By Francesco Ancona - Junior Researcher Mondo Internazionale G.E.O Defense and Security
Abstract
Since the turn of the millennium, the People's Republic of China has significantly increased its status in multiple spheres, economic, technological and military, becoming one of the most influential players globally. Thanks to its massive consumer and industrial manufacturing industry and a strong focus toward foreign exports, China has become the leading industrial and trade power. Indeed, naval trade holds significant value both as outlet of its products in Asian, African and European markets, and for the supply of raw materials to fuel its growing industrial production. By virtue of this, the maritime lines of communication linking the Red Sea to the South China Sea are vital to China, as they are considered a “lifeline” to be monitored and protected. Geopolitical, economic, and military considerations, presented here, are woven into a single node that can be summarized as China's desire to expand its projection through a growing military, commercial, financial, and, albeit to a lesser extent, political presence within the Indo-Pacific. The purpose of the following series of analyses is to “unravel” this knot by analyzing the evolution of China's growing projection of strength in the area in the economic, geopolitical and military spheres, ultimately offering some thoughts on how this ambition affects the behavior of the United States and its allies in the Pacific, compounded by the role of the European Union, and possible future developments.
The relevance and weight of trade for the Chinese economy
The last two decades have seen China evolve from a regional player to a great power with ambitions on a global scale. In July 2021, during his commemoration speech for the 100 years anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi Jinping provided his vision of China's future by calling it a “rich, prosperous advanced and powerful” nation, and that it would have an armed and naval force, describing it as “world-class” by 2049 (Yip, 2021); these are the key points of his vision of “Great Rejuvenation” (Sacks 2021; Council of Foreign Relations Editors, 2017). On one side, one of the primary aspects of this vision of Chinese leadership and projection of influence in the world, subject of this analysis, is economic in nature; on the one hand, the massive manufacturing industry, on the other hand, a trade policy heavily focused on exports. Because of its difficulties in 'absorbing the supply of goods (China Power Project, 2024), about 20% of its GDP is dedicated to exports (World Bank, 2025), while nearly 40% industrial production (China Power Project, 2024). The heavy dependence of supply chains passing through the Indo-Pacific's major Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), and the fragility to which sensitive shipping points such as straits are subject, are factors that, in the event of conflict or destabilizing geopolitical events, would lead to serious global economic and trade consequences. As a result, undisturbed access and navigation by Chinese merchant ships through SLOCs, and their protection, is of vital importance to the security of its economy. Against this backdrop, according to a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), countries in the Pacific consider the Taiwan Strait to be a particularly vulnerable area as a large volume of goods transits through it. China, in particular, is heavily reliant on trade passing through the Taiwan Strait, whose sum of goods exceeded $1.3 trillion in 2022 (about 30% of imports, and 15% of exports of the entire flow of goods in the strait) (Funaiole, Hart, Peng, Lin, and Verschuur, 2024). According to the CSIS report, crises or destabilizing acts such as naval blockades, or an invasion of Taiwan itself, would force maritime traffic to and from China to divert to other, longer routes, leading to increased transportation costs, and the added risk of being more exposed to naval blockades by rival states such as the United States. Instability, or even closure, of the Taiwan Strait would thus have serious economic and financial repercussions especially for China, both for its exports and for its supply of mineral resources such as oil and rare earths, which corresponds to about two-thirds of Chinese overall imports passing through that corridor (Ibid; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024).
