European Security in the Black Sea Region

Focus - Allegati
09 June 2022
33 minutes, 31 seconds

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the main issues in Black Sea security that the European Union and NATO must address.

It outlines the historical posture and the interests of the two regional powers, Russia and Turkey, vis-a-vis Western institutions and other affected players in the area. Furthermore, it describes how dynamics have been altered by the outbreak of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war.

Finally, it singles out two strands of analysis: the competition between the EU and Russia over different conceptions of “membership”, a crucial factor for the long-term security of the Black Sea region, and the contested status of the Crimean peninsula, which brings together the different foreign policy stances of Turkey, Russia and their Western counterparts.

Authors:

Chiara Malaponti - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale, G.E.O. - Politica

Marco Rizzi

The Black Sea. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Russia and Eastern Europe

Moscow’s Black Sea strategy and the confrontation with the West

The Black Sea constitutes a key node linking Russian geopolitical, economic, and security interests. The regional balance of power has shifted overtime, but the relationship with the West and Turkey has always been crucial in informing Russia’s outlook in the area (Stronski, 2021).

Providing a way into the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles and Bosporus, the Black Sea answers to one of Moscow’s main geopolitical imperatives: access to warm waters; in this regard, the Crimean peninsula is of significant strategic value. Indeed, gaining control over the port of Sevastopol was one of the main goals behind Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and currently the port hosts the headquarters of Moscow’s Black Sea fleet. It was leased to the Russian Navy up until 2042, but Russian authorities became worried that their access to the facilities might be jeopardized (CSIS, 2014); indeed, as suggested by past endeavors, “maintaining access” is one of the main factors informing Russian strategic thinking (Flanagan, 2020). Crimea offers “a platform for regional power projection, from which long-range cruise missiles and coastal defense systems can more effectively threaten Western forces throughout the Black Sea” (ibid.). The annexation of Crimea has, in this sense, increased Russian anti-access/area-denial capabilities, which had reached a low point with the disintegration of the USSR. In 2014, Russia was able to extend air defense capabilities 300 km to the West of the ex-Soviet border (Reach, 2020).

Generally speaking, Russian forces stationed in the Black Sea region assolve two relevant security functions: protecting the Federation’s south-west borders and deterring third countries from taking a course of action that goes against Moscow’s wishes (Reach, 2020). Nevertheless, the environment in which they operate has become increasingly challenging over the years. During the Cold War, the Black Sea could be considered a “Soviet lake”, with Turkey being the only NATO member in the region (Fischer, 2010). The Eastern enlargement of both the European Union and NATO has changed things, as Bulgaria and Romania are now both NATO and European Union members, leaving Russia at a geographical disadvantage. The Kremlin’s long-term goal would be to constitute its own sphere of influence, drawing in post-communist countries and leveraging on the idea of Russia as a “Eurasian power”. Since it is unlikely that the regional players that are now integrated into Western institutions (ex. Bulgaria) will dramatically change their geopolitical orientations, Moscow seeks to influence them through soft-power instruments (Reach, 2020).

Ukraine and Georgia constitute a completely different case. History has shown that Russia tends to push back against any effort towards “Western” integration (either through NATO or European Union membership), both on the part of Kyiv and Tblisi. For the Russian national security community, proximity is a salient factor. This leads to a security approach which integrates into the concept of homeland security also the status of its “near abroad” (Flanagan, 2020). This tendency is exemplified by Moscow’s interventions in 2008 and in 2014. “Ensuring Ukraine’s neutral status” was also one the main arguments used by Russia to justify its 2022 invasion of the country (President of Russia, 2022). Moscow’s move, however, resulted in Ukraine applying to be granted European Union candidacy (Reuters, 2022), even though it is unlikely that integration will take place in the near future. Nevertheless, the Russian approach is that of a zero-sum game, given the deterioration of the relations of the West and the necessity to maintain a minimum degree of influence (Reach, 2020).

