Authors
Giulia Tessadri - Head Researcher G.E.O. Politics
Alessandra Condorelli Natarelli - Senior Researcher G.E.O. Economics
Chiara Malaponti - Junior Researcher G.E.O. Politics
Abstract
We continue our cycle of publications on the Russo-Ukrainian War by focusing on its eventual costs and damages on the Ukrainian economy and on the economy of other countries around the world.
Ten months after the start of the conflict, the situation on the ground has undergone numerous and important changes. With the advance of Russian troops into Ukrainian territory and the uncertainty surrounding the destiny of the war, it is crucial to analyse how much Ukraine would need to "reconstruct" its own economy and the country’s infrastructures.
On the other hand, Russia has to face harsh economic damages as well. With the enactment of sanctions from part of Western countries and with a decreasing demand for its energy products, Russia is facing the consequences of its actions.
Moreover, being Russia and Ukraine among the largest exporters of wheat in the world, concerns over wheat supply disruptions have grown to a considerable extent - not only in developed countries, but especially in the developing ones, due to their incapacity to diversify their own wheat sources.
This paper aims at giving a broad overview of the national and international consequences of the war, for what concerns the following issues: sanctions on Russia, the energy economy, the disruption of wheat supply and the Ukrainian reconstruction.
It concludes that the ongoing conflict in Eastern Europe had major impacts on the world economy, affecting the previous trend of recovery that followed the waning of the harsh shock caused by COVID-19. Moreover, it also highlights the political implications of economic ties in our globalised world - more specifically, when dealing with non-democratic states such as Russia.
1. Sanctions on Russia
Before analyzing which kind of sanctions has been imposed on Russia, it is necessary to provide an exact definition. In the context of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, sanctions are used as a tool to seek to bring about a change in the policy or conduct of those targeted (Council of the European Union).
Contextually, sanctions have been imposed on Russia by a variety of countries -especially the US, the UK and the EU- as a reaction to their unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February of 2022. In particular, the EU imposed unprecedented sanctions, which add up to the previous existing measures imposed on Russia since 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and the non-implementation of the Minsk agreements (EU Council, 2022). The sanctions mainly target the Russian economy and aim to effectively thwart the abilities of the country to continue the aggression. Moreover they also target people or even countries who support, finance and implement actions which undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine (EU Council, 2022). That is the reason why the EU also adopted sanctions against Belarus and Iran, as they were involved in the war zones operations. (VOA, 2022)
Prohibition of import and export of certain goods, raw materials and resources have been enacted and the most crucial bans regard crude oil and transport facilities. Mainly because, the Russian Federation is the EU's top energy importer, and energy export profits make up a significant amount of the Russian Federation's revenue (Kilinc-Ata et al). European nations are highly reliant on the Russian fossil fuel energy sources; therefore with the imposition of sanctions on oil and natural gasses, energy costs have risen.
Bans imposed
Bans on transport instead regard road, maritime and air transport making it impossible for the country to either acquire goods or export them in the Western part of the world.
Economic bans regarding the access to the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) system for Belarus and Russia have been enacted, together with bans on the National Central Bank of Russia (EU Council, 2022). The SWIFT system is a “vast and secure messaging system that allows banks and other financial institutions from all around the world to send and receive encrypted information, namely cross-border money transfer instructions”. (Corporate Finance Institute, 2022).As a result, financial institutions who previously used the SWIFT system, now can neither get foreign currency nor transfer assets abroad.
Meanwhile, since the EU has prohibited all transactions with the National Central Bank of Russia related to the management of the Russian Central Bank’s reserves and assets, it is estimated that more than half of Russian reserves are frozen (EU Council, 2022).
Impacts on the economy
It goes without saying that sanctions have had huge consequences on the life of Russian citizens and on the economy of the Russian Federation. The uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the war has had a negative effect on financial markets, since “global equity prices fell sharply and especially prices on European exchanges” (Kalish, 2022). As it can be noticed from the following figure, there has been a considerable fall in Russian securities which supposedly originated from the outbreak of the conflict.
