Introduction
Back in 2019, the Minister of Interior of Serbia, Nebojsa Stefanovic, announced that thousands of cameras with facial recognition technology would be installed across Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. The decision to introduce “smart cameras” supplied by the Chinese tech-giant Huawei was justified by Serbian authorities as an attempt to deter crimes and increase citizens’ security. However, the lack of more detailed information on how these cameras worked, where they were located and how they collected and stored data, fuelled a climate of suspicion among the civil society in Serbia and in Europe. Because of Serbia’s recent democratic backsliding, human rights activists, NGOs and other actors feared that surveillance cameras could be used by the government to stifle dissent and strengthen the power of the ruling elites. Analysts and politicians in the West, for their part, while acknowledging the risk of abuse of surveillance cameras by local politicians, were also concerned by the possibility of China using Huawei cameras to export its “authoritarian” model and carry out espionage activities in Serbia. Whereas the supply of facial recognition cameras by China may be the most controversial aspect of the Sino-Serbian partnership, collaboration between the two countries goes well beyond the security realm. Indeed, China has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure in Serbia as part of its One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR). Politically, Beijing refuses to recognize the statehood of Kosovo, which Belgrade sees as a breakaway province. In turn, Belgrade supports Beijing's “One China” policy vis à vis Taiwan. More recently, the two countries have also collaborated militarily with China having delivered CH-92 drones and HQ-22 missiles to Serbia, a topic I extensively discussed in my previous paper on Sino-Serbian cooperation (Knezevic, 2022).
The purpose of this paper is to look into Serbia’s decision to resort to intrusive surveillance technology supplied by the Chinese tech-giant Huawei. For analytical purposes, the paper will be structured as follows. In the first section, the origins of Serbia’s decision to introduce facial recognition technology in the country will be outlined and the gradual attempts made by Serbian authorities to introduce this type of intrusive technology will be presented. Moving on, the implications on citizens’ basic rights of potential abuses of surveillance technology by the government will be discussed. The third section is dedicated to the geo-political dimension and explores the drivers behind China’s export of its “surveillance” technologies through tech-companies such as Huawei. Before presenting the conclusions, the domestic and international responses, most notably by the United States, where the use of Huawei technology was banned out of security concerns, will be presented.
Origins and development of facial recognition softwares in Serbia
The decision to rely on increased surveillance of citizens to foster security in Serbia dates back to 2009, when the “Safe Society” agreement was signed between Beijing and Belgrade. In the subsequent years, talks were held between the Serbian Ministry of Interior and the Chinese company Huawei. Indeed, the Chinese tech-giant was to provide cameras, softwares and knowledge to implement the “Safe Society” project (Krivokapić, 2022). However, an event popular in Serbia as “the Countryman case” accelerated talks between the two parties. In the summer of 2014, a “Mini Countryman” hit and killed a young man on Branko’s Bridge in Belgrade. The perpetrator then fled to China but was arrested by the Chinese police as early as 3 days after his arrival in the country thanks to the use of facial recognition cameras. The effectiveness of the facial recognition softwares used by China impressed Serbian officials, who soon initiated talks with Beijing to boost cooperation in the security field (Standish, 2022). The first round of talks led to the signing of a Strategic Partnership Programme with Huawei in 2017. The agreement with the Chinese tech-company was intended to promote digital transformation in Serbia. Most importantly, to increase security in Serbian cities through facial recognition cameras as part of the “Safe City” project. The agreement also envisioned the training of Serbian police officers on artificial intelligence in China (Kramer, 2020).
