HORN OF AFRICA SLIDES TOWARD BROADER CONFLICT OVER RED SEA CONTROL

  Articoli (Articles)
  Redazione
  17 October 2026
  4 minutes, 42 seconds

Edited by Amb. Giuseppe Mistretta, Member of Scientific and Academic Committee 

Translated by Stefania Madera 

The current resurgence of fighting in Ethiopia between the federal army and northern Tigray militias raises a series of questions about future scenarios, not only for the Ethiopian State but for the entire Horn of Africa. 

Indeed, it remains to be seen whether the new military clashes are the prelude to a wider war in East Africa - primarily between Eritrea and Ethiopia, historic enemies who were only temporary allies against the TDF during the First Tigray War of 2020-2022.

A possible new conflict could also involve Egypt, Sudan and Somalia - all of which are loggerheads with the Ethiopian Government. Together with Eritrea, they firmly oppose any Ethiopian territorial access to the Red Sea, an outlet strongly claimed by Ethiopian Prime minister Abiy Ahmed, outside the procedures established by international law.

Egypt and Sudan also have additional reasons for tension with Addis Abeba. Cairo has long been locked in a dispute with Ethiopian authorities, arguing that The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (or GERD) - built on the Blue Nile of Ethiopia and now fully operational - restricts downstream river flow, with devastating effects on the Egyptian economy. For its part, Khartoum protests Addis Abeba’s covert support for the rebel militias Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the brutal civil war that has been ongoing in Sudanese territory for over three years. 

It is difficult to imagine that the small territory of Tigray, already resoundingly defeated in the first Tigray war, would have reignited the conflict with the central government without ensuring the external support of other Countries, starting with Eritrea. The gap in military resources and technology with Addis Abeba was already evident during the 20-22 war, especially concerning air supremacy and the use of combat drones. Thanks to these, the federal government routed the enemy, also causing tens of thousands of casualties among the Tigrayan civilian population. 

It’s true that in mid-September, the Tigrayan authorities signed an agreement, named Alliance for Survival, with six other Ethiopian opposition militias, including Fano (Amhara) and the OLA (Oromo) - with the declared objective of removing an Ethiopian Prime minister Abiy Ahmed. However, these forces remain highly heterogeneous and internally divided, making it unlikely that they can seriously challenge the Ethiopian army and achieve a decisive victory on the ground. 

Many factors suggest that the true reason behind the resumption of fighting in Tigray is the control of the African coast of the Red Sea, which is bordered by all aforementioned states, except landlocked Ethiopia, which has lacked a coastline since Eritrea gained independence in 1993. 

Eritrean President Isaías Afewerki, an autocratic leader who has been in power in Asmara for over thirty years, is strongly opposed to Ethiopian’s ambitions on the Red Sea, which are targeted directly at the Eritrean port of Assad, located just about sixty kilometers from Ethiopian border. 

Like his colleagues Sudanese, Somali and Egyptian counterparts - Burhan, Hassan Sheik and El Sisi - he is convinced that the Ethiopian President is not claiming maritime access for commercial and economic reasons, but rather to establish full sovereignty over a strip of coastal territory. His ultimate goal is to build a powerful navy capable of controlling near the strategic Bab El Mandeb Strait. 

Against this backdrop, the Heads of State of Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan convened in early October in El Alamein, signing a Joint Declaration that affirms their full consensus on the necessity for regional stability. The document explicitly states, among other things, that “the governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of its coastal states”. 

The new fighting in Tigray is therefore intertwined with regional tensions, over Ethiopian’s demand for maritime access, suggesting that the most likely future scenario in the region is a war of attrition. This conflict would pit Eritrea and the Tigrayan militias - supported with varying degrees of intensity by Egypt, Sudan and Somalia - On one side, against the Ethiopian Federal Government and the United Arab Emirates, backed by limited external support from China and Russia, on the other. 

Furthermore, a swift blitz by the Ethiopian army toward the Eritrean port of Assab cannot be ruled out. A severe military defeat for Eritrea could lead to Afewerki’s definitive exit from the political stage, grant Ethiopian access to the Red Sea, and reshape of geostrategic balances around the Baby El Mandeb’s strait, where the Arab shore is already controlled by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. 

A more remote scenario, however, is reaching a diplomatic agreement through common grounds between their respective needs. Indeed, it would not explain the reasons for resumption at this very moment of the fights from Tigrayan militias, nor border crossings of the Eritrean army in Ethiopian territory, witnessed by local people.

Ethiopia and Eritrea, after having interrupted in the last days their diplomatic relations, have dragged their dispute onto the UN Security council, accusing each other of acts of aggression towards the territorial integrity of respective parties.

Taking into account the general international atmosphere, also in the horn of Africa, the non-stop negotiations seems to give away to the advance of the troops, drones and weaponry, who once again bear the brunt of the civil people, already severely affected by the atrocities of the 2020-2022 war. 

Mondo Internazionale APS - Riproduzione Riservata ® 2026

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