Translated by Martina Ravasi
The inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in September 2025 marked a decisive political shift in the Nile area. Indeed, the long phase where Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt were mainly debating about the building of the dam has come to an end and a new phase has begun. The core issue now is no longer whether to halt the project, but how it is possible to deal with the new strategic balance created by the inauguration of the dam. In this sense, GERD is not only a hydroelectric infrastructure, but it’s a concrete symbol of the fact that we’ve gone beyond a historical hydro-political order. Moreover, it also represents the rise of Ethiopia as a regional actor.
Built on the Blue Nile in the Ethiopian region of Benishangul-Gumuz, the dam is the biggest hydroelectric infrastructure in Africa and it’s an economic, political and symbolic lever for Addis Ababa. Its construction interrupts the framework based on the 1929 and 1959 agreements, where Egypt and Sudan split the Nile by excluding other countries upstream. Cairo and Khartoum have been appealing to those agreements as the basis for their own historical rights, whereas Ethiopia considers them as the result of a colonial order having no legitimacy. For this reason, GERD goes beyond water management, since it’s a concrete example of the Ethiopian opposition to a regional hierarchy consolidated for decades.
Ethiopia and the dam as a power lever
First and foremost, GERD is a national transformation tool for Ethiopia. Indeed, Addis Ababa aims to reinforce its internal production of electrical energy and reduce its energy insufficiency. Moreover, Ethiopia strives for becoming an energy regional hub through electricity exports to its neighbourhood countries. Consequently, the dam is functional not only to the internal development of the country, but also to the establishment of a network of regional relations where Ethiopia can play a pivotal role.
The economic dimension of the dam is intertwined with a political one. In a country weakened by a civil war and the persisting tensions and instabilities in several regions, GERD has become one of the few symbols able to create transversal consensus. Governmental supporting campaigns and the central role of the dam in the public storytelling of the country have turned it into the symbol of the Ethiopian “renaissance”. While in the past the Nile used to be perceived as a river that simply crossed the country without any advantage for the local population, now it’s considered an eventually recovered resource for national development.
This symbolic value of GERD helps understand Addis Ababa determination in negotiations. The issue doesn’t concern only technical parameters or water, but also Ethiopia sovereignty and the political legitimacy of its government. From an internal point of view, allowing substantial grants for a project that was presented as the symbol of the Ethiopian autonomy would mean weakening the public storytelling that was made up around the dam. For this reason, GERD is a power tool too, since it allows Ethiopia not only to increase its economic power, but also reinforce its capability of redefining the rules of regional confrontation.
Egypt and the transformation of water security into national security
GERD has completely different implications for Egypt. Indeed, the Nile is almost the single water supplier in the country and the high concentration of the population around this river makes any alteration of this system an issue in terms of political, economic and social stability immediately. Therefore, it’s not surprising that Cairo defines the dam an existential threaten.
However, from a geopolitical point of view, the most relevant point is not only water risk, but also the loss of centrality of Egypt in the Nile system. Indeed, GERD is modifying a historical balance where Egypt used to consider itself as the main political reference point of the regional water issue. Following the inauguration of the dam, Egypt now has to deal with a new political actor which can influence the river management and at the same time it showed to be able to make the project over despite diplomatic pressures.
Nevertheless, the news tells us about an essential element. So far it seems that reservoir filling cycles, which started in 2020 and were completed between 2020 and 2025, haven’t caused a catastrophic drop in water flows towards Sudan and Egypt nor a critical decrease in the level of the Assuan dam. Favourable rainfall and more prudent management of downstream water reserves helped contain the immediate effects of water reduction. Moreover, according to simulations reported in some analyses, using the dam as a political tool through extra water containments wouldn’t be beneficial for Ethiopia, since it would jeopardise its hydroelectric production.
Despite this, Egypt keeps uncompromising, which shows that the dispute can’t be explained just in technical terms. Indeed, the storytelling of an external threaten allows Cairo to internationalise the issue, consolidate its internal consensus and reaffirm its strategic role in the regional framework. Therefore, for Egypt GERD isn’t a simple dam we have to deal with, but it’s an evident sign of relative loss of control of a vital resource for the country.
Sudan: from a potential mediator to a weak actor
Sudan position is more ambiguous and fragile at the same time. Indeed, unlike Egypt, Sudan may benefit from the dam concretely. On one hand, there may be a better regularity of the Blue Nile flow as well as a decrease in seasonal floods and a lower sediment accumulation in Sudanese water infrastructures, especially in the Roseires dam. On the other hand, the geographic proximity of GERD to Sudan makes Khartoum particularly exposed to several risks due to uncoordinated water management. For Sudan the crucial point isn’t only the amount of water available, but a timely data sharing above all, as well as coordination of the dams along the river and prior notice for significant releases. In this sense, Sudan would be interested in a more pragmatic and operative negotiation than Egypt.
Nevertheless, this margin dropped following the outbreak of the civil war in 2023. The conflict weakened Sudanese diplomatic capabilities making this country less autonomous in the Nile triangle. According to the news, opposing the GERD project is also a tool to gain more support from Cairo. The result is a progressive Sudanese realignment towards Egypt, which further limits Khartoum opportunities to work as a mediator and hold the balance. Therefore, the civil war has turned Sudan’s role as a potential stabilizing force into a weak link of the regional system.
From the Nile to the Horn of Africa: a crisis within a wider framework
GERD geopolitical relevance is even clearer if we look at it within the wider context of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Over the last few years, Ethiopia has been trying to consolidate its regional position not only through the dam but also claiming a sea access and looking for new strategic opportunities – such as the memorandum signed with Somaliland in 2024. This action worsened Ethiopian tensions with Somalia and paved the way to a new Egyptian activism against Ethiopia by strengthening its relations with other regional actors.
Therefore, the dam issue isn’t just a water matter. Indeed, it’s part of a wider competition for infrastructure access, Red Sea security, regional alliances and political influence in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, there are external actors which are following this issue according to their own interests – the United States, China and Gulf States. However, they all agree in recognizing the strategic value of the Nile area and its concessions with regional trade corridors.
As a result, GERD is a multiplicator of tensions and a catalyst of new power hierarchies at the same time. Its inauguration has reinforced Ethiopia and has forced Egypt to adopt a more defensive strategy. Moreover, the dam has further exposed Sudan to the pressure of regional events.
The most plausible scenarios following September 2025
The first plausible scenario is a controlled negotiation impasse. The dam has been inaugurated, and we can no longer go back. However, there’s still a missing agreement about its management and controversy resolutions among the three countries involved. In this situation, we’ll be likely to have a high but controlled tension with on-and-off negotiations, limited technical cooperation and lack in a true political solution.
A second scenario is a growing regional polarization. In this case, the dispute about the Nile would affect other issues, thus fostering the strengthening of alliances and counter-alliances in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The news is already talking about the Egyptian tentative to exploit other regional tensions to contain Addis Ababa. Apart from being a direct conflict for water, an indirect strategic and diplomatic conflict may break out. In the latter case, the dam would be the symbol of a wider conflict.
The third scenario is a pragmatic cooperation – which may be less immediate but not to be excluded. Energy needs, instability costs and potential extreme climate events may encourage some countries to establish a more stable coordination, especially in terms of data exchange, flow management and responding to periods of drought. Although it wouldn't necessarily be a political reconciliation, it may be a functional adaptation forced by circumstances.
Conclusion
Following its inauguration in September 2025, GERD isn’t just the core of a technical controversy about the filling of a reservoir, but it’s an evident sign of a geopolitical shift in the Nile area. Indeed, while Ethiopia has turned its position into a development, prestige and regional influence lever, Egypt has perceived this change as a threaten to its internal security and historical role. Moreover, Sudan is even more vulnerable due to the civil war and its internal political weakness – although it may have benefitted from the new river configuration. Therefore, the issue no longer concerns the construction of the dam itself, but it affects the power management that the dam has created. In this sense, GERD isn’t simply a dam, since it’s the test bench of a new still uncompleted regional order where today any actor involved isn’t able to impose a shared stability on its own.
Mondo Internazionale APS - Riproduzione Riservata ® 2026