The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict has also brought attention back to the Black Sea as a strategic asset. In this sense, one major signal came with the Turkish decision to close the passage through the straits for all warships (Ozberk, 2022). By looking at a map, one could easily spot that the Russian fleet might only project power into the Mediterranean insofar as passage through the straits is not put into question. Nevertheless, denying passage through the straits to Russian warships stationed in the Black Sea is also an effective way to trap them into an enclosed body of water (Reach, 2020). This has become evident, as Ukrainian and Russian forces came to a confrontation even at sea. Indeed, they have long fought for the control over Snake Island (Zmiyny Island), a small outpost in the North-West of the Black Sea, only 48km off the coast of NATO’s Romania, crucial for power projection towards the city of Odessa and, beyond that, Transnistria (Williams, Kirby, 2022). Ukraine, even if at a conventional disadvantage, was able to inflict casualties on the Russian navy through a guerrilla approach. This includes the sinking of the missile cruiser Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (Stavridis, 2022). Given the current situation, Moscow may find it hard to replace the fallen ships, given the fact that it is being somewhat choked into the Black Sea by Turkey’s decision.

Even though Crimea remains of strategic value to Russia, by giving it uncontested access to the port of Sevastopol and in perspective even the possibility to project power into the Balkans and the Caucasus (Reach, 2020), Russian ambitions might be frustrated by Turkey’s pre-eminence over the straits. More generally, Moscow is currently at a geographical and conventional disadvantage, given NATO’s expansion into the area. One partial way out, then, would be to fracture the compactness of the Alliance through non-military methods. Indeed, Turkey and Bulgaria have been exploited as weak links at times (Reach, 2020). Broadly speaking, the invasion of Ukraine has made the implementation of this strategy more challenging, by compacting the NATO front, even though there might still be some internal disagreements, for example on the possible membership of Sweden and Finland on the part of Ankara (Lukov, Murphy, 2022).

Ukraine’s EU candidacy

On February 28th, 2022 Ukraine officially applied for candidate status within the European Union’s access procedure (Reuters, 2022). In light of the current situation, this decision and its reception by European authorities was of course of great political relevance. Nevertheless, some questions remain whether European membership would be feasible for Ukraine or effective in solving Kyiv’s security predicament.

The accession criteria (also called “the Copenaghen criteria”) include the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”, “a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU” and “the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the ‘acquis’), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union” (EUR-lex). It is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to meet these criteria in the short-run, giving current circumstances. The accession process would probably be long and delicate, as integration would in any case be detrimental to the Union and cause strife with countries that have been in the candidacy limbo for years (Dennison, Torreblanca, 2022; Duff, 2022). What has been then proposed for Ukraine in the current internal debate is a form of associated or affiliate membership; the latter would involve “stronger functional links between Kyiv and the EU’s executive, legislative and judicial institutions'' (Duff, 2022) and answer to Ukraine’s short-term needs of “increased security; an economic reconstruction plan; and the confirmation of its Western and European anchoring” (Dennison, Torreblanca, 2022).

When it comes to security, though, it is still unclear how it should be delivered under the European Union’s umbrella, as it lacks a mechanism of collective security, such as NATO’s. Nevertheless, the war between Russia and Ukraine has sparked great debate over the security posture of the European Union. The emergence of a structured military body seems unlikely, given the cost of coordination between the Member States and the difficulties associated with developing a clear chain of command within the EU institutional framework. Nevertheless, a new intergovernmental security body, possibly associated with the benefits of associate/affiliate membership, “could bridge the historic divide between the two Brussels-based organizations of EU and NATO, helping the former to act militarily and the latter to think strategically” (Duff, 2022).

The issue of Transnistria

A possible weak link in the broader Black Sea security architecture is Transnistria. The territory of Transnistria comprises a strip of land at the border between Moldova and Ukraine;t is de jure part of Moldova, but de facto independent since the Nineties. As this region enjoys strong links with Russia, it was an immediate cause of concern on the eve of the Russian invasion. The fear was that it might open another front from the North-West. Nevertheless, Transnistria maintained a non-aggressive posture, which “created the impression that the existing status quo could be maintained until the end of the war in neighboring Ukraine” (Cenusa, 2022).