This negative pressure on the financial markets has consequently led to a negative depreciation of the Russian currency, the ruble. Some measures have been put in place to thwart such tendency, namely the CBR (Central Bank of Russia) increased its benchmark interest rate from 9.5% to 20% and the Russian government ordered Russian exporters to sell 80% of the foreign currency they have earned this year to help support the ruble (Kalish, 2022).
(taken by Deloitte Insights article- How sanctions impact Russia and the global economy).
Moreover, due to the decrease in the overall trade volume of the country, the Finance Ministry and the Economic Development Ministry of Russia “speculate that Russia’s GDP will likely fall by 8-10%” (The Moscow Times, 2022).
Taking into account the above mentioned data, it could be possible to conclude that sanctions are effectively working towards their aim; however, it is worth considering that even though the consequences on the Russian economy have been tremendous, the impact on the European countries and on their economies has not been so light.
“Following Russian Federation special military operation to Ukraine, Brent oil prices rose beyond $100 per barrel, reaching their highest level since 2014” (Kilinc-Ata et al). Moreover, it is difficult for European countries to diversify their energy market in a short period of time and it is even more complicated to give up completely on oil and gas (Kilinc-Ata et al). The real challenge for European countries is therefore to effectively manage this critical energetic situation without creating outstanding damage for their own economies.
2. Impacts on the energy sector
Since the beginning of the conflict, the role of the Russian energy sector has been broadly discussed, as it both provides revenues to finance the war against Ukraine and is a tool for diplomatic leverage vis-a-vis European countries.
The energy ties between Russia and the West can be broadly described as a relationship of interdependence. For example, “The EU imported a range of products from Russia in 2021, but the value of imports of energy products, including petroleum oils, natural gas, electricity and coal was higher than the value of all other products put together, accounting for 62.5 % [...]. Indeed, the value of no other product group exceeded the equivalent of 5% of the total value of imports” (Eurostat, 2022). Notably, it is common knowledge that the EU was heavily dependent on Moscow for its natural gas imports. “In 2021, the European Union imported 155 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Russia, accounting for around 45% of EU gas imports and close to 40% of its total gas consumption” (International Energy Agency, 2022). At the same time, though, Europe was the primary market for Russian exports of oil and natural gas and hence, was a vital source for revenues. In 2020, “Most of Russia’s crude oil and condensate exports in 2020 went to European countries (48%), particularly Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland”; in the same year, 72% of Moscow’s natural gas exports went to OECD Europe (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2021).
Even though the energy trade between the European countries and Russia was to be inevitably altered by the dynamics of the green transition, the invasion of Ukraine further complicated things. The EU was challenged by the sudden need to both guarantee its energy security and to diversify its imports, while taking into account the diplomatic implications of the varying degrees of dependence from Russia among the Member States. On the other hand, Russia was faced with the necessity to keep incoming cash flows alive, while being conscious of the potential diplomatic and coercive value of its energy sources.
Indeed, the sharp - and to an extent cohesive - response of the EU countries delivered results in terms of imports reduction: “Considering seasonally adjusted values, the share of Russia in EU energy imports was rather stable until the first quarter of 2022 (between 26.0% and 27.6%). The share declined sharply between the first and second quarter of 2022 and this downward trend continued between the second and third quarter of 2022. Overall, Russia’s share of EU energy imports fell by more than 10 percentage points between the first and third quarter of 2022, from 25.5% to 15.1%” (Eurostat, 2022).
Questions remain on whether it was also effective in hampering the Kremlin’s war-financing capabilities. This summer, a document coming from the Russian economic ministry forecasted a 38% increase in energy export revenues in 2022. This development was attributed to rising natural gas prices and increased oil output, to be sold to Asian buyers (Reuters, 2022). However, in August, oil and gas revenues actually hit a 14-month low. As explained by Bloomberg, “The refusal to buy Russian oil by some traditional customers in Europe means Moscow has been forced to sell oil at a steep discount in Asian markets, depriving it of the full benefit of higher prices. While August saw record-high spot gas prices in Europe, gas levies, which take up a smaller share in the budget, couldn’t fully offset lower oil revenues” (Bloomberg News, 2022).
