Why are the Franco-German relations a useful tool to understand the difficulties in the European integration in terms of defence?

Translated by Martina Ravasi

On one hand the need to regulate the relations between France and Germany accelerated the European economic integration through the establishment of ECSC. On the other hand, the Franco-German issue was one of the major obstacles that hampered the creation of a common defence. This ambivalence has emerged again during the most recent attempts to integration, thus showing how it’s hard to transfer this convergence in the defence sector.

Europeanise to control

Following the Second World War, we have two countries whose needs seem to be apparently inconsistent. On one hand, France wants to prevent Germany from being a military threat again. On the other hand, the US believe that the rearmament of Western Germany is increasingly necessary to contain the expansion of the USSR.

Europeanise to control is the core idea that tried to lead member countries to the establishment of a supranational defence system - the European Defence Community (EDC), which was conceived to solve the German rearmament issue. Instead of re-establishing its own national army force, Western Germany would rearm within a supranational environment, thus making it more acceptable for France. However, there was a fundamental contradiction in this project. Indeed, France didn’t accept EDC implications regarding the sharing of military sovereignty, although they had promoted it as a tool to control the German rearmament. Therefore, in 1954 the French National Assembly halted the EDC ratification process.

From European defence to the Atlantic guarantee

One of the reasons that pushed the French political debate to halt EDC was precisely the possibility of a potential German rearmament. Nevertheless, the failure of this project didn’t prevent Germany from rearming. Indeed, Western Germany was rearmed and integrated within the Atlantic security system through NATO. With the passing of time, the progressive expansion of the Atlantic Alliance made the need for an autonomous European defence less urgent. Although NATO and the EU periodically stress on the need for a synergic cooperation to tackle transversal threats, the reality is that a real complementarity between these organisations is hard to achieve. The result is that NATO is the main pillar of European defence. Recent criticism raised by US President Donald Trump regarding NATO has put the need to reinforce the European strategic autonomy at the core of debates again, since his disengagement threats are a heavy burden for a system that is struggling to grow and establish itself.

The Franco-German dilemma comes back

France and Germany have recently faced a situation where it was hard for them to turn their cooperation into a shared project. We’re referring to the impasse on the SCAF project due to a lack of industrial coordination between Dassault Aviation and Airbus. This impasse is a symptom of a wider problem. Indeed, this industrial failure isn’t a mere matter of industrial divergences, since it risks inverting the relation between political and military needs. The establishment of a common defence system mustn't be subordinated to the ability of the involved companies to reach an autonomous compromise. It's politics that plays the decisional role and it’s the one that must define strategic goals and subordinate industrial and military interests to them.

“A stronger EU in a stronger NATO”

If France and Germany have some troubles in sharing their control on the creation of a conventional military system, how far can a cooperation that extends to nuclear deterrence go? On July 17th France and Germany institutionalised the Nuclear Steering Group, jointly chaired by the French president and the German chancellor with the participation of their respective defence and foreign ministers. Additionally, by 2026 some German conventional army forces are expected to take part in a French nuclear training. Historically, France has always looked for the leadership in the creation process of European defence and the idea of extending its own nuclear umbrella may concretize this ambition. France and Germany specified that the above-mentioned cooperation won't be an alternative either to the Atlantic Alliance’s nuclear deterrence or to the nuclear sharing mechanisms that Berlin will continue to participate in. Therefore, it’s worth wondering whether European defence can truly be defined as autonomous while European countries consider NATO – and the US strategic guarantee – as their pillar. “A stronger EU in a stronger NATO” tries to combine European autonomy and its alliance with NATO. However, the dilemma between giving more responsibilities to NATO and a real European capability to take action regardless of the Atlantic Alliance keeps unsolved.

Conclusions

From EDC and SCAF to current talks about nuclear deterrence, the limits to the European integration seem to stand out when member States must shift from costs sharing to decision sharing. Moreover, the Franco-German relations underscore that the problem of European defence is mainly political, rather than an industrial or a military one. The French advanced nuclear deterrence is just an integration tool, but it isn’t the definitive solution. Moreover, a potential – albeit utopian – US disengagement from the European territory would create a gap of deterrence that may be filled by the French nuclear umbrella. However, this scenario risks being a mere replacement of the Alliance’s senior partner rather than an equal cooperation where burden-sharing isn’t a simple matter of costs, but also a sharing