OSINT and the Red Sea crisis. Energy, security and strategic dynamics in sea routes

Translated by Martina Ravasi

Trade routes and strategic points

In our current international system, energy security and freedom of navigation are crucial elements of the global balance that can affect daily decisions of navigation companies as well as insurers, governments, and financial actors. Against this background, one of the most relevant geopolitical issues is the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait. This is a maritime corridor linking the Suez Canal to the Gulf of Aden and it’s one of the main arterial routes between Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Over the last few years, the spread of Houthi’s military actions from the Yemeni war to the sea domination has turned this route into an international high visibility conflict area. The attacks against transiting trade vessels have drawn the attention to vulnerabilities of energy routes and interdependences of globalization. Against this background, open-source intelligence (OSINT) is not only a descriptive tool, but also a way to understand how regional events can provoke systemic effects.

Origin and nature of the crisis

The Red Sea crisis can be better understood if we look at the Yemeni war and the regional dynamics in the Middle East. Starting from November 2023, the Houthi declared that they were intentioned in targeting all vessels belonging to hostile States, thus enlarging the meaning of legitimate goals progressively. The effect was immediate, since a local issue has been turned into a global one about sea security. The core of this issue is not only Houthi military capabilities, but also its geographic location. Indeed, attacking a sea choke point means targeting a crucial point of the international economy. If we want to create instabilities, we don’t have to interrupt economic flows completely; increasing uncertainties is enough.

OSINT and route monitoring. From the very first signals to trends

One of the main OSINT tools used to analyse crises is sea trade monitoring through public AIS data (Automatic Identification System), as well as MarineTraffic and VesselFinder. These data, which are made available thanks to dedicated platforms and analyst communities, allow not only the observation of vessels routes in real time but also their changing courses and trade companies decisions according to the perception of risks in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb area.

According to several reports – such as ITS, a significant part of trade vessels modified their routes during the peak of attacks choosing to circumnavigate Africa through the Cape of Good Hope. This typology of decision isn’t an isolated one. On the contrary, it’s a credible indicator of risk and volatility perceptions that can be assumed according to OSINT data. The importance of these data is given by their promptness and accessibility. Indeed, classified sources aren’t necessarily required in order to realize that a relevant number of vessels is avoiding a specific route and that this choice is driven by economic reasons - high costs (up to more than 40% in final prices) and longer delivery times.

Choke points and structural vulnerabilities of the global system

The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait are structural choke points in the international trade. Their importance depends not only on the volume of their trade traffic, but also on the difficulties of replacing them without high costs. The deviation of routes towards the Cape of Good Hope shows that the global system is able to get adapted. However, this resilience isn’t free of charge. It implies longer lead times, higher fuel consumption, increased insurance costs, and higher exposure to operational variables. In strategic terms, this means that the system is flexible, but it isn’t invulnerable. The activities of a non-statal actor such as the Houthi underline a typical dynamic of contemporary geopolitics, namely the fact that the ability to affect critical points has economic repercussions that go widely beyond the original conflict scale.

Real and perceived risks. The economic dimension of security

One of the essential elements of this crisis is the distinction between real and perceived risks. Although there aren’t any total interruptions of energy flows, the increase in the number of threatens modifies the behaviour of all actors. In the energy sector, stability depends on predictability. When uncertainties increase maritime companies diversify their routes. Moreover, insurers adjust their premiums, and all countries pay more attention to their energy stock. Risks perception becomes an economic factor. OSINT contributes to reduce information asymmetries. If we have a look at AIS data, public reports and trade satellite pictures, analysts can distinguish between a mediatic shock and a structural transformation. This ability to filtrate is crucial if we want to avoid excessive reactions and dangerous undervaluation.

The geopolitical context and international reactions

The Red Sea crisis is part of a challenging regional framework involving Yemen, Iran, Israel, and the United States. Some international reactions – such as the US Prosperity Guardian Operation and Aspides Operation promoted by the EU – are an example of the willing to guarantee freedom of navigation in a high-risk context. Even though these missions don’t dissolve the root causes of the conflict, they try to deal with it. We can monitor the activities of these missions through open-source information, which means that situational awareness is no longer the exclusive monopoly of national intelligence systems.

Limits and risks of OSINT in the maritime context

Despite the fact that it’s a useful tool, OSINT has some structural limits. For instance, AIS signals can be disactivated or changed, and satellite pictures provide us with instant images but don’t have continuity. Moreover, public declarations can be part of communicative strategies. For these reasons, an efficient analysis requires contextualisation and triangulations. Analysts mustn't mix up an isolated event and systemic trends. Their expertise doesn’t consist in accumulating data, but in evaluating their coherence and strategic relevance.

Evolutionary scenarios and long-term implications

If pressures on the Red Sea continue, more radical transformations may come up. For instance, maritime companies might stabilize new routes, infrastructural investments may look towards other logistic alternatives and military forces in strategic routes could become structural. Additionally, this crisis raises an issue about the security of global check points in a long term. The Red Sea isn’t an isolated case, since other critical routes may be victims of such pressures. Against this background, the ability to analyse stress signals quickly becomes an integral part of a strategic planification.

Being able to interpret not only a single event, but all the system

The Red Sea crisis shows that contemporary geopolitics is played along the routes sustaining the global economy. Houthi’s attacks didn’t simply hit single vessels, but they underlined the vulnerability of a strategic point. Although it’s possible to observe these phenomena in real time through OSINT, its value doesn’t consist in having data access. On the contrary, OSINT allows these data to be interpreted in a systematic way. For example, a naval deviation becomes an economic signal, and a rise in increasing insurance premiums reflects a new risk landscape. Lastly, international missions highlight the link between maritime safety and energy security.

Ultimately, open-source intelligence is not only a technical tool, but it’s also a method of analysis that allows people to link local events to global dynamics. In a vulnerable and interdependent international system, the ability to being able to do this connection is an essential strategic expertise.

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