THE MATTEI PLAN CAN BE IMPROVED — WITH A FEW ESSENTIAL ADJUSTMENTS

  Articoli (Articles)
  Redazione
  09 May 2026
  5 minutes, 11 seconds

By Giuseppe Mistretta

One of the more curious developments in recent weeks has been the formal warning issued to the Italian government by the grandson of Enrico Mattei against using his distinguished ancestor’s name for the package of Africa-focused initiatives launched in January 2024 and commonly known in Italy as the Mattei Plan.

It emerged that Pietro Mattei, grandson of the former ENI chairman, disapproves of the link between the Plan’s declared investments (€5.5 billion) and the Italian government’s underlying objective of curbing migration flows from the African continent. He also pointed out that Enrico Mattei, in his time, had deliberately distanced himself from the United States’ approach toward oil-producing countries — in Africa and elsewhere — pursuing instead an autonomous Italian energy policy that frequently clashed with Washington’s preferences, unlike the current stance of the Italian executive.

These are not the only shortcomings of the Mattei Plan. The good news, however, is that with a number of simple and relatively inexpensive corrective measures, the Italian initiative could regain credibility and appeal among African partners.

One of the Plan’s principal structural flaws is that it failed, from the outset, to include a properly funded and organized pillar devoted to good governance. Such a component should have featured significant capacity-building initiatives aimed — according to the needs expressed by African countries themselves — at strengthening the rule of law, sound public administration, the protection of fundamental freedoms, and the political maturity necessary to ensure resilient democratic institutions. Africa is not a politically neutral landscape: nearly half of the continent’s countries suffer from institutional fragility and face anti-government insurgencies, terrorism, coups d’état, external tensions, and other destabilizing pressures. Any one of these factors can quickly erase the positive impact of Italian and European investments under both the Mattei Plan and the EU’s Global Gateway initiative. Yet while Global Gateway includes robust and articulated good-governance mechanisms, the Mattei Plan addresses this essential dimension only marginally.

To African partners, the Plan largely appears as another financing mechanism for economic projects. In this respect, it differs little from the various “Africa Plans” promoted by other advanced economies. Many capitals, in fact, have their own version of a Mattei Plan, even if under different names. Naturally, African leaders welcome Italian investments and express appreciation for them. But they do exactly the same with all donor governments.

Moreover, competitors such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, China, India, and Japan allocate far greater financial resources to their African initiatives than Italy does. Regrettably, this means there is currently no genuine Italian added value in the Mattei Plan, despite domestic political messaging often suggesting otherwise.

The picture would have been different had Italy simultaneously launched a “Mattei Plan for Rights,” aimed at supporting the rule of law, good governance, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and liberal institutions. Such an initiative would have represented a genuine qualitative leap in Italy’s relationship with Africa, clearly distinguishing it from the purely economic — and at times highly opportunistic — offers advanced by the new global actors on the continent. So far, however, this has not happened, and one may legitimately speak of a missed opportunity — albeit one that can still be recovered.

There is also insufficient transparency regarding how interested companies can access the Mattei Plan and potentially receive financial support for projects in Africa. Apart from major national corporations — which have so far benefited from effective funding, especially in the energy and agricultural sectors — small and medium-sized enterprises, even two and a half years after the Plan’s launch, still lack clear information about whom to contact, how to submit project proposals, and what criteria determine success.

Since the Mattei Plan relies on taxpayer money, entrepreneurs should reasonably expect a transparent and accessible process. Unfortunately, even the Foreign Ministry’s handbook, Growth Diplomacy: Destination Africa, fails to provide this clarity. While it lists public and private initiatives connected to the Plan, it remains opaque and difficult to decipher when it comes to the actual roadmap Italian companies should follow.

The Plan’s focus on only 14 priority countries also conflicts with the principle of inclusiveness. However important these countries may be, roughly 40 African states are effectively left outside the framework, understandably generating disappointment and raising questions about the reasons for their exclusion.

Italy, of course, lacks the financial means to meet all of Africa’s demands. Yet explicitly framing the initiative around a small group of “selected” countries runs counter to Italy’s historical traditions on the continent — particularly when two of the principal beneficiaries are the current governments of Ethiopia and Tunisia, both of which display increasingly autocratic tendencies.

The absence of major blue economy programs — an area in which Italy possesses recognized expertise — also reflects a lack of strategic foresight.

Finally, one broader consideration should not be overlooked: it is hardly beneficial for Italy’s international image to suggest that the “equal and non-predatory” relationship with African countries, frequently invoked by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, only began with the launch of the Mattei Plan in 2024.

As noted above, Republican Italy has historically enjoyed an admirable relationship with Africa. Between the 1970s and the 1990s, Italian development cooperation — driven jointly by the socialist and Catholic components of Italian society and politics — mobilized considerable financial and human resources toward the continent and implemented exceptionally effective programs. Italy actively supported decolonization processes and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa — a topic largely absent from today’s political discourse, perhaps because it is unwelcome to President Trump, though once a major source of national pride.

Since the fall of Fascism, Republican Italy has neither pursued discriminatory nor predatory policies in Africa. On the contrary, thanks to the vitality of its civil society and the commitment of young volunteers, it succeeded in building a people-to-people relationship that remains unmatched by the continent’s newer actors.

This essential legacy should be highlighted whenever possible, rather than inexplicably consigned to oblivion.

Fortunately, Africa’s leaders and societies have long memories.

Mondo Internazionale APS - Riproduzione Riservata ® 2026

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