Integration Without Membership: Turkey, the Green Deal, and Europe's Regulatory Power

Translated by Maria Pia Longo 

For over twenty years, the future of relations between the European Union and Turkey has been interpreted primarily through one question: will Ankara ever join the EU? Today, with accession negotiations virtually stalled, that question continues to dominate the political debate, risking, however, to obscure a less obvious process. While political integration has ground to a halt, economic and regulatory integration has not necessarily followed the same trajectory.

In 2025, trade between the EU and Turkey reached a record value of €217.6 billion. The Union remains by far the primary market for Turkish exports, and the customs union—in force since 1995—has generated a level of economic interdependence over time that is difficult to untangle from the broader history of Turkey’s rapprochement with Europe. Yet, just as the accession process loses its central position, new European policies are opening up alternative forms of convergence.

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which entered its definitive phase on January 1, 2026, offers a significant example. As part of the European Green Deal, the mechanism aims to prevent the EU's climate targets from incentivizing the relocation of carbon-intensive production to countries with less stringent rules. For certain high-emission sectors, such as steel, aluminum, and cement, access to the European market is thus linked to the emissions generated during production.

Behind an apparently technical measure lies an important political transformation. To access the European market, it is no longer just a matter of which product crosses the border, but how that product was made. In this sense, the EU's regulatory border is beginning to extend beyond its territorial one.

For Turkey, this issue is particularly relevant. Ankara is among the primary origins of products targeted by the CBAM. Decisions adopted in Brussels can therefore alter the incentives for Turkish firms without relying on the traditional tools of the accession process.

Turkey, however, is not merely reacting to European policies. In July 2025, it adopted its first Climate Law, establishing a legislative framework for the climate transition and for the development of its own emissions trading system. Furthermore, Ankara is pursuing a national target of climate neutrality by 2053. It would thus be simplistic to view these developments solely as a direct result of pressure from Brussels.

What is more interesting to observe is how domestic goals and economic integration with the EU reinforce one another. A Turkish carbon pricing system can meet the demands of the national transition while simultaneously making Turkish industry more compatible with the new European framework. It is hardly surprising, then, that the CBAM and the future Turkish emissions market have already become key topics of dialogue between Ankara and Brussels.

It is at this point that the Turkish case transcends climate policy and raises a broader question regarding the Union's power. The term Brussels Effect is often used to describe the EU's ability to project its rules beyond its territory due to the size and attractiveness of the European market. Firms and governments seeking to maintain competitive access to that market face strong incentives to align—at least in part—with standards set in Brussels.

The CBAM makes this dynamic particularly visible. The EU does not necessarily have to impose its rules for them to produce consequences beyond its borders: the economic weight of the single market often creates the necessary bargaining power. When access to that market is sufficiently vital, alignment with specific standards becomes an economically sound choice even for actors that remain formally outside the Union.

This gives rise to a geography of European integration that is broader than the one defined by its institutional borders. Around the EU, relationships are developing in which non-member states participate in its market to varying degrees, adopt parts of its rules, and cooperate in specific sectors without being fully incorporated into its institutions. Between membership and complete exclusion lies a broad space of selective integration.

Turkey represents perhaps one of the most evident examples of this intermediate space. It is not simply a third country exporting to Europe; it is an accession candidate, part of the customs union, and embedded for decades within European supply chains. The CBAM does not initiate convergence between Ankara and Brussels, but rather adds a new dimension to an already deeply structured economic and regulatory relationship.

Herein lies the paradox. While political integration through membership remains blocked, new domains continue to generate forms of compatibility and cooperation. The trajectory of EU-Turkey relations can no longer be evaluated solely through the advancement or suspension of accession negotiations.

This dynamic also reveals something about the EU's position in the global economy. Often described as a geopolitically less assertive actor compared to major military powers, the Union possesses a different form of influence: the ability to transform the centrality of its market into regulatory power. Rules drafted to govern the European economy can thus reshape standards, incentives, and production choices far beyond Europe.

This does not mean that the CBAM will automatically bring Ankara closer to membership, nor that climate convergence will trigger broader political alignment. Rather, it demonstrates that membership and integration are not necessarily synonymous. A country can remain far from joining the Union while becoming increasingly involved in specific segments of its economic and regulatory sphere.

The Green Deal makes this possibility particularly clear. Conceived as a project to transform the European economy, it is also reshaping incentives for countries closely tied to the single market. The border of regulatory Europe ultimately extends beyond that of institutional Europe.

The question to ask may therefore no longer be simply if—or when—Turkey will join the European Union. In a Europe surrounded by candidates and partners tied to Brussels through increasingly differentiated forms of cooperation, it becomes equally important to ask how far integration can reach, even without membership.

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