Indeed, the picture is further complicated by the different perspectives on Russian natural gas and oil.
Albeit incoming flows have been substantially reduced, Russian natural gas has not been the direct target of any EU sanctions package yet, making its importance almost self-explanatory. EU Member States long discussed the application of a price cap on natural gas, to curb the effect of inflated gas prices, which are “four times higher than normal for this time of year” (Bloomberg, 2022). On December 19th, 2022 the EU energy ministers finally reached an agreement: “Ministers agreed to trigger a cap if prices exceed 180 euros ($191.11) per megawatt hour for three days on the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) gas hub's front-month contract, which serves as the European benchmark [...] The TTF price must also be 35 eur/MWh higher than a reference price based on existing liquefied natural gas (LNG) price assessments for three days” (Abnett, 2022). The cap can be triggered from February 15th, 2023. The negotiations leading to the establishment of the cap on gas prices were indeed divisive. On one hand, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, which could afford higher prices, opposed the cap by raising concerns on matters of energy security - namely, they were ready to pay more to secure gas supplies. On the other hand, a group of 15 EU states circa, led by France, Spain and Italy moved in favour of this proposal. The agreed cap is anyway lower than that brought forward by the EU Commission in November, which was to be set at 275 euros per megawatt hour. However, former Italian PM Mario Draghi had originally proposed to set the cap regardless of market trends (Il Post, 2022).
As the deep winter season approaches, the main aim is also to make the economy of the EU more resilient to more supply squeezes coming from Russia - while it must also be noted that gas has been already stocked and that plans to reduce the national demand are easing the situation. At present, only two out of four gas routes from Russia to Europe remain open: the TurkStream and, interestingly enough, the Ukraine transit route. The Nord Stream was shut down indefinitely at the beginning of September, and will not be reopened by Russia until sanctions are lifted; the Yamal pipeline was closed in mid-May amid controversies with Poland. On May 11th, 2022 Gazprom listed some Western companies that could not have gas delivered anymore, among which figured Polish-Russian EuRoPol GAZ, that owned the Polish section of the Yamal (Euractiv, 2022). However, Poland had not received supplies from Moscow since the end of April, when Warsaw refused to comply with the proposed rouble payment mechanism for gas. Besides being an attempt to circumvent central bank sanctions, the latter was also engineered as a tool to execute a sort of divide and conquer strategy vis-a-vis European countries, to divide their united front between those who chose to comply and those who did not.
Indeed, Russian natural gas remains a sensitive issue for the EU. On the other hand, in the long run the Russian Federation will need to cope with European buyers pulling away from its gas. The question, then, is whether a pivot to Asia is possible, for example in light of the 30-year gas deal Russia signed with China at the beginning of last February.
Instead, Russian oil has been hit by the combination of an EU embargo on crude imports (effective December 5, 2022) and on oil products (effective on February 5th, 2023) and a G7 (plus the EU and Australia) price cap set at 60 dollars per barrel (Strupczewski, Abnett, Lawder, Shalal, 2022). As a result, already in November the International Energy Agency forecasted that Russian oil output would fall to 1.4 million barrels per day in 2023 (ibid.). To give some context, only in September 2022 “crude oil production in Russia was measured at 9.8 million barrels per day” (Statista, 2022).
On December 27th, 2022 Russia retaliated against the price cap on oil, “signing a decree that bans the supply of crude oil and oil products from Feb. 1 for five months to nations that abide by the cap” (Marrow, Soldatkin, 2022). At the same time, the Russian Finance Ministry expects the budget deficit for 2023 to be wider than the planned 2% GDP, as the cap on oil prices squeezes Russian export revenues (ibid.)
However, Asian buyers are still tapping into Russian supplies of oil: “In March, combined oil imports by China and India from Russia overtook those from the 27 EU member states. From late November, there appears to have been a renewed surge in oil purchases by India” (Menon, 2022). Beijing and New Delhi are already buying Russian oil at discounted rates, so it is not clear how the G7 price cap will affect these purchases.