The importance of the 9-dash line and “reef building” for access to the Indo-Pacific
In 1897, naval strategy theorist Alfred Mahan described the link between geography, trade, and naval power, and their importance in increasing national wealth. Indeed, he argued that “centers of commercial interest were automatically centers of political interest and therefore of military interest because they represent nodes of communication” (Mahan, 1897). Closely following his theories, China has developed a clear maritime strategy in the long run in order to protect and enhance its commercial interests focused, on the one hand, on the gradual growth of its naval forces and capabilities for operating not only in its own coastal waters, but also in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. On the other hand, the strategy is also focused on the establishment of a network of overseas naval bases (or logistical points) capable of supporting overseas naval operations (Marchant, 2024; Wooley et al., 2023). In particular, the protection of Chinese interests along major SLOCs through the use of its navy (PLAN), as well as the construction of an interconnected network of commercial and logistical infrastructure also for military use (dual use) operated by state-owned companies, is ascribable to China's securitarian concept of “strategic strongpoints” (Dutton et al. 2020; Kennedy, 2020; Singleton, 2023) as its geopolitical guideline for gaining access and projection in the Indo-Pacific. Part of the establishment of this maritime "lifeline" (a sea highway crucial for shipments from and to China) (Kennedy, 2019) is located in an area referred to as “the 9-dash line”, and it involves the construction of “strategic strongpoints” dedicated to the security of the SLOC connecting the Indo-Pacific to the Red Sea (Ibid; Dutton, Cardon, Kennedy, 2020). The 9-dash line represents an area within the South China Sea, where China claims to enjoy “unquestionable sovereignty over the islands and adjacent waters as well as their bed and subsoil” (PRC Letter to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2009). The territorial claims overlap with portions of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) belonging to Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines that border that sea under the rules established by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (UNCLOS, Part V). Over the years, territorial disputes over the islands have been accompanied by both an increase in accidents and clashes between vessels (China Power, 2024; Global Conflict Tracker, 2024), and the construction (mainly by China) of artificial reefs with attached logistical and military infrastructure, such as telecommunication towers, sensors, radar, airstrips, anti-aircraft batteries, etc.; a practice referred to as reef building. According to CSIS's Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative's China Island Tracker report, China has effective control over the Paracel archipelago since 2012, plus seven islands in the Spratly archipelago (many of which have undergone major drainage works, construction of infrastructure and outposts), and of Scarborough Shoal (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2025). In particular, Duncan, Woody, and Tree islands in the Paracel Archipelago host important protected harbors capable of accommodating both civilian and military vessels (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2017). As pointed out by various researchers and Chinese academics, this type of dual-use infrastructure is strictly functional and necessary for the purposes of developing “strategic strongpoints” that would provide the operational and logistical support needed by PLAN naval units to operate across the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, protecting the “lifeline” and monitoring access to the most important sea lanes (Kennedy, 2019; Ke, 2016; Duoyue, 2017; Dutton et al, 2020; Wooley, Zhang, Fedorochko, Patterson, 2023; Holmes 2014). The administrative status given to these islands by the Chinese government in 2020, along with the intensification of military exercises by the PLAN and Coast Guard patrols in the area, further confirm the strategic importance of these reefs and their infrastructure for high seas operations (Cash 2024; Global Times, 2020, Lo, 2020).
