and trans-Saharan migration routes. This positioning provides Russia with an asymmetric source of leverage capable of affecting the stability of NATO’s and the European Union’s “southern flank”, turning regional dynamics in Africa into an instrument of global competition with the West.

The Strategy: Exploiting Instability

According to technical analyses conducted by institutions such as ISPI and IAI, the Russian Federation’s strategy in the Sahel appears to diverge from the objective of stabilising countries such as Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Libya, areas historically marked by civil conflicts and the presence of jihadist groups such as JNIM and ISSP, affiliated respectively with Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Despite the Kremlin’s official statements, Russian involvement, initially carried out through the Wagner Group and subsequently through the Africa Corps, appears to be aimed at capitalising on regional instability. Moscow provides tactical support and protection to local military juntas in exchange for strategic concessions involving military bases and extractive resources.

In this context, Russian paramilitary forces have gradually taken over infrastructure previously used by French contingents, whose expulsion from West Africa began with the May 2021 coup in Mali and was completed between 2024 and 2025. A crucial stage in this realignment was Niger, where the military government ended cooperation with the United States amid tensions over possible agreements between Niamey, Moscow and Tehran concerning the management of uranium resources.

The gradual replacement of France and the United States by Russia points to a transformation of Africa’s structural vulnerabilities into instruments of geopolitical advantage. This doctrine rests on three main pillars: the deployment of unconventional military forces, the management of logistical hubs along migration routes, and control over raw materials.

Finally, the use of information campaigns reinforces a broader strategic design which, rather than seeking direct confrontation with the West, aims at the gradual political erosion of European and transatlantic democratic systems.

Agadez and the Control of Migration Routes: Risks for the Southern Flank of the European Continent

The case of Air Base 201 in Agadez represents a turning point in regional power dynamics. Completed in 2018 with an investment of more than $100 million, the facility served for years as a cornerstone of the US strategy in the Sahel, functioning as an isolated and technologically advanced hub for drone-based surveillance and counterterrorism operations. Following the 2024 coup in Niger, the US military presence was initially relocated from Base 101 in the capital to the more secure Base 201. However, the US presence came to an end following complex negotiations in March, during which Washington expressed serious concerns over Niamey’s growing ties with Moscow and Tehran. The official US position, also reported by Reuters, reflected the impossibility of sharing strategic infrastructure with Russian forces.

In May 2024, during the US withdrawal, the presence of Russian paramilitary personnel at Base 101 was reported, although they were operating in separate areas. Following the completion of the US withdrawal in August 2024, Base 201 formally came under Nigerien control. However, the close cooperation between the local junta and the Russian Federation now raises serious questions about who is effectively managing the facility.

Agadez’s infrastructure therefore holds dual geopolitical significance. On the one hand, there has been speculation about the potential use of the base for long-range aerial assets, including Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones — already used in the war in Ukraine — whose range of approximately 2,500 km would theoretically allow them to reach sensitive targets as far as the Strait of Gibraltar or Sicily. On the other hand, the base’s strategic position along trans-Saharan migration routes gives whoever exerts influence over it an unprecedented demographic leverage.

Libya: The Heart of the Russian Strategy

This pattern of Russian acquisition of former Western infrastructure, airports and ports forms part of a broader strategy. Russian support for General Haftar, although ultimately unsuccessful in his attempt to seize control of Tripoli, has been instrumental in enabling the Russian Federation to gain control over migrant hubs. Human trafficking is a problem affecting both Haftar-controlled Libya and the internationally recognised government. Reports by CNN have documented how these migration routes are often sustained by a complex network involving auctions and the trafficking of human beings.

According to the 2024 Francken Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Moscow may be seeking to replicate the “Belarusian model” of 2021 in the Mediterranean, instrumentalising migration flows to create artificial crises along the European Union’s borders. The aim would be to fragment European public opinion and divert resources away from the eastern front.

Within this strategic landscape, the role of the port of Tobruk in Libya is equally critical. It has become an essential logistical hub for supplying the network of fragile states operating under Russian influence, thereby consolidating what NATO describes as the “second front” of the hybrid threat.

The Sahel and Ukraine: Interconnected Scenarios

When discussing the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, it is often difficult to imagine other areas of confrontation between the two countries beyond Ukraine’s borders. This approach, however, limits analysis of Ukraine’s strategic policy, as Kyiv has sought to engage with or establish contacts with countries outside Europe in order to gain advantages or disrupt Russian foreign policy.

According to reports by The Times and the BBC, Ukraine had already provided assistance in 2024 to rebel groups linked to Al-Qaeda. This reportedly contributed to the breakdown of relations between Mali and Ukraine, particularly following an ambush near the Algerian border that resulted in the deaths of dozens of Malian government soldiers and Wagner mercenaries.

Finally, according to an investigation by Radio France Internationale, Ukrainian personnel are reportedly present on Libyan territory. The investigation, conducted following the Ukrainian and British attack off the Libyan coast on the Arctic Metagaz in March 2026 — which Russia accused Ukraine and the United Kingdom of carrying out against the vessel, allegedly part of Russia’s shadow fleet — indicates that, according to sources within the Libyan administration, Ukrainian personnel are stationed at three locations: in the city of Misrata, in the city of Zawiya, and at a third site near Tripoli airport.

According to the same source, the Ukrainian military presence in Libya stems from an agreement reached between the parties in October 2025, following a request made by the Ukrainian military representative in Algiers. The agreement, which was promptly criticised by the Russian Federation the previous year, grants Ukraine access to the sea as well as to facilities considered essential for military logistics.

This development broadens the confrontation between the two countries while also placing the Russian-Ukrainian conflict within a larger framework of confrontation between Western powers and the Russian Federation.