The Brussels Effect in Action: How Geographical Indications Are Transforming the EU’s Regulatory Power

Translated by Aurora Forlivesi

Geographical Indications and the EU’s Regulatory Strategy

Geographical indications (GIs) are a fundamental pillar of the European Union’s quality policy, serving as a tool to protect the cultural and gastronomic heritage of its member states.

In the current global context, the EU has assumed the role of a “normative power” and a “regulatory actor”, aiming to export its high standards of intellectual property protection through bilateral “new-generation” trade agreements. This strategy seeks to overcome the stalemate in multilateral negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO), caused by the limitations of the minimum standard set by the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement—which provides strengthened protection only for wines and spirits, considered insufficient by European institutions, which promote the adoption of higher standards (so-called “TRIPS-plus”). Within this framework, the EU aims to move beyond the distinction between “strong” and “weak” protection, extending the reinforced protection regime to all agricultural and food products listed in the agreements.

Through treaties such as CETA with Canada and the agreement with MERCOSUR, the European Union not only facilitates interregional trade but also actively promotes the integration of its standards into the legal systems of its trading partners.

The EU’s ability to influence global regulations is often described through the concept of the “Brussels Effect” whereby the Union’s market power encourages third countries to adopt its standards in order to maintain access to the single market. Geographical indications (GIs) represent a paradigmatic example of this power in action, as they are a concept rooted specifically in European law that the EU promotes as a distinct and more advanced form of intellectual property compared to the traditional trademark system. The Union’s goal is to achieve extended protection that goes beyond the reinforced safeguards originally provided under the TRIPS regime, including, among other measures, the prohibition of terms such as “type” or “style,” even in cases where the product’s true origin is clearly indicated. This regulatory approach openly challenges the legal traditions of several countries, particularly Canada and the United States.

The CETA Case: Successes and Compromises Between the EU and Canada

The negotiation of CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement) between the European Union and Canada represented a significant challenge in this respect, given Canada’s tradition of protecting geographical names primarily through the trademark system—based on the exclusive protection of distinctive signs linked to individual producers.

For the EU, the inclusion of a chapter dedicated to GIs is considered a crucial negotiating success: Canada agreed to recognize a specific list of 173 European GIs, extending protection beyond the wine sector to include cheeses, meats, and other food products. 

However, this outcome came with a series of significant compromises. First, coexistence between GIs and pre-existing trademarks registered in good faith was allowed, enabling Canadian trademark holders to continue using names identical to protected GIs. Second, Canada obtained exceptions for names considered “generic” in the domestic market: new Canadian producers, for example, may use denominations such as “feta” or “asiago” if accompanied by qualifiers indicating imitation or similarity.

From the perspective of normative power, CETA demonstrates that, even though the EU secured formal recognition of GIs, it had to accept a limitation of their exclusivity to accommodate the acquired rights and established practices of local producers.

The MERCOSUR Case: Complexities and Innovations

The negotiation with the MERCOSUR countries, on the other hand, has been described as a kind of “family dispute,” due to the deep historical ties and migratory flows that brought European culinary traditions to South America. Unlike Canada, these countries already had systems for protecting Geographical Indications, although they were fragmented and not harmonized with one another.

The European Union succeeded in securing protection for an extensive list of 355 European GIs—the largest number ever agreed upon in a trade agreement. An innovative aspect of the deal concerns the protection of non-agricultural GIs, such as handicrafts, introduced by the MERCOSUR countries, which thus anticipated a subsequent regulatory evolution of the EU itself in this area.

Despite the high level of protection achieved, the agreement provides for a transitional phasing-out period (up to 10 years), allowing South American producers to gradually discontinue the use of historic European denominations—such as “champagne” or “cognac.” The main challenge therefore remains the implementation of the agreement: the lack of a central authority within MERCOSUR forces the EU to negotiate specific solutions with each country, creating a patchwork of rules that risks hindering the free circulation of products within the South American bloc.

The Limits of the European Strategy: Moderate Success and Conditional Normative Power

Despite its successes, the EU’s strategy based on closed lists of selected products has faced criticism for its potentially discriminatory nature: this approach tends to favor economically stronger GIs—so-called “global names”—leaving many local GIs excluded from the treaty annexes without international protection. Moreover, the individual negotiation of specific denominations could undermine the concept of GIs as a form of intellectual property with general applicability, comparable in legal status to trademarks.

In conclusion, the EU’s actions in CETA and the more recent agreement with MERCOSUR demonstrate a moderate but tangible success in its strategy of exporting regulatory standards. The Union has managed to consolidate the concept of GIs in markets traditionally resistant, securing a competitive advantage for its premium products. However, the hostility of trading partners and the need for legal compromises indicate that European normative power is not absolute and must contend with the historical, economic, and institutional specificities of partner countries.

GIs thus remain a political “bargaining chip,” capable of shaping not only the dynamics of agri-food trade but also the scope and limits of the EU’s regulatory influence on a global scale.