Main SLOCs and chokepoints as strategic trade areas
Sailing south-west from the South China Sea, the SLOCs branch out into three routes through three straits and then rejoin in the Indian Ocean: a) the Singapore and Malacca Straits route; b) the Sunda Straits route; c) and the Lombok Straits route. Of these three routes, the one through the Straits of Singapore and Malacca (about 900 km long and varying in width between 3 and 200 km) is the most relevant for trade, with one of the highest transit volumes in the world (accounting for 30% of global maritime traffic), where about 25% of the crude oil bound for and from the Pacific transits (Port Economics, Management and Policy, 2023; Singh 2023). Due to its crucial importance, and increasing density of ship traffic through it (forced to travel at less than 10 knots), the strait has become particularly susceptible to piracy and transnational crime over the years (Nofandi et al. 2022). In the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal, two areas in the eastern Indian Ocean, maritime trade is closely interdependent on the geopolitical context between China and India. The historical rivalry between the two countries and the spill-over effect resulting from recurrent border clashes have led both countries to intensify their military presence in that stretch of sea over the past five years. In response to the PLAN's increased probing activities and in order to counterbalance the Chinese infrastructure investments from the Belt and Road Initiative programme in Pakistan and Sri-Lanka, New Dehli has both increased naval and air patrols (through the use of P-8I reconnaissance aircraft) in order to monitor PLAN activities (Singh, 2023), and fortified its military bases on the islands of Andaman and Nicobar (Singh, 2025). Heading further west, three further SLOCs branch off: the first in the Strait of Hormuz, the second in the Red Sea, and the third towards the Cape of Good Hope. The first two are particularly sensitive for Asian markets. The Strait of Hormuz, which at its narrowest point is only 21 miles wide, is a crucial passage for the supply of almost one fifth of all world oil. According to an estimate by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2023 about 80% of its traffic was destined for Asia, of which 60% was bound to the Chinese, South Korean, Indian and Japanese markets (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2023). However, this area is particularly exposed to risks; the shallowness of the strait makes ships in the area susceptible to mines, attacks by land-launched missiles and interception by fast attack vessels. For instance, from 2021 to 2023, Iran has been involved in about 26 aggressive actions of different kinds (seizures, harassment, and attacks) against merchant ships (Brobst, Bowman, 2023). Finally, the Red Sea SLOC, which is crucial for rapid access to European markets via the Suez Canal. Although the Gulf of Aden (its entrance) can only be transited under naval escort, the area continues to be at the centre of both the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Dunne, 2023), and regional instability resulting from attacks on merchant ships by pirates and Houti militias (Salim 2024; Gambrell 2024; ACLED, 2025).
Chinese projection: tools and means for economic security: naval bases, trade agreements and infrastructure plans in Asia and the Indian Ocean
Economically and geopolitically, China's projection and influence capabilities on key SLOCs to the Red Sea are articulated through infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive infrastructure investment and development programme launched by Xi Jinping in 2013 with the aim of improving land and sea trade links between China and the rest of the world (McBride 2023). Since its launch to date, most countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia (excluding India) have joined various direct investment programmes or loans of varying sizes for infrastructure works (Schrag, 2024). Many of these are related to the construction or financing of port, logistics and mining infrastructures by Chinese state-owned companies or national banks according to the Chinese ‘Shekou’ model, i.e. through the development of a network of interconnected infrastructures (logistics, services, energy and manufacturing) with the aim of promoting local economic development and fostering foreign trade (Ebbesen 2025). Of particular economic and geostrategic relevance in light of the establishment of new dual-use ‘strategic strongpoints’ as naval support bases for PLAN forces in addition to the Djibouti military base (officially the only overseas base controlled by Beijing), China has initiated or concluded port infrastructure projects in Africa, the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia.
Cambodia
Strongly enthusiastic about the prospect of joining the BRI programme (ASEAN Energy Database System, 2025), Phnom Penh has received around $5 billion in loans and $21 billion in investments for the development of infrastructure works from Chinese companies and banks linked to the central government in Beijing over the past 10 years (American Enterprise Institute, 2025; Sun 2023), making China its most important financial creditor and economic partner (Gupta 2024). The most prominent project is the modernisation of the Ream naval base, largely completed in 2024 (AidData, 2023). In 2019, following a secret agreement, Cambodia granted the PLAN permission to use the naval base as logistical point (Page, Lubold, Taylor, 2019). Since 2022, the base has undergone extensive modernisation works (funded by China) to build new shipyards and docks, capable of also harboring Type 056-class corvette, a command and control centre, and a radar installation (Yaacob, 2024; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2024). Beijing's growing economic and political influence, Cambodia's dependence on its financial aid and exports (Gupta 2024), and the PLAN's preferential access to the Ream naval base with frequent visits by Chinese corvettes since 2023 (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2024; Head 2024), have raised concerns from the United States, Vietnam, and Thailand about the possible exclusive use of the naval base by Chinese naval forces and the PLAN's potential increased presence in the Gulf of Thailand. Although China is unlikely to gain permament exclusive use, or even effective control, it still retains strategic relevance as a potential ‘strategic strongpoint’, given also its proximity to the Strait of Malacca. However, the shallowness of the seabed in the vicinity of the base, which does not allow larger vessels such as aircraft carriers from docking, and the relative proximity to the naval bases of Vietnam and Thailand, would make naval operations complicated for China (Yaacob, 2024).
