Tariffs and “Made in Europe” to Counter China: Is Brussels Heading Toward a Defensive Trade Policy?

News has recently emerged of a confidential document that France, Italy, Spain, Lithuania, and the Netherlands reportedly drafted jointly and sent to the Commission, requesting approval of timely trade defense measures. This will be the subject of the next European Council summit in June 2026.

The document—which will be discussed this coming June at the European Council’s summer session—appears to have been strongly championed by President Macron, who had previously warned Brussels about unfair competition from China and the need for the EU to review its trade policy.

The document—signed by the five countries—is presented as a manifesto in defense of European trade, highlighting the concerning state of European economic growth. Eurostat data for the five-year period 2022–2026 show a slowdown in GDP growth in the 27 Member States compared with the previous years, while employment growth appears to be in an irreversible decline throughout the period under review.

For the five countries who signed the document, the situation is, in part, justified by the inevitable economic repercussions of the international scenarios, but it's also aggravated by the unfair market practicesof certain powers — China and the United States above all. 

It is worth highlighting that the document does not explicitly mention either of them, but appears to refer to them in general terms. However, President Macron’s statement at the Center for Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies (CEA) in Bruyères-le-Châtel, on May 22 seems to leave any doubts. The French president emphasised the need for the European Union to protect its sovereignty when threatened by foreign actors, and to adopt measures that promote “Made in Europe,” encouraging companies to “buy European.” The French president even alluded to the introduction of a series of protectionist tariffs, in full Trumpist style.

However, The statement made in Bruyères-le-Châtel and the letter from the five countries to the Commission is not a new phenomenon, but rather comes from a period of intense focus on the topic. The Commission, instead, has reportedlybegun working on a more defensive trade policy, aimed at bettershielding the aggregate economy of the 27 member states from external shocks and competition, particularly from Beijing. The EU-27’s dependence on China is indeed a cause for serious concern: the volume of Chinese goods entering the EU currently far exceeds the value of products the EU exports to China. Not only that, but in 2025, the EU imported Chinese goods totaling nearly 600 billion—a 6% increase compared to 2024—while exports to China amounted to only about 200 billion (-6%).
(SOURCE: Eurostat).

The issue seems to have set off alarm in Brussel, that it decided to draft a new strategy. The tools avaliable to the Commission are primarily concerned with strengthening investigations into cases of unfair competition and protectionism. The EU intends to increase the number of staff assigned to these types of inspections, with the goal of making them more effective and faster at identifying Chinese products and companies engaged in irregular practices.

The plan would then introduce the so-called the overcapacity instrument- aimed at identifying and restricting those companies that, as a result of government subsidies, are able to produce enormous quantities of goods and sell them at artificially low prices, making it impossible for European companies to compete in the market. 

The final goal of the new strategy would be to promote the long-awaited Made in Europe initiative by imposing duties and tariffs on Chinese companies that meet the criteria outlined above.

In response to Beijing’s concerns about the possible adoption of these measures, Brussels stated that the new instruments will apply exclusively to those strategic sectors where the EU is gradually losing competitiveness to Chinese products—seeking to convince others that the focus is on Europe’s loss of competitiveness, not on Beijing’s improper conduct. 

The strategic sectors that will be involved are the electrical components and machinery sectors—on which new AI technologies and the green transition depend—as well as robotics, textiles, and chemical fertilizers.

It's worth to remember that the Commission, in 2025, has already introduced some

 E’ utile ricordare che nel 2025 la Commissione aveva già introdotto delle restrictive measures on steel imports —in response to U.S. tariffs—and that last April it adopted a new package of measures aimed at protecting domestic production from competition from outside the EU (which is still awaiting approval by Parliament).

Finally, the European Parliament will soon be called upon to deliberate on the Industrial Accelerator Act initiative as well. The proposal aims to increase demand for products made in Europe in critical sectors, such as electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels. If approved, the legislation would encourage companies to diversify their suppliers by introducing a mandatory minimum quota for sourcing European products. In addition, significant restrictions would be imposed on foreign investment in strategic sectors: non-EU companies investing in the Union would be required to hire European workers and purchase a set minimum of EU-made components.

European efforts to revitalize its declining sectors and protect its competitiveness are part of the Competitiveness Compass program, launched by the Commission in 2025, in conjunction with the Draghi Report on European competitiveness.

Although these efforts appear promising, we will have to wait for the European Council meeting in June to see whether the 27 member states will approve this new defensive strategy or whether they will decide to maintain calm relations with Beijing.

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