However, in spite of these early developments, the surveillance system was officially introduced in Serbia only two years later. In 2019, Serbian officials purchased technology, cameras and softwares from Huawei and announced that 1,000 surveillance cameras would be installed across Belgrade (Kramer, 2020). Commenting on the matter, the Ministry of Interior of Serbia stated that “there will be no significant streets, entrances or passages between buildings that will not be covered by cameras” (Kramer, 2020). However, the decision to install surveillance cameras was met with resistance by the civil society in Serbia. Human rights activists, researchers and NGOs stressed that the use of facial recognition softwares had no legal basis under Serbian law, raising data and privacy concerns. In spite of the objections posed by the civil society, almost three years after the installation of cameras, the Ministry of Interior attempted to introduce a draft law that provided a legal basis for the use of biometric surveillance. In doing so, privacy and data collection problems raised by civil society were neglected, resulting in a public outcry that forced the Minister of Interior to withdraw the bill (Standish, 2022). One year later, a second attempt was made to introduce a legal basis for the use of facial recognition cameras in Serbia. As in 2021, the reaction by the civil society in Serbia was harsh and the draft was withdrawn (Balac, 2022). Still, the fact that a second draft was presented in a year suggests that the Serbian government is determined to introduce a legal framework for the use of facial recognition technology in the country. Consequently, a new attempt is to be expected in the near future. For the time being Chinese cameras have been installed across the country but, lacking a legal framework, facial recognition technology has not been used yet.
Domestic legal and political implications
If used for purposes that go beyond the fight against crime and terrorism, facial recognition softwares in Serbia can potentially affect its citizens right to privacy and other basic freedoms. Indeed, since the very beginning, the “Safe City” project has been marked by lack of transparency, as most Sino-Serbian agreements. According to Milan Marinovic, the Serbian Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data, “these intrusive surveillance technologies have been procured in murky circumstances without proper due diligence and in the absence of any transparency” (Delbos-Corfield, 2022). As a result, Serbian citizens lack information about how their data are collected and processed, how data is stored and where cameras are located. Serbian authorities' refusal to disclose information further raised suspicion around the issue (Delbos-Crofield, 2022).
Most importantly, human rights activists, NGOs and other relevant actors from the civil society fear that surveillance cameras with facial recognition technology may be used for purposes other than the enhancement of public safety. Such concerns by the civil society in Serbia stem from political elites' authoritarian tendencies. It is worth recalling that Freedom House downgraded Serbia from “free” to “partly free” in 2019, blaming the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic and the Serbian Progressive Party for “abusing the majority, blurring the distinction between state and party activities, putting pressure on voters and…luring voters through social initiatives” (European Western Balkans, 2020). The pressure exerted over the media was another major democratic deficit noted by the democracy watchdog.
The use made by Serbian authorities of the cameras and Huawei technology in the following months seemed to confirm the worst fears of civil activists in Serbia. In 2020, there were indications that Huawei cameras in Serbia were misused to make sure that people observed Covid-19-related quarantine and measures (Vuksanovic, 2021). On the other hand, in 2021, facial recognition technology was reportedly used for political purposes. On that occasion, plainclothes police officers resorted to Huawei EP 821 trunking terminals to film people who were protesting against the government in Belgrade. Even though this device does not feature a recognition software, many protesters that took the streets in late 2021 received fines for obstructing the traffic and other traffic-related offenses without having been stopped by the police to show their ID. Commenting on the matter, the Ministry of Interior denied that facial recognition was used and that the police followed the proper procedure for filming protestors (Standish, 2022). Therefore, whether facial recognition softwares were deployed remains unclear. However, the mere act of filming citizens and then fining them for having participated in anti-government protests “raises concern about how Serbian officials could abuse cutting-edge Chinese surveillance tools like facial-recognition software once a legal basis for it is established in the country” (Standish, 2022). So far, Marinovic noted, there is no legal basis for the use of facial recognition technology in Serbia. Neither the use of facial recognition technology nor the processing of biometric data are regulated under Serbian law (Delbos, Corfield, 2020). The adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation, while representing an important step in Serbia’s implementation of the EU Acquis, failed to regulate these two areas. It is for this reason that thousands of cameras have been installed but the facial recognition software has not been activated yet (Kramer, 2020). Clearly, any misuse of facial recognition cameras and the data collected through them would be a breach by Serbian authorities of citizens' right to privacy and other basic human rights such as the freedom of movement, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.
Last but not least, important are the dangers linked to the use of facial recognition technology to identify perpetrators of crimes. While sophisticated, these softwares are not completely precise and innocent citizens may end up being identified as criminals.
