Translated by Benedetta Calice
«War. War never changes». This is how Fallout 4 (2015) opens, set in a world devastated by a nuclear catastrophe: technological progress has increased the destructive capacity of weapons without putting an end to rivalries for power and resources. The tension between changing tools and recurring conflicts recalls Carl von Clausewitz, who described war as something more than a chameleon, capable of assuming different forms depending on circumstances. His words invite us to distinguish the transformation of means from the nature of the phenomenon: weapons, protagonists, and modes of combat can change profoundly, while the question of what allows us to recognize a war remains open. At the centre of this distinction lies the relationship between violence and politics.
War between violence and politics
In his treatise On War, Clausewitz defines war as an act of physical violence through which one seeks to impose one's will on the opponent. Force therefore constitutes an essential element of it, but its use acquires meaning in light of the goals pursued and the political relationships in which it is embedded. The famous formula of war as a continuation of politics by other means expresses precisely this bond: hostilities do not suspend political life, which continues to guide their course and is in turn modified by the combats. War objectives are also affected by power struggles and conflicts of interest that run through societies, going beyond the sole decisions of governments. However, this relationship between force and politics does not encompass everything that influences the course of a war. To explain its variability, Clausewitz introduces the «trinity», a model based on the interaction of three tendencies: passions and hostility, chance and probability, the rationality of political aims. The author associates them predominantly with the people, the army, and the government, without rigidly identifying them with these subjects. The weight of each varies according to circumstances, since political decisions can guide the use of force without controlling the passions of the protagonists or the unforeseen events of combat. The theory thus identifies recurring elements, whose different combinations contribute to explaining the changing character of war.
New wars and political coercion
Some wars persist because their continuation can favour the interests of those who fight. It is one of the mechanisms highlighted by the model of «new wars» developed after the Cold War to analyse conflicts within States, in which non-state armed groups also operate. In these contexts, keeping the confrontation with an enemy alive can strengthen collective identities and legitimate those who exercise power. Violence against civilians feeds fear and polarization, consolidating the divisions upon which some groups build their influence. To these political advantages economic ones can be added, when control of resources guarantees revenues linked to the continuation of hostilities. If the power and earnings of certain actors depend on the duration of the conflict, its conclusion can put both at risk. This interpretation calls into question a component of Clausewitz's theory: the «tendency to extremes», according to which the confrontation between opposing wills generates a mutual pressure toward an increasing use of force. When the continuation of war itself becomes advantageous, this pressure is no longer sufficient to explain the course of hostilities. The critique thus concerns the ability of the logic of extremes to interpret the persistence of certain conflicts, without denying their political character.
Interpretive difficulties concern not only the course of wars, but also the possibility of distinguishing them from other forms of political pressure. Cyber operations, economic measures, and disinformation campaigns can indeed support a military offensive, contributing to weakening the opponent's capacity to resist or be employed to influence a government's decisions outside of an armed conflict. The same tools can therefore pursue political ends in different situations, making it less immediate to establish what role they play in the confrontation between contenders. This difficulty increases when different means are coordinated within the same strategy. Their combination is often associated with the expression «hybrid war», whose use can, however, generate confusion if it indiscriminately includes activities accompanying an armed conflict and pressure exerted outside of it. To interpret these situations, it is necessary to consider how the various practices relate to organized violence, rather than inferring their nature from the tools employed alone. The problem thus concerns the meaning assumed by activities in the context in which they are used and poses a further question regarding the capacity of previous theoretical categories to understand contemporary warfare.
Transformations put to the test of theory
The difficulties that have emerged do not necessarily make Clausewitz's categories obsolete. Indeed, even in prolonged conflicts, the advantage that some actors derive from the duration of hostilities does not eliminate uncertainty regarding the opponent's capabilities and intentions. The fear of suffering an attack can continue to push them toward a greater use of violence. However, when forces are fragmented or militarily unequal, the pressure to prevail over the opponent meets concrete limits: those who do not possess the necessary resources to achieve a decisive victory may resort to shifting alliances, opportunistic strategies, and limited attacks. The tendency to extremes can therefore manifest itself through modes that contribute to the continuation of hostilities, rather than translating into a continuous escalation toward the definitive defeat of the enemy. The risk of considering a specific evolution as inevitable also emerges in forecasts regarding the future of combat. The spread of indirect operations and ambiguous coercive practices had fuelled the idea that conventional large-scale clashes would gradually become marginal.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, showed the limits of this forecast: intense combat, mobilization of men and resources, and territorial contention confirmed the importance of conventional military force. Indirect strategies continue to be employed, but they can accompany open combat when the political stake prompts States to mobilize large forces. The persistence of hostilities and the evolution of combat modes raise different questions, but both show how transformations in war do not necessarily entail the disappearance of previous dynamics and forms. It remains to be clarified, then, what interpretive contribution we can still derive from the relationship between force and politics.
The relationship between force and politics retains an interpretive capacity precisely because it spans very different modes of warfare. During hostilities, organized violence does not merely execute decisions already made: it alters power balances, can redefine the interests of contenders, and influences subsequent choices. Political competition thus develops also through combat, while combat continues to be guided by the aims of the protagonists. This reciprocal relationship allows for the understanding of both conventional wars and fragmented conflicts, without presupposing a single mode of using force. The political character of war, however, does not make every coercive practice part of an armed conflict. Economic, informational or diplomatic pressures can also pursue political objectives without accompanying hostilities. Clausewitz's perspective thus remains useful for examining the role assumed by organized violence in the confrontation between opposing wills, even without providing an automatic answer to every controversial situation.
«War never changes» captures only part of the problem: the modes of war change, and the tools of political pressure can resemble those employed during an armed conflict. This resemblance, however, does not erase the difference between war and other forms of political competition. Recognizing it requires looking beyond individual tools, considering how organized violence fits into the confrontation between contenders. It is in this possibility of interpreting transformations without confusing every antagonism with war that Clausewitz's perspective remains useful.
Mondo Internazionale APS - Riproduzione Riservata - 2026
Share the post
L'Autore
Tommaso Ravizza
Categories
Tag
Clausewitz Guerra Contemporanea guerra ibrida Teoria della guerra conflitti armati