China at COP30: the green paradox

The world’s largest emitter presents itself as a driver of the transition, between contradictions and concrete facts.

  Articoli (Articles)
  Sarah Azzurra Spada
  03 December 2025
  6 minutes

Translated by Martina Cintioli

In the heart of the Amazon rainforest, in the Brazilian city of Belém, an event of crucial importance for the future of our planet has recently come to an end. We are referring to COP30, the United Nations’ annual conference that promotes dialogue and agreements on climate change. 162 countries and over 40 heads of state and government sat at the negotiating table to address one of the most pressing issues of the 21st century. COP30, it is worth recalling, took place in a particularly significant year. 2025 marks the tenth anniversary of the signing of the historic Paris Agreement, the first legally binding agreement aimed at tackling global warming by limiting the increase in the average global temperature to below 2°C (an objective that, unfortunately, remains far from being achieved). Moreover, 2025 has been a year of growing geopolitical tensions, which inevitably influenced the power dynamics within the negotiations. The absence of the United States under Trump, which refused to take part in the Conference, and a European Union that was present but weakened due to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as well as internal divisions, left a partial power vacuum. It is precisely within this vacuum that a power which has been on the rise for the past twenty years has stepped forward: China.

At COP30, Beijing chose not to remain in the shadows and presented itself as a key actor in the fight against climate change. The Chinese Pavilion stood out for its remarkable dynamism: exhibitions on electric vehicles, solar and wind energy, and events held in English to showcase the country’s most recent technological achievements in the green sector. China’s presence was also strong behind the scenes. Numerous sources reported Chinese diplomats actively working to facilitate negotiations and the achievement of agreements. It is important to note that throughout the Conference, China consistently referred to a particular expression: “a shared future,” the idea of a collective responsibility of humanity in building a better future. This approach is also reflected in China’s green transition strategy in the Global South: no longer proposing an asymmetrical donor–recipient relationship, but rather an equal alliance based on genuine partnerships (at least on paper).

At first glance, such statements might appear paradoxical to the reader. Wasn’t China the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gases? A power seemingly unconcerned with the environmental impact of its extraordinary economic development? All of this is partially true. China emits one third of global greenhouse gases, has been responsible since 2015 for 90% of the increase in global emissions, and its economy is still heavily dependent on fossil fuels (58% in 2024). And yet, there are data that clearly point in the opposite direction. China is the world’s leading producer of renewable energy, particularly strong in the solar and wind sectors. Suffice it to say that the country manufactures more than 80% of all solar panels worldwide. Moreover, thanks to massive state subsidies, a vast domestic market, and the possibility of achieving economies of scale, China can cut costs by over 70%, offering products at unbeatable prices. In doing so, the country helps remove a well-known obstacle in the energy transition: the high cost of green technologies. To complete the picture, China is the world’s largest investor in clean energy. Its investments account for more than 30% of total global investments. China’s strength in the green energy sector leads to two fundamental consequences. First, Chinese exports of renewables are estimated to reduce global emissions by 1% per year. Second, through renewables, China has managed to keep its annual emission levels stable, despite a constantly increasing energy demand.

This certainly gives us an idea of the contradictory trends characterizing the Chinese giant. However, to fully understand China’s position at COP30, an additional step is required. Let us therefore consider NDC 2035, announced by Beijing in September of this year. NDCs are documents that the signatories of the Paris Agreement must submit every five years. In them, each party must outline the strategies it intends to adopt in order to meet the obligations of the Agreement. In NDC 2035, China’s proposal is clear: 1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 7–10% below peak levels by 2035; 2) increase the share of clean energy in total energy consumption by 30%; 3) improve and strengthen the wind and solar sectors, increasing capacity to 3,600 gigawatts by 2035; 4) expand forest reserves to 24 billion cubic meters. The Chinese approach has been the subject of widespread criticism. The plan appears insufficiently ambitious, especially when considering the extraordinary contribution China could make to the fight against climate change. It is a fundamentally disappointing strategy, inadequate to meet the obligations of the Paris Agreement, let alone to address the enormous challenges ahead. Other observers rightly point out that China is characterized by a complex top-down political system, in which achieving party-set targets is crucial for national cohesion. For this reason, Beijing often limits itself to setting more modest or, at least, realistic goals. In practice, these targets often end up not only being met but even surpassed.

To conclude our analysis and fully grasp China’s approach, it is interesting to compare it with that of another major player in the green transition: the European Union. At a summit held in Beijing in July of this year, the two parties agreed to work closely together to “drive a global just transition.” While noble in intent, a fundamental issue remains: two radically different approaches. To decarbonize the planet, the European Union focuses on a sharp increase in the price of coal, in order to discourage the use of fossil fuels. Making the coal path costly and unviable, investing in high-tech renewables, and promoting high-quality research—this, in broad terms, summarizes the European approach. China, by contrast, proposes an investment- and export-led model: massive investments in green technologies, exploitation of economies of scale, and flooding the global market with low-cost renewables. It is a supply-first approach, in which China bets everything on the supply side.

This is how China interprets climate change in a perhaps controversial way. Climate change becomes, from Beijing’s perspective, an extraordinary economic opportunity. An existential threat and, at the same time, the perfect moment to become the supplier of the means to fight it. It is now clear that China aims to become the leading global supplier, the economic power that dominates the supply side and derives enormous gains from exports. While it is true that the country would reap unprecedented geopolitical and economic benefits, China’s strategy also offers collective advantages: massive foreign investments in clean energy, funding for research and development, and good-quality technology at extremely affordable prices. One cannot help but ask, therefore: is this a strategy that benefits the entire global community, or a short-sighted plan with limited benefits?

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L'Autore

Sarah Azzurra Spada

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China COP30 COP30 Belém climate change green transition renewable energy greenhouse gas climate policies