In summary, the Russian invasion has greatly and suddenly reshaped the dynamics of energy markets. Nevertheless, it has done so by reinforcing a few long-term trends that were already unfolding - e.g. the Russia-China partnership, or the decoupling of Europe from Russian fossil fuels.
3. Disruptions in wheat supply
According to the OEC, in 2020, Ukraine exported $4.61B in wheat, making it the 5th largest exporter in the world and in the same year, wheat was the 3rd most exported product of the country. In the same year, Russia exported $10.1B in wheat, making it the largest exporter in the world and making wheat the 7th most exported product in the country.
Export destinations for wheat in Russia include: Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The Ukrainian export destinations are basically the same, with the addition of Indonesia and Lebanon.
(Figure taken from Aljazeera)
Market data shows the huge importance of Russia and Ukraine for the global supply of wheat, especially for least developed countries. In fact, the most endangered countries are those in the South of the world, because of their impossibility to diversify their food sources and to rely on their own domestic production capacity. The only long-term solution for such countries is to increase their domestic capabilities.
According to Bagwandeen et al., “Since Russia invaded Ukraine, concerns over wheat supply disruptions, especially from the Black Sea region, have significantly increased wheat prices. Between January and February 2022, global wheat prices increased by 2.1%” (Bagwandeen et al, 2022). This increase in prices has a significant impact on the livelihoods in low-income countries, above all in Africa, as one of the biggest export destinations for both Ukrainian and Russian grain sources. In fact, crop yields in the continent are relatively low compared to major wheat-producing regions in the Global North; especially due to extreme weather conditions, water scarcity, poor soil quality and poor irrigation systems (Bagwandeen et al, 2022).
On the other hand, even developed countries have been affected by such disruptions in wheat supplies. Since most of the wheat exports are shipped through the Black Sea and in particular, through the Ukrainian city of Odessa, now countries in the Western part of the world have to face a shortage of wheat coming from Ukraine and Russia and need to find viable alternatives in the global market (Capone, 2022).
4. The Ukrainian reconstruction
When discussing the Ukrainian conflict it is also important to analyze the reconstruction, as the largest conflict in Europe since World War II has had devastating consequences on the economy. Specifically, according to the Kyiv School of Economics, the conflict has lost at least $127 billion in buildings and infrastructures (Skidmore, Wessel, Asdourian, 2022). Moreover, the International Monetary Fund believes that the country’s GDP will decline by 35% this year and inflation is set at around 20% (Ibidem, 2022).
In the aftermath of the invasion, the Ukrainian government began discussions with its allies and institutions on reconstruction. The main organizations and research bodies that addressed the topic are the World Bank, the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in London with “A Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine, the European Commission, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Skidmore, Wessel, Asdourian, 2022). Ursula von der Leyen expressed the need for Europe to play a central role in the reconstruction of Ukraine, since Europe has a "special responsibility and a strategic interest to be at Ukraine's side” (Deutsche Welle, 2022).
The Ukraine Recovery Conference is fundamental in the analysis of the reconstruction is the Ukraine Recovery Conference that took place in July 2022 in Lugano, Switzerland. The conference was planned before the invasion in order to address reforms in Ukraine, clearly taking another path in light of the war. In Lugano forty-one governments, representative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Investment Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation discussed and analyzed Ukrainian reconstruction and expressed their support for the country (Quirk, Sharma, 2022). In fact, the Conference resulted in the Lugano Declaration stating that the participants “fully commit to supporting Ukraine throughout its path from early to long-term recovery” and that Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan - released by Kyiv and proposing an outline for rebuilding and modernizing the country - is “an overarching framework guiding the recovery process” (Ibidem, 2022). The importance of the Lugano Declaration and the National Recovery Plan is fundamental, since they constitute the way towards a definition of a framework for the stabilization and the reconstruction of the country.
The report Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) analyzes a deep evaluation of the damages related to the war and its impacts. Specifically, it is believed that the recovery and reconstruction will cost US$349 billion, accounting for more than 1.5 times the GDP of Ukraine in 2021 (European Commission, 2022). Moreover, the RDNA believes that in the next 3 years Ukraine will need US$105 billion, in order to overcome urgent needs such as the restoration of education, the full functions of the health system and of infrastructure, the preparation for the winter with heating and energy supply, assistance to agriculture, and the restoration of the main transport routes (Ibidem, 2022). Another important cost is linked to the safe management of explosives and mines, which affect and will continue to affect the country. In this framework, the World Bank and the European Commission granted their support to Kyiv in the analysis of damage, loss, reconstruction and recovery.