Sri Lanka
The deep-water commercial port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is located near one of the main SLOCs crossing the Indian Ocean. Planned out by the Rajapaksa government in the early 2000s, the project to build the country's second largest port was financed by several loans at a fixed interest rate of 6.3% provided by the EXIM Bank of China for a total value of $1.4 billion, and constructed by two state-owned enterprises: China Harbour Engineering and Sinohydro Corporation (Wignaraja, Panditaratne, Kannangara, Hundlani 2020; Hillman 2025). However, following delays in the construction (completed only in 2011), and constant financial losses resulting from prohibitive operating costs (Moramudali, 2020), led the subsequent government to enter into a contract arrangement whereby it granted the lease, port operations (including repairs, warehousing, and cargo distribution), and future development for a duration of 99 years, in exchange for $1.12 billion, to the joint venture Hambantota International Port Group (HIPG), which is 85% controlled by the Chinese company China Merchant Port Holding (Aneez, 2017; Wignaraja et al, 2020; Ebbesen, 2025). Although the lease agreement explicitly excluded the use of the port by foreign military vessels, this did not prevent a Yuan Wang-class military surveillance and monitoring vessel from docking there in 2022 (Jayasinghe, 2022). In fact, port calls by Chinese military vessels are not new to Sri Lanka given the depth of its waters and the size of the ports of Colombo and Hambantota. For example, in 2014, a PLAN submarine and frigate docked at the port of Colombo causing tensions and concern from the Indian government (Aneez, Sirilal, 2014). Docking rights were also granted to Chinese scientific ships for oceanographic research, which, according to a CSIS study, is dual-use, as data taken from the ocean floor can also be used for submarine operations (Funaiole, Hart, Powers-Riggs, 2024). To this end, it is likely that China will continue to benefit from the Sri Lankan government's non-alignment in the Beijing-India rivalry (Srinivasan 2024; Siow, 2025) through the use of its ports as a foothold for its research activities in the Indian Ocean. Despite the Sinhalese population's negative perception towards the development model promoted by the Chinese narrative, from a commercial and economic point of view, the Hambantota Port has seen an increasing expansion of commercial volume and operational capacities in recent years, through the construction of new industrial parks and goods storage centres under the leadership of the HIPG consortium (Hambantota International Port, 2024; Ebbesen 2025; Hellenic Shipping News, 2025). Given its size, logistical support facilities, seabed depth and relative proximity to the main Indian Ocean SLOC, the Hambantota Port has the potential to become a logistical support facility for both PLAN military vessels and dual-use activities by scientific vessels affiliated with PLAN military centres (US Department of Defence, 2023; Wooley, Zhang, Fedorochko, Patterson, 2023).
