Translated by Aurora Forlivesi
The Syrian chemical weapons issue remains one of the most complex and sensitive dossiers in contemporary international security. It came to the forefront during the civil war that began in 2011, and it was not resolved by Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013, nor by the partial destruction of the declared arsenal under international supervision. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 has reopened the debate over the actual fate of Syria’s chemical weapons program, presenting new opportunities but also persistent questions regarding disarmament, verification, and regional stability.
Syria’s accession to the CWC followed the August 2013 chemical attack in the Ghouta suburbs near Damascus and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118. The resolution required Syria to provide a complete declaration and to destroy its chemical weapons arsenal under the supervision of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Although a significant portion of the declared weapons was removed and neutralized by 2014, serious gaps emerged from the early stages of the process, with the initial Damascus declaration marked by omissions, technical inconsistencies, and a lack of verifiable documentation.
In the following years, the OPCW repeatedly reported its inability to close the Syrian dossier, highlighting unresolved issues related to the production, storage, and use of chemical agents. These uncertainties have fueled suspicions that significant portions of Syria’s chemical weapons program remained outside the disarmament process, undermining the credibility of the commitments made by the previous regime.
The Post-Assad Phase: Renewed Cooperation and Unresolved Challenges
The fall of the Assad regime has opened a new phase in Syria’s relations with the international community regarding chemical weapons. According to United Nations and OPCW reports, the new Syrian authorities have expressed a renewed commitment to fully cooperate with the relevant international bodies, framing the issue of chemical disarmament as an integral part of the diplomatic normalization process and reintegration into the multilateral system.
Throughout 2025 and into early 2026, OPCW technical teams were deployed across Syrian territory to conduct targeted inspections. So far, 19 sites have been visited, only four of which were previously declared, with activities including sampling, document analysis, and the collection of testimonies. Particularly significant is the Syrian authorities’ acknowledgment of the possible existence of over 100 additional sites potentially linked to the former chemical weapons program, highlighting the scale and complexity of the apparatus developed under the previous regime.
Before the Security Council, the UN’s disarmament chief described the current phase as a “critical opportunity” to obtain clarifications that have remained unresolved for over a decade, urging continued international support in terms of resources, technical capacity, and political leadership. Without such commitment, there is a risk that the process could stall or yield only partial results.
Structural Factors and International Action
Despite signs of cooperation, the path toward the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons remains constrained by structural factors. Persistent uncertainties regarding the completeness of declarations, the destruction of archives during the conflict, and difficult security conditions in certain areas of the country continue to hinder verification activities. Added to this is the institutional fragility typical of periods of political transition, raising questions about the new authorities’ ability to ensure effective control over the entire territory and disarmament operations.
The Syrian case represents a crucial testing ground for the international regime on chemical weapons non-proliferation. On one hand, it highlights the limitations of existing mechanisms when faced with prolonged conflict and political opacity; on the other, it demonstrates how multilateral cooperation can be reactivated in the presence of significant political changes.
However, the central concern remains that remnants of Syria’s chemical weapons program could evade international control, with potential implications for regional security and for the enforcement of global norms against the use of chemical weapons.
Conclusion
More than ten years after the start of the disarmament process, the Syrian chemical weapons issue remains unresolved. The fall of the Assad regime has created a window of opportunity, but it has not dispelled the deep uncertainties surrounding the fate of the country’s chemical arsenal. The credibility of the OPCW and the CWC will largely depend on the outcome of the Syrian dossier and on the international community’s ability to ensure effective, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament.
Sources consulted for this article:
https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166724