It is worth mentioning that the study published by the German Marshall Fund believes that institutions other than the European Commission should lead the reconstruction since “Brussels has neither the necessary political nor the financial heft” (Allenbach-Ammann, 2022). Specifically, the study argues that the G7 countries should be in charge of the recovery, while the EU might later take a more important role regarding the possible EU accession of Ukraine.
The Marshall Plan is often mentioned when discussing the reconstruction of the country, yet there are many differences. The main difference is that the key actor of the Plan was the United States, representing the donor, while the recipients were many European countries. The Ukrainian situation is quite different, since one country will be the recipient while many nations and institutions will be the donors (Skidmore, Wessel, Asdourian, 2022). It is clear that reconstruction requires major coordination between the Ukrainian government, the EU and members of G7, independently from who will lead the reconstruction.
Conclusions
The geoeconomics of the war cannot be ignored, since they represent a crucial aspect in the conflict. Moreover, they have massive impacts not only on those involved, but on the majority of the world. It is clear that the war affected the global economy. Before the conflict, there were forecasts that the global trend of recovery would continue in 2022 and 2023, thanks to ongoing vaccine campaigns and to the macroeconomic policies adopted (OECD, 2022). In December 2021, OECD predicted that the global GDP would increase by 4,5% in 2022 and by 2,3% in 2023 (Ibidem), thus overcoming the challenges posed by the COVID-19 on the global supply chain and on the world economy. The war clearly impacted this trend, creating a negative shock on the world economy.
Specifically, as mentioned above, the wheat supply situation has negatively impacted many countries, both developed and developing. In addition, the energy crisis and, specifically, the increase in the price of gas has strongly impacted Europe, due to its past dependence on Russian supplies. The recent decision to adopt a European cap price on gas represents a clear example of the international economic effects of the conflict.
Moreover, the geoeconomic impacts are also connected to the sanctions towards Russia, due to their impact on Moscow’s economy and on the financial markets. However, Russia uses its advantage on the possession of natural resources as a leverage tool on the countries supporting Ukraine and that have strengthened their sanctions in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion. Anyway, it must be noted, for example, that the sanctions have made it difficult for Russian energy companies to access Western technology: this represents a huge threat to the Russian economy. In fact, while the Kremlin’s energy reserves are diminishing, new areas of investment in the energy sector will require Western money and technology to be made profitable (Demarais, 2022).
In addition to the above-mentioned geoeconomics, the discussions on the Ukrainian reconstruction show the extremely high costs of the conflict and the need to develop long-term plans.
Moreover, it is clear the failure of “Wandel durch Handel” - “change through trade”, the theory that closer commercial relations with authoritarian states, such as Russia, will induce political change towards more open systems. Thomas Kleine-Brockoff - vice president of the German Marshall Fund - said that: “Germany believed that trade would be a peacemaker, that interconnectedness would prevent us from going to war with each other (...) There was a belief that trading with Russia - notably with what it does best, namely oil and gas - was a strategy for peace. But that strategy has failed” (Dodman, 2022). It is clear that Germany’s energy dependence on Russia has proved to be problematic, as this strategy became counter-productive with the outbreak of the war.
The magnitude of the economic impact of the war is uncertain and will depend on its length, on the international measures and on the sanctions imposed, and on its end. The conflict has impacted and most probably will impact global trends in growth, inflation levels and the health of global financial markets.
In the next and last publication of the cycle, we will talk about the consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian War on the international stage.
Classification of sources and information:
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
Trustworthiness of the source | ||
A | Trustworthy | No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness |
B | Normally trustworthy | Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases |
C | Sufficiently trustworthy | Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past |
D | Normally not trustworthy | Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past |
E | Not trustworthy | Lack of authenticity, reliability or competence; history of invalid information |
F | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
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