Translated by Martina Ravasi
On February 6th an attack upset the capital of Pakistan, whose target was a Shiite mosque during a Friday congregational prayer. The attacker, who died during this catastrophic event, triggered off an explosion causing around 30 victims and 170 wounded. The attack was claimed by the Islamic State of Pakistani Provinces (ISPP), established in 2019. And since that moment it has carried out an array of sectarian mortal attacks against the Shiite community in Pakistan. These aggressions have been soaring unprecedently in terms of violence and mortality over the last decade in Islamabad. This latest attack came up in a high alarming situation for police authorities due to the visit of the President of Uzbekistan, thus unveiling the limits to security and anti-terrorism strategies within the country. Not to mention the fact that this attack followed another one on November 11th 2025, which caused 12 victims and damaged the district court of the capital. However, the latter was claimed by Therik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and it has nothing to do with the religious issues behind the February attack.
The increase in such successful and high-profile attacks in the capital itself has led the Pakistani authorities to blame the Indian and the Taliban Afghan governments for their backing to the activities of several political groups who are hostile to the Pakistani government. This thesis is even more strengthened following the discovery of the tight relations between the February 6th attacker and Afghanistan. The Taliban, the Islamic State and the Belucistan liberation army are the main political actors responsible for violence, uprights and terroristic attacks in Pakistan. Moreover, there are further ten army forces that are considered as terroristic in Pakistan and in 2025 they were responsible for 699 or so successful attacks. Although their agendas and revendications are different from each other, their frequent cooperation and convergence of intents allow attackers to be supported from many sides. They also benefit from the trans-national identity of some groups, thus weakening the efficiency of the Pakistani intelligence in contrasting the increase in violence. As a result, in 2024 Pakistan became the second most affected country by terrorism worldwide. The escalation in some provinces – such as Belucistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – has paved the way to several fronts for the government of Islamabad. On one hand, we have an internal front, which is against militants and uprights in the provinces, and on the other hand there is an external front, which is against the Afghani and the Indian governments. Pakistan shares its most extensive and even troubled borders with these two countries, which are accused of being responsible for the deterioration of security in Pakistan by sponsoring terroristic attacks.
Just in 2025 two transnational crises shocked the entire region. They were triggered by the tensions related to the ethno-nationalist terroristic groups active along Pakistani borders. During the first one, in May, India launched missiles on Pakistan (Sindoor Operation) aiming to hit the terrorists' hideouts who were accused by New Delhi of having planned a terroristic attack in the Kashmir region. During the second attack, in October, Pakistan kicked off its Khyber Storm Operation against the Pakistani Taliban groups escaped to Afghanistan by launching missiles on Kabul and other cities. In response, Afghanistan bombed several Pakistani military bases on its border.
While territorial disputes with India had already worsened the situation of Pakistan in the region, the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 further isolated Islamabad in its regional dynamics. Consequently, the Taliban militant groups operating in Pakistan could find support and shelter simply by crossing the border with Afghanistan, thus weakening the potential of diplomatic mediation in the resolution of border disputes and increasing the use of armed forces to solve conflicts between these three countries. Even Iran is involved in these dynamics, although it shares about 900 km of its borders with Pakistan. Indeed, this border divides the Belucistan region, which is at the core of un upright claiming its own independence. The Belucistan issue has kept the relations between Iran and Pakistan particularly tense over the years until the latest escalation in January 2024, when Iranian missiles were launched on the Belucistan province aiming to target the headquarter of an armed group backing the independence of the Iranian Belucistan.
China remains a crucial ally of Pakistan in the region. Indeed, not only does its alliance with Islamabad imply a strengthening of the front against India, but also its infiltration in Southern Asia and the access to the Arabic Sea through Pakistani coasts. As a matter of fact, since 2013 China has already invested in this sector through the launch of an economic corridor with Pakistan – with a total of 60 billiard of dollars of investments in 2025 – and a special economic zone in Gwadar Harbour. This is a free-trade area of 2 billiard dollars totally in Chinese hands that may reshape the Pakistani sea trade dynamics. Furthermore, China is the most important foreign investor in Pakistan, responsible for about 50% of foreign investments in this country. At the same time, Pakistan is financially dependent on Chinese loans, and China is the most relevant creditor of the country. However, the lack of internal security combined with conflicts with other regional actors put the future of economic relations between Beijing and Islamabad at risk. Indeed, the steady increase in the number of attacks towards Chinese infrastructures and staff in Pakistan, which are mainly carried out by the Belucistan Liberation Army, has provoked a coolness of economic relations between the two countries. This is due to economic uncertainties and a high risk of investment in areas that the central government of Islamabad doesn’t manage to cover. The Chinese reaction to the attacks has resulted in a temporary suspension of several projects of development related to the Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan. China has also made an explicit reference to the government of Pakistan regarding internal security. In 2026 the Pakistani government has established a new special security unit exclusively devoted to protecting Chinese citizens in the Pakistani territory. The idea is to reaffirm its interest in supporting and protecting the relations with China.
The security crisis in Pakistan is a law-and-order issue that isn’t limited to single attacks but it’s a symptom of a deeper governance and governmental legitimacy crisis undermining the ability of Islamabad to provide its citizens with security, justice and development perspectives. Even though military operations can stop an outbreak of violence temporarily, they don’t deal with dissatisfaction, marginalization and hostility that armed forces turn into recruitment tools and opposition to the central government. If Islamabad doesn’t succeed in halting the vicious circle of violence as well as anti-state propaganda and institutional weakness, Pakistan risks an erosion both in terms of legitimacy and productivity. On one hand, we have an increasingly internally contested government whereas on the other hand the Pakistani economic situation is less attractive to foreign investors. The consequence of this phenomenon is a drop in terms of growth and development opportunities.
Mondo Internazionale APS - Riproduzione Riservata ® 2026