However, at the end of April a series of explosions jeopardized the security environment around Transnistria and Moldova. Concerns were raised over a possible destabilization of the area as the Russo-Ukrainian conflict spilt over the border; as of April 27th, 2022 Russia had 1,500 troops stationed in Transnistria (Peter, 2022). If those forces were to move to Ukraine, they would target the city of Odessa first, causing a further dispersion of the Ukrainian military over the field (ibid.). On the other hand, if Russian forces were to attack Transnistria, they would similarly need to gain control over Odessa. Either way, the port city located in Western Ukraine would be of crucial importance. For this reason, to prevent the fallout of the security architecture in Chisinau and Tiraspol, the West would need to support the Ukrainian foothold on Odessa. Other measures could comprehend logistical and military support to Moldova (even though it has to be managed carefully, given the country’s neutral status), as well as leveraging on the European Union’s role as a bridge between Chisinau and its separatist counterpart to ensure communication (Cenusa, 2022).

II. Turkey

Overview of Turkish geostrategic relevance in the area

The security around the Black Sea region is a constantly evolving, dynamic, and challenging situation. Turkey, at present, is considered to be the second hegemon in the area as its geographically strategic position allows it to control access to and from the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits (Wezeman, Kuimova, 2018). Despite the deep changes Turkey has undergone since the 1920s, its multidimensional geographical strategic position kept its importance in shaping its foreign policy and often served for gaining both economic and political benefit.

Turkish action in the Black Sea is managed by the Montreux Convention Regulating the Regime of the Straits (1936). It is an agreement concerning the areas of the Bosphorus strait, Dardanelles strait, and the Sea of Marmara, which ensures the full military control of such areas to Turkey. This limits the presence of non-littoral forces in the Black Sea to a maximum of 21 days. During wartime, Turkey can decide to close the Straits to all foreign warships; nonetheless, it guarantees complete freedom of passage to civilian ships crossing through said space during peacetime (Wölfer, 2022). The Montreux Convention largely shaped the role that Turkey plays nowadays in maritime security as a balancing element between the West and Russia (Toucas, 2018; Koru, 2017)

After the end of the Cold War, profiting from the void created by the fall of the Soviet Union, the weakness of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, and a lack of significant naval force of the other actors around the Black Sea–Georgia, Romania, and Bulgaria–Turkey succeeded in gaining naval superiority in the region. In 2001, Turkey, to keep its hegemony, created the naval security initiative BLACKSEAFOR, a joint agreement with all the littoral states, aimed at ensuring security and stability in the Black Sea architecture. In the subsequent years, the Black Sea Harmony mission of 2004, aimed at tackling soft security challenges in the Black Sea (mainly smuggling and transnational terrorism) and created in parallel to the NATO’s Active Endeavour Mission, strengthened the Turkish position in the area (Tanrisever, 2012; Naumescu, 2017). As part of the NATO alliance, Turkey could maintain Black Sea security by deliberately cooperating with the other 2 littoral countries which are part of NATO (Bulgaria and Romania). This situation allowed Turkey to gain the status of NATO gatekeeper within the Black Sea area, involuntarily leading Russia and deciding to strengthen its own military in the territory, and subsequently to annex Crimea in 2014.

Indeed, in the Black Sea, Turkey’s strategy has always been aimed at becoming the sole key regional actor: to this end, despite being an essential partner for relations with the West, NATO presence in the area has been often seen as negative and excluded from Turkish plans, as it is believed to undermine the legitimacy of Turkish actions, and to possibly increase the risk of collision with Russia. For this reason, NATO countries were kept out from both said initiatives and from regional matters (Médard, 2019).

The expansion of Russian influence over Crimea in 2014 alarmed Turkey as, besides granting Moscow control of the Port of Sevastopol (strategic for providing Russia with a natural deep-water port located in the center of the Black Sea basin and for ensuring Russian access through the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean, allowing it to trade military supplies with Syria), it changed the overall balance of power in the Black Sea in favor of Moscow–whose coastline grew from 475 km to 1200km-and boosted the Russian military presence in the Black Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Black Sea, in the words of Erdogan, had become a “Russian lake” (Adzinbaia, 2017) as Turkey lost the supremacy of the sea, becoming the second maritime power in the area. NATO reactions to such events were aimed at supporting Turkey, which in turn decided to detach from the policy of avoiding any NATO presence in the area vis -a-vis Russian expansionism towards the West. A permanent NATO fleet was established in the Black Sea and the security strategy was strengthened also with the creation of a maritime coordinated entity, the Tailored Forward Presence (TFP), aimed at showing NATO unity of action and at deterring any further expansionist Russian actions. Further NATO air defense force systems were deployed in the Turkish region of Antalya to counter any possible threats coming from Syria. Moreover, Turkey shifted its policy towards support to pro-Western countries, namely Georgia (by recognizing the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions in Georgia as independent) and Ukraine (International Crisis Group, 2018). The posture of Turkey toward Russia proved, however, to be very moderate (namely, not joining anti-Russian EU sanctions), in order to benefit from the cooperation with the latter in other domains, such as in the energy sector.

In 2020, Turkey announced the discovery of a field of natural gas of 320 billion cubic meters, the largest natural gas discovery in history in the Black Sea. Such discovery is relevant in having a strong impact on Turkey's energy security, limiting its energy dependence on Russia. Furthermore, the discovery of gas fields in the Black Sea is an asset that could turn Turkey into an energy hub for Europe. This is coupled with the infrastructure project of the 'Istanbul Canal', which aims at achieving control of naval transit by favoring partner nations and damaging rival economies. The Istanbul Canal project is scheduled to be completed in 2023 and will develop a 45 km-long canal parallel to the Bosphorus connecting the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara. The geopolitical consequences of such a project are of particular interest; indeed, Russia looks with concern at the potential strategic alteration that the new canal could bring about to the Montreux Convention of 1936, while Russia's main concern relates to the fact that the Istanbul Canal could allow warships from other states to pass through the strait into the Black Sea basin, thereby circumventing the Montreux Convention (Cella, 2020).

Turkey’s ambiguous foreign policy between West and Russia

While the West wishes to use Turkey as a tool for counterbalance and contain Russia, Russia aims at exploiting Turkey to gain even more control of the region. The recent foreign policy agenda of Turkey seems characterized by a keen interest in developing some pendulum relations with whichever country, in that specific period, appears to provide Turkey with the most favorable advantage, as its constantly vacillating relations with both the East and the West neighbors show (Wezeman, Kuimova, 2018).

The power vacuum resulting from the disintegration of the Soviet Union could have possibly led to a regional cooperation between Russia and Turkey, as shown by the Turkish initiative of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Such cooperation did not occur as a rivalry between the two intensified due to disagreements over a series of issues that saw the two actors having conflicting interests. The 2000s started with a rapprochement as both Turkey and Russia succeeded in creating a political dialogue, thanks to the more stable governments which, in turn, ensured more political predictability in their relations. Indeed, Erdogan’s party victory from the elections of 2002 onwards marked a continuum in Turkish policy. The same happened in Russia with the election of Putin as President, who consolidated his authoritarian regime in the two decades onwards. Moreover, Russia, in that period, had almost totally recovered from the crisis following the disruption of the Soviet Union and started to increase its global influence thanks to its exports of oil and natural gas. Throughout the 2000s, Russo-Turkish cooperation extended in both the energetic and economic fields. On one hand, Turkey became increasingly dependent on Russia after the realization of the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline project aimed at providing Turkey with Russian natural gas through a pipeline constructed under the Black Sea. Such dependence was enhanced even more with the creation of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in 2010. Concerning the economic sector, the two countries’ economic activities, on the bilateral side, became increasingly more intertwined and developed (Tanrisever, 2012; Koru, 2017).

On the other hand, observing the relations with the West, Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952, and it has been struggling to enter the European Union since 1987. In 1999, the request started to be considered as Turkey met the Copenhagen criteria to join the Union as it both had a free-market economy and was ruled by a democratic political system. This means that Turkey was considered an emerging global actor, with whom the West was interested in shaping a form of cooperation (Neset, Strand, 2021; Tanrisever, 2012).

The Turkish government that entered NATO in 1952 and the one applying for EU membership presented some characteristics more similar to European countries, rather than to Russian identity (Reuters, 2022). Turkey's foreign policy in recent decades has been marked by a strong regional dynamism, which after the end of the Cold War was able to develop within a more autonomous and multidimensional framework. Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's speech at the Helsinki European Council, which gave the green light to Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999, emphasized Turkey's fundamental relevance in the Eurasian process and noted that "The Bosphorus bridges do not only straddle the two sides of Istanbul, but they also unite the continents of Europe and Asia. And this, not only in geographic terms, but in the political and cultural senses of the word as well” (Lòpez, 2021). The Erdogan-governed Turkey we know nowadays, however, is very far from concepts like the respect of the rule of law or the respect of democratic values. Such transformation contributed to the worsening of the relations with the West and the suspension of negotiations for EU membership in 2016. Such cooling of the relations with the EU led to deep deterioration of the Turkish economy (for example, devaluating the lira). This realization is key to understanding the very diplomatic position Turkey is assuming right now between two polarized sides, as, from the economic point of view, the West is considered a very valuable partner that may favor a Turkish recovery. On the other hand, European countries highly value the strategic position of Turkey in the Black Sea as a potential security provider to counter Russia (Reuters, 2022).

The turning point of the ambiguous position Turkey assumed between the US and Russia could be considered in July 2016, when Erdogan violently suppressed a coup d’état in Turkey, and subsequently imposed systematic control over Turkish media and other institutions. This authoritarian turn was highly criticized by the US and led, as said, to the suppression of the process of application to the European Union. The cooling of relations with the US led Turkey to an interest in developing good relations with Russia, firstly regarding the Syria issue, by signing a joint agreement with both Iran and Russia. Secondly, in 2017, in the framework of a strengthening of security concerns of the Turkish Southern border, NATO has strongly opposed Turkey's decision of purchasing S-400 missiles from Russia, rather than from the US or another European NATO country (Wezeman, Kuimova, 2018; Médard, 2019). Russo-Turkish distensions are witnessed also when the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Turkish Navy performed common operations in the region, such as joint drills in the Port of Novorossiysk in 2019 (Reuters, 2022)

However, Ankara values the NATO alliance as it provides it with a multilateral framework able to balance and contain Russian expansionist policies and hegemony in the Black Sea. At the same time, Europe sees Turkey as the only possible mediator in the Black Sea region, able to possibly act as a balancer of Russia. It actually has the second largest NATO military and the combination of its geostrategic position and the fact it hosts NATO forces on its territory makes it a special NATO partner (CMI Report, 2021).

Concerning the most recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey's position is very diplomatic. Despite the words of Turkey’s foreign minister Melvut Cavusoglu defining the situation as officially a war, the main incursions launched by Russia on Ukraine ‘southern coast passed through the Straits’(Reuters, 2022). Such a fact clashes with the main point of the Montreux Convention, and it is key to stress the paramountcy of Turkish position as a possible decisive actor of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and of the Montreux Convention as a tool to maintain regional peace and stability. Erdogan's idea lies between the two sides; on one hand, Turkey has recently increased its cooperation with Russia in the energy and defense sectors. On the other hand, Turkey is a NATO country, which has developed warming relations with Ukraine and has relied for a long time on Western protection. Turkey's disagreement with NATO’s response of imposing economic sanctions is just another example of the position that the Turkish government seems to have acquired in this circumstance: to act as a mediator and navigate between the two sides (Reuters, 2022; Politico, 2022).

Turkish President Erdogan has made it clear that he wants to maintain strong political, military, and economic relations with both Ukraine (and thereby with the West) and Russia, making neutrality the only option for his country. Nevertheless, seeing as the Black Sea is mainly controlled by the Russian Black Fleet, Turkey is much more dependent on Russia than on Ukraine: 33 percent of its natural gas imports come from Russia, and the Russian market is key for its agricultural exports, nuclear energy (a Russian company is building Turkey's first atomic reactor), tourism, and even air defense (Reuters, 2022).

III. Conclusions

The outbreak of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian conflict brought the Black Sea back to the spotlight. What remains to be discussed is how and to what extent the EU and NATO will be engaged in this region.

As previously mentioned, the early 2000s saw an expansion of EU and NATO towards the East, which was helpful in changing the balance in the Black Sea, at least until Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. This event was paramount not only in shaping further political and military developments, but also in writing the rules of the game. Europe consequently saw the emergence of two types of membership: one by regional political and economic association through the promotion of liberal values, as proposed by the European Union, and the other one rooted in ethnolinguistic, historical and cultural factors, as portrayed by Russia. The idea of a common lineage was often used by the Kremlin as justification for the maintenance of a minimum degree of influence and for intervention in countries such as Ukraine, often described as the birthplace of the Russian state. The Kievan Rus’ “is regarded as a joint ancestral homeland that laid the foundations for both modern Russia and Ukraine” (Düben, 2020). This approach bypasses the frontiers of nation states, defined as sovereign political entities. Therefore, it is incompatible with the European Union’s way of thinking about membership and, more generally, international relations (however, some argue that even in the EU’s case ethnoreligious thresholds might implicitly exist: see the debate over Turkey’s candidacy). For this reason, some have proposed that the European Union should “put democracy at the heart of its Russian strategy” (Freudenstein, 2021). In the Black Sea region, this could be done by leveraging Bulgaria’s and Romania’s strategic position.

Nevertheless, supporting democracy in Russia could be misinterpreted as a Western push towards a regime change, which would degrade the international relations framework in the region as a result of “exporting democracy” to Russia. Experiences in the Middle East remind Western authorities that the local context must always be taken into consideration. Furthermore, the European Union as a peace project will need to support and enforce its own values; in its Eastern neighborhood, this could be accomplished through forms of associate and affiliate membership, which would allow the EU to come to the aid of States such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. As for Russia, the Kremlin’s current diplomatic and (to a certain degree) economic isolation from the West is surely detrimental towards its war efforts in Ukraine. In the long-term, however, exchanges between Western European and Russian civil societies will be necessary if the EU’s goal is to come to at least a partial convergence of values.

Another crucial point, when speaking about Black Sea security, is the contested status of the Crimean Peninsula. Contrary to Moscow’s claims, Crimea is not strictly Russian, as the peninsula was absorbed into the Tsarist Empire only after the separation from the Ottoman Empire in 1783. A rapid Russification process started, and in 1944, the Tatar population of Crimea, became the object of a fully-fledged ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Stalin. Tatars, who partially returned to the peninsula in the previous decades, claim Crimea as their ancestral homeland, thus maintaining their presence on the peninsula, of which they are an indigenous element (Knott, 2018). The intervention in Crimea, as discussed, constitutes a model of Russia’s present attitude at international level: conducting a series of coercive interventions by invoking the principle of protection referred to customary practice which postulates the right to defence of abused compatriot populations living outside the Russian borders. This approach implied low regard for principles such as the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, and the national sovereignty of states. (Grant, 2015; Knott 2018).

Turkey, presently, is naturally a major player in the Ukrainian crisis, both because of their partnership within the framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC) and its ethnic ties with the Tatars and Ukrainians. In fact, Russians disrupted Crimean demography: after the annexation of 1783, thousands of Russians emigrated to the region, while to escape the atrocities, many Tatars fled, in at least eight different waves of emigration from 1792 to 1902, to the Ottoman territories, especially in Anatolia and Dobruja. The dispute over Crimea must be understood by analysing the triangular and intertwined Turkish-Russian-Ukrainian relations (Reynolds, 2014). The Tatar diaspora in Turkey, indeed, still exerts a strong influence on both the geopolitical arrangements of the peninsula and the dynamics of Turkish-Ukrainian and Turkish-Russian relations. Ankara, today, does not recognise Moscow's occupation and annexation of the peninsula and supports Ukraine's territorial integrity. The Turkish government did not just take sides in the Crimean question but actively contributed to the economic development of Ukraine and the disputed peninsula throughout the past decades. But because of the deep bilateral energy and trade relations, and the pressing security issues in the Black Sea, Turkey has preferred to take a cautious geopolitical position. In fact, the Turkish government has always intended to resolve the Crimea issue through diplomacy and dialogue, balancing its regional geopolitics. The Turkish position is ambiguously in between West and Russia also on this matter. On one hand, it firmly supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and the respect for the territorial rights of the Tatars, but on the other side, Turkey does not despise at all its economic partnership with Russia aimed at fulfilling its own interests in the Black Sea (Wezeman, Kuimova, 2018).

When it comes to the military aspect, most of the work falls into the hands of NATO. While the Atlantic Alliance strengthens the Eastern front, a challenge could come from within. Especially in the light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the perspective of a NATO enlargement in the North, Turkey’s opposition and “much-touted balanced policy between Moscow and Kyiv is resulting in another major disruptive stance against NATO at one of the most critical times since its establishment” (Pierini, 2022).

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