On March 15, 2025, Ethiopian Airlines Group’s deal with the African Development Bank (AfDB) for the construction of a new airport in Bishoftu—40 kilometers southeast of Addis Ababa—was unveiled. The project not only aims to alleviate mounting congestion at Addis Ababa’s Bole International Airport, but also to cement Ethiopia’s role as the major aviation hub on the continent.
Bole International Airport, which currently handles around 17 million passengers per year, has reached its capacity limit. Ethiopian Airlines’ exponential growth requires infrastructure that can accommodate the increasing flow of passengers and cargo, supported by the company’s extensive African and global network. The new Bishoftu hub is projected to have a capacity of over 60 million passengers per year by 2040, potentially overtaking Johannesburg’s O.R. Tambo International Airport—the continent’s current leader.
The airport project is part of a broader push toward urban modernization in the country, particularly in the capital, Addis Ababa. Notable initiatives include the Chaka Project—a grand national satellite city development—and the newly announced second-phase corridor development project aimed at transforming the city’s infrastructure and urban landscape.
After a major renovation carried out in the 1960s by Emperor Haile Selassie, it now appears to be Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s turn to reshape the face of the city. His goal is to transform Addis into a “livable and welcoming city for its residents” and for investors from around the world.
The pressure for the city to radically modernize stems from the fact that the Prime Minister “uses built space as a political tool,” according to an architect interviewed by The Guardian. Addis Ababa’s physical transformation is being driven by a top-down planning approach that largely favors political and economic elites—often at the expense of the broader population. “Every time people ask about these projects, they are just shut down”, the interviewee explained.
The implementation of Abiy’s projects indeed comes with high social costs. For example, in the heart of Addis Ababa, the historic neighborhood of Piassa was torn down by bulldozers last year as part of a road-widening project, displacing more than 4,000 people. This was consistent with Abiy’s belief that poverty must be removed from the city center to attract foreign investment and tourism. Indeed, he suggested Dubai as a model.
But Ethiopia is no UAE. While it aimed to reach lower-middle-income status by 2025, according to the World Bank, it is currently being heavily supported by the Gulf State, which has become a major stakeholder in the Horn of Africa. “You turn over any rock in the Horn of Africa, and you find the UAE there,” a former Trump administration official observed.
Abiy Ahmed’s pharaonic projects are deeply connected to his broader national and international strategies. The UAE’s massive economic involvement in Ethiopia’s development is a clear example of the red thread that ties together the dots of Abiy’s strategic vision. The Emirates engagement is multifaceted—spanning economic interests such as investments in food and beverages, agriculture, livestock, logistics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and real estate—and geopolitical and security concerns.
As Dr. Micheale Kihinshen Gebru explains, “Both countries are seeking to expand and improve port access in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean for mutual economic, geopolitical, and security reasons.”
This statement is now more relevant than ever. Once a Red Sea power, Ethiopia’s loss of direct access to the sea remains a painful wound—one Abiy has promised to heal, calling it “an existential matter.” While he has recently stated that “Ethiopia does not have any intention of engaging in conflict with Eritrea for the purpose of gaining access to the sea,” skepticism is growing.
In reality, despite his conciliatory language, Abiy has been maneuvering on multiple fronts to strengthen Ethiopia’s position in the event of a military confrontation with its long-time adversary, Eritrea. Domestically, he is offering panem et circenses to appease the population, distract them from the country’s internal fragile stability and strengthen his popularity, while internationally, he is garnering support from regional and global powers—including Russia, which is simultaneously deepening its partnership with the UAE. These alignments may ultimately back Ethiopia’s territorial claims.
Conclusion. Abiy Ahmed is walking a geopolitical tightrope. He aspires to turn Ethiopia into a strong regional power, while the country still wrestles with internal instability, economic challenges, and historical grievances. A potential military confrontation over Red Sea access would be catastrophic from a humanitarian standpoint—but could, in Abiy’s eyes, allow him to fulfill a historic mission.
In a rapidly shifting global order, the precedent set by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and recently elected US President Trump’s compliant posture towards it, could (re)open the path for landlocked Ethiopia to regain its access to the sea in the substantial acquiescence of the international community, thus crowning Abiy as a national hero.
Mondo Internazionale APS - Riproduzione Riservata ®2025