Pakistan
In the BRI context, Pakistan is the country that has received by far the most funding and loans, amounting to approximately $60 billion (Afzal, 2020), for the construction of the BRI's most ambitious project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This is a network of logistical, road, rail, industrial, energy and telecommunication infrastructure projects connecting the Xinjiang region with the Kashmir and Belucistan regions, aiming to improve land trade and economic cooperation between China and Pakistan (Pakistan Ministry of Planning, Development, & Special Initiatives, 2025; Ibid, 2017; South China Morning Post, 2025; Kanwal, 2025). This project includes the development of the port of Gwadar, which serves as the terminal of the economic corridor. Located 400km east of the Strait of Hormuz, the port was subject to a first phase of development completed in 2007 by the China Harbour Construction Company, while a second one funded by China for $1.2 billion was announced in 2015 (China Daily, 2015). The development was entrusted to the China Overseas Ports Holding Company (COPHC), which won the contract in 2013 (Raza, 2013). Among the objectives of the project, along the lines of the Shekou model (Dutton, Cardon, Kennedy, 2020), were to expand maximum tonnage to 100,000 tonnes through the construction of three new 200-metre berths and the installation of a roll-on roll-off facility, to build two oil terminals, and to create a new 2281-acre industrial zone attached to it and named Gwadar Free Zone (China Daily, 2015; Kanwal 2025; Zaheer, 2013). In 2017, as part of a further agreement, the government conceded the lease of the port and its operations to the COPHC for a 40 years duration, including 91% of the profits coming from port operations (Pti, 2017). Despite continuous developments under the CPEC, the port of Gwadar has for quite some time been experiencing great difficulties in attracting business activities, vessel traffic and acting as the main hub for regional economic development. The current lack of adequate supporting infrastructure (roads, railways, energy and primary services) and competition from cheaper regional port solutions are the main factors negatively affecting its overall economic viability in the medium and long term (Zaman, 2025). Despite the economic challenges, the port of Gwadar remains relevant for China. As pointed out by US Naval War College researchers Kardon, Kennedy and Dutton, its strategic location within the Indian Ocean, combined with the set of infrastructure projects inherent to the CPEC and the good diplomatic relations with Islamabad, would provide China with a port outlet and an alternative land route for the supply of its energy needs, through the use of pipelines connecting Belucistan to Xinjiang. By doing so, Beijing would reduce the risk of a possible distortion or even blockage of the shipping lines, thus partly reducing its dependence on them. In this sense, according to the authors, Gwadar would fall under the concept of a ‘strategic strongpoint’ as a logistical and supply point for the protection of Chinese interests overseas (Dutton, Cardon, Kennedy, 2020). As in the previous cases, given its characteristics and depth, Gwadar would also lend itself for military use, being potentially capable of hosting large vessels such as Type 054A-class frigates, Type 075 amphibious assault ships, Type 071 amphibious transport ships and aircraft carriers (Vázquez, 2023; Dutton, Cardon, Kennedy, 2020). Although still underdeveloped and underutilised, it is likely that the commercial and infrastructural development plans of the dual-use port of Gwadar will go ahead in the short to medium term; this is largely motivated by the link between commercial interests and security of energy supply, which are necessary to ensure China's economic development.
In the second part of this analysis, we will analyse the trade relations between China and some African countries, and the main logistics and port development programmes pursued as a tool to support the ‘strategic strengths’ strategy.
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Confermata |
Confermato da altre fonti indipendenti; logico in sé; coerente con altre informazioni sull’argomento |
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Presumibilmente Vera |
Non confermato; logico in sé; consistente con altre informazioni sull’argomento. |
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Forse Vera |
Non confermato; ragionevolmente logico in sé; concorda con alcune altre informazioni sull’argomento |
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Incerta |
Non confermato; possibile ma non logico in sé; non ci sono altre informazioni sull’argomento |
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Improbabile |
Non confermato; non logico in sé; contraddetto da altre informazioni sul soggetto. |
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Non giudicabile |
Non esiste alcuna base per valutare la validità dell’informazione. |
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Affidabilità della fonte |
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Affidabile |
Nessun dubbio di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza; ha una storia di completa affidabilità. |
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Normalmente Affidabile |
Piccoli dubbi di autenticità, affidabilità, o competenza, tuttavia ha una storia di informazioni valide nella maggior parte dei casi. |
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Abbastanza Affidabile |
Dubbio di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza; tuttavia, in passato ha fornito informazioni valide. |
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Normalmente non Affidabile |
Dubbio significativo sull'autenticità, affidabilità o competenza, tuttavia in passato ha fornito informazioni valide. |
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E |
Inaffidabile |
Mancanza di autenticità, affidabilità e competenza; storia di informazioni non valide. |
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Non giudicabile |
Non esiste alcuna base per valutare l’affidabilità della fonte. |
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