‘Framing the World’ is an analytical column that offers in-depth analysis of key trends in international politics. The column is organized by geographic region—Asia, the Americas, Africa & MENA, and Europe—and each week features a thematic focus comprising several coordinated articles. The goal is to provide clear and accessible insights into major global developments through the collaborative work of the editorial team.
This and much more in the latest issue of FtW!
Scarborough Shoal, the disputed shoal reigniting Chinese pressure in the South China Sea.
The new naval and aerial patrols conducted by China near Scarborough Shoal, the disputed shoal in the South China Sea, do not merely represent an isolated episode of tension. Rather, they fit into a broader dynamic of strategic competition, where every exercise, every patrol or official declaration. The Chinese decision has been announced, in fact, while the Philippines, USA, Australia and New Zealand take part in the annual Balikatan exercises, expected to be from April 20th to May 8th, that this year include the highest number of participating countries ever recorded.
From Beijing’s point of view, the patrols found near the shoal are presented as a defensive measure that is necessary to respond to acts considered to be provocative and to safeguard its territorial sovereignty. China claims, in fact, Scarborough Shoal – called Huangyan Island by them – and in 2024 established a baseline for its “territorial waters” around the area. On the contrary, Manila considers such claims as a violation of its sovereignty and of international law. It is precisely this overlap of claims that makes Scarborough Shoal one of the most sensitive points in the Sino-Philippine maritime dispute.
The strategic value of this news lies in the fact that the crisis is not merely about control of a maritime area or fishing rights. The shoal has become a symbol of the competition between two models of regional security: on the one hand, China claims a dominant role in its maritime surroundings and denounces the presence of external powers; on the other, the Philippines is strengthening cooperation with Washington and other partners to contain Chinese pressure and defend its waters.
The Balikatan exercises, which include coastal defence manoeuvres, actual firing and simulated responses to threats, indicate that military cooperation between Manila and its allies is no longer merely diplomatic, but is becoming more and more operational. China’s response thus confirms a key trend in contemporary Asian security: escalation remains below the threshold of direct confrontation, but the military presence is becoming increasingly visible, regular and normalised. In this sense, Scarborough Shoal is not just a local dispute, but a testing ground for the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.
Federica Placidi
China is cracking down on VPNs, again.
From April 2026, the Chinese authorities began to restrict internet access for residents in China once again, without any official announcement. On Wednesday, April 8th, China’s main internet regulator summoned a national meeting in Beijing. At the same time, a series of internal documents was leaked, including one attributed to Shaanxi Telecom, suggesting the launch of a new coordinated campaign to block traffic to all IP addresses outside mainland China, including Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, threatening internet service providers with financial penalties and permanent shutdowns.
Another element reported by some independent journalists, which is often cited, is a patent focusing on the identification of computers connected to VPN services, filed in 2025 by a company in Fujian, which, according to the same sources, is said to have attracted the attention of the Chinese authorities. LetsVPN, one of the most widely used services in China in recent years, has been severely affected by the measures introduced on April 8th, forcing it to issue a statement on April 29th, announcing that it had ‘no choice but to cease commercial operations in mainland China’ and promising refunds to all users.
It is important to note that the Chinese government has, on an almost annual basis, consistently alternated between long periods of ‘leniency’ and short periods of restrictions regarding access to foreign content. However, the current approach seems to be much more structured at the moment, and is focusing on the total 'elimination of all forms of elusion', effectively including VPN services and proxy routing, commonly referred to as 'fanqiang' (翻墙) – literally ‘going over the wall’ – a term that refers to the extensive digital filtering system known as the “Great Firewall”.
An example of this new approach is the decision of the public security authorities in Hubei province to impose an administrative fine on private individuals who use VPN services to access foreign social media. There are numerous examples of social media posts describing the intensification of monitoring by the Chinese authorities, with some users reporting that they have been contacted by the police even for minor matters – such as receiving a verification code – but at the moment, it is, of course, impossible to verify the accuracy of such posts.
Leonardo Di Girolamo
Framing The World is a project conceived and created through the collaboration of a team of associates at Mondo Internazionale.
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