The “geopolitical dimension”
In its security and technological cooperation with Serbian authorities, China is mainly motivated by geo-economic and geo-political goals. Indeed, due to its geographical position, Serbia is central to China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. The OBOR is a commercial corridor that allows goods to travel from China to the European Union (EU) through Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in different countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. Bordering four EU member states (and being a candidate to the EU), Serbia is an important connecting point between Asia and the Union. It is for this reason that this Balkan country was the main recipient of Chinese investments in the last decade. In this respect, agreements between Chinese-tech companies, most notably Huawei, are aimed at cementing Beijing’s presence in the country by including it in its “Digital Silk Road” (DSR). Indeed, the DSR is an important and complementary part of the OBOR whereby Huawei and other Chinese companies improve “recipients’ telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payments systems, surveillance technology, smart cities, and other high-tech areas” (Kurlantzik, 2020). In the case of Serbia, China’s aims go well beyond improving digitalization and technological development of the country. Indeed, according to Vuk Vuksanovic, “Beijing sees Serbia as a hub for regional technological infrastructure…this can be then used as a shortcut to win over what is one of the greatest Chinese desires - the European market” (Briganti, 2021). This was reflected in the signing of a contract with Telekom Srbija, a state-owned telecommunications operator, to develop fast broadband internet as well as in the opening of the Huawei Center for Innovation and Digital Development in Belgrade and in the plans to build a regional data center (the third largest in Europe) in Kragujevac, Serbia (Vuksanovic, 2021).
From a purely geo-political perspective, by exporting its surveillance technology, China is promoting its form of authoritarianism (Vladisalvljev, 2021). China has used surveillance cameras to closely monitor its citizens and strengthen its authoritarian regime. By 2020, around 626 million cameras had been installed across the country, giving state authorities access to every aspect of their citizens' lives. Surveillance technologies are particularly intrusive towards minorities with independentist claims such as the Uighur or Kazakhs in Xinjiang. In these regions, advanced Artificial Intelligence systems are used to closely monitor the population and stifle political dissent and pro-democratic sentiments. According to experts and analysts, while China has been exporting technologies to authoritarian regimes for decades, until some decades ago it was mainly driven by economic motives (Frakenberg, 2020). On the contrary, nowadays “there is…greater emphasis on the value these exports bring to China’s international influence, foreign policy, and long-term strategy” (Frakenberg, 2020). In this respect, China’s exporting of its “authoritarian” model may find fertile ground in Serbia given the country’s elite authoritarian tendencies. Indeed, the problem is not that Serbia is acquiring facial recognition technology itself as most countries, including the most democratic ones, resort to it to increase public security. The problem arises if political elites in Serbia, who previously disregarded democratic principles, acquire this type of technology to emulate China’s surveillance model (Vladisavljev, 2021).
Apart from exporting its “surveillance” and “authoritarian” model, China’s drivers behind its security cooperation with Serbia may be even more dangerous. The United States and the EU have been suggesting that Chinese tech-companies products are a way for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to spy on other countries' and gather intelligence data. This proved to be the case in 2018, when Huawei handed over data collected using its equipment at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa to the Chinese government (Vuksanovic, 2021). Indeed, under Chinese law, tech-companies are legally bound to transfer data collected to the Chinese government. The CCP may then use this data for different purposes. For instance, data collected by companies in other countries may be used to feed and boost AI algorithms in China. As these machines' efficiency improves the larger the amount of data they are exposed to, China may exploit the data collected abroad to enhance its AI algorithms (Frankberg, 2020) In addition, as some experts pointed out, China may use these devices, including Huawei cameras, to mount cyber-attacks and coerce the political elites of countries where its technology is used (Kurlantzik, 2020). Unsurprisingly, given the overall secrecy and confidentiality of the “Safe City” project, Serbian authorities remained silent on the potential misuses by China of facial recognition technology in Serbia.
