Italy and China: The Legacy of the Belt and Road Initiative Seven Years Later

Translated by Giulia Girardi 

In March 2019, at Villa Madama, Giuseppe Conte and Xi Jinping signed the memorandum of understanding through which Italy officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — also known as the "New Silk Roads”. The initiative envisioned multibillion-dollar investments in infrastructure, ports, railways, and digital networks aimed at connecting China to Europe through Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Italy was the only G7 country to sign the agreement, hoping to rebalance unstable trade flows with Beijing. As a matter of fact, these had historically favoured the Chinese economy over the Italian one.

The result of that choice remains a matter of debate. What can be said is that, despite its limited economic impact, Italy's participation has undoubtedly exacerbated tensions with its Atlantic allies. Bruxelles and Washington have expressed strong concern because of China's growing influence over Europe, considering the surrounding, increasingly unstable geopolitical environment. As early as 2021, the Draghi government strengthened the golden power framework, imposing strict control over Chinese investments. Giorgia Meloni’s presidency has undoubtedly accelerated this shift: In December 2023, Italy decided not to renew the memorandum of understanding. In order to avert the conclusion of the bilateral dialogue, the countries chose instead to maintain the strategic partnership initiated in 2004 and renewed in 2014 and 2024.

In recent years, the Italian approach to the matter has sought to reconcile two competing priorities: on the one hand, preserving China’s role as a strategic trading partner; on the other hand, protecting Italy's national and industrial interests within a more robust economic security framework — in line with the de-risking strategy promoted by the European Union. Therefore, compared with 2019, the Italian response to the matter has profoundly changed. Several European partners of the peninsula — including France and Germany — have started a new dialogue with Beijing. This confirms that, in Brussels as well as in other major European capitals, China is regarded as an economic partner that is too important to be approached solely through a strategy of containment.

In relation to trade networks, the relationship between Italy and China has become more and more prominent. According to ISTAT data published in the 2026 Report on the Competitiveness of Productive Sectors, China is now Italy's largest supplier, accounting for 10.3% of Italian imports — an increase of 17.2% compared with the previous year and the highest ever recorded. The manufacturing industry, the automotive industry, and the luxury sector have been enormously affected by this increasingly dominant trend. More precisely, the luxury sector was relevantly influenced by new Chinese investments announced between December 2025 and June 2026.

Pirelli represents the most emblematic case. The tire manufacturer, whose largest shareholder is the Chinese holding company Sinochem, represents the largest investment ever made by a Chinese entity in Italy. Pirelli also encapsulates how commercial interests and economic security have become increasingly intertwined. The Italian government has repeatedly exercised its golden power authority to limit the influence of Sinochem over the company's governance, imposing increasingly stringent conditions on corporate decision-making.

At the institutional level, the economic relationship between the two countries is built on a well-established framework. The Italy-China Government Committee regulates the bilateral partnership and serves as the main coordinating body to ensure dialogue between Rome and Beijing. As a matter of fact, the Joint Economic and Trade Commission operates within this framework, where representatives of the two governments discuss market access, the protection of intellectual property rights, and the promotion of bilateral trade and investment. In addition to this, the two countries maintain a bilateral Financial Dialogue, dedicated to macroeconomic coordination and financial cooperation.

However, it is important to consider that — in comparison to China’s major European partners — Italy is still playing a less prominent role. While this bilateral relationship continues to be marked by institutional meetings, reaffirming shared commitments to commercial and socio-cultural cooperation — including the Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani’s visit to Beijing in in April 2026 —, Italy's economic agreements and investment flows remain less significant than those developed by other European allies. Between the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain all carried out relevant missions, which produced more immediate political and economic results compared to those achieved by Rome.

The Italian paradox is that of a country which, after withdrawing from the Belt and Road Initiative, finds itself trying to catch up in a troubled dialogue with Beijing — a relationship that other countries are definitely pursuing with greater determination. The questions that had emerged in 2019 still remain unsolved, even if the central issue is no longer whether to establish a stronger relationship with China, but how and to what extent this engagement should take place in order not to compromise the strategic autonomy that the BRI experience has called into question.

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