Domestic and International Responses
Members of civil society and independent bodies have resisted the full implementation of facial recognition technology by Serbian authorities. A key role in this process was played by Share, a digital rights organization based in Belgrade. In 2019, members of the Share asked the Minister of Interior to disclose information about where cameras were located, how data were collected, stored and processed. Citing confidentiality of the agreements, the Minister declined to provide this type of information. Frustrated by the lack of transparency, Share later launched the “a thousand cameras” initiative in May 2020. The primary goal of this initiative was to identify the location of surveillance cameras and then create a map with all the places where one could be monitored (Krivokapic, Bajic, Perkov, 2021). Apart from Share, an important role has been played by Milan Marinovic, the Serbian Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data. Marinovic immediately pointed to the overall lack of transparency around the “Safe City” project as well as to the fact that no legal basis existed for the use of facial recognition technology and the processing of biometric data under Serbian law. The Commissioner also declined the Ministry of Interior’s Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) twice, on the grounds that it did not meet the requirements of the Law on Personal Data Protection. Under Serbian laws, to process data obtained from mass surveillance a DPIA is required. In turn, to be valid, the DPIA needs to be approved by the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data (Krivokapic, Bajic, Perkov, 2021). Therefore, both the civil society actors and the Commissioner played a role in preventing the Serbian government from using facial recognition technology until specific laws regulating the use of surveillance by officials, the collection, storing, processing and transfer of data are adopted.
From the international perspective, the EU and especially the US, responded to Serbia’s decision to install Huawei cameras with facial recognition softwares across the country. Fearing potential misuses by Serbian authorities, Members of the European Parliament wrote a letter to Serbia’s Minister of Interior to express their concerns and ask for more information on the installation of Huawei cameras. Clearly, the EU was also concerned about the spread of the Chinese surveillance model in the periphery of the EU. This would put Serbia on an increasingly authoritarian path, compromising its already slow and complicated accession process in the EU, exacerbating Union’s enlargement fatigue in Western Balkans. The United States, for their part, was more active than the EU in pushing back the spread of Huawei technology in Serbia. Indeed, alarmed that Huawei devices may be used by the Chinese Communist Party to spy on countries across the world, the US, under Trump’s administration, launched a global campaign against the Chinese tech company (Ruge, Vladisavljev, 2020). According to some experts, accusations of espionage against China are ill-founded and the real reason behind the US' campaign against Chinese tech-companies stemmed from the need to slow down China’s booming economic growth. Whatever the reason, after banning the use of Huawei and ZTE technology in the US, the Trump administration signed several memorandum of understanding with different countries across the world preventing them from using technology from “untrusted vendors”. In the case of Serbia, the same provision was included in Article 9 of the Washington Agreement, signed in 2019. While the latter is aimed at normalizing political and economic relations between Serbia and Kosovo, article 9 prevented Serbia from using 5G equipment supplied by “untrusted vendors”. Clearly, the US aim was to reduce Huawei’s presence in the country but proved to be unsuccessful as reflected by the opening of Huawei Center for Innovation and Digital Development in Belgrade in 2020 (Vladisavljev, 2021).
Conclusions
Serbia’s decision to resort to intrusive surveillance technology has led to domestic and international responses. The activity of civil society in Serbia and the work of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data have, so far, managed to prevent the project from being fully implemented. Attempts to introduce a draft law that would provide a legal basis for the use of mass surveillance without taking into account citizens’ rights were met with resistance by members of the civil society. However, the fact that two attempts to introduce a legal framework for the use of facial recognition softwares were made in a year shows that the Serbian government all but abandoned plans to introduce this type of technology. Therefore, a “legal-tug-of-war” is to be expected in the following months, or years, between NGOs, human rights activities and the Serbian government. From the international perspective, efforts by the EU and the US were far less successful. As prospects for EU membership are still distant, political elites in Serbia are reluctant to clamp down on collaborating with China in the security, military and especially economic realm. This is even more the case as Beijing’s loans, supplies of weapons, and technology come with “no strings attached” and allow Serbian elites to promote economic growth in the country. The 2019, US-sponsored Washington Agreement, for its part, proved to be rather ineffective as demonstrated by Huawei's growing presence in Serbia since 2020. However, after the 2023 Chinese balloon incident and the renewed fears of Beijing carrying out espionage activities, the Biden administration may adopt a more muscular approach vis à vis Serbia’s mass surveillance program through Huawei technology.
Classification of sources and information:
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
Trustworthiness of the source | ||
A | Trustworthy | No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness |
B | Normally trustworthy | Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases |
C | Sufficiently trustworthy | Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past |
D | Normally not trustworthy | Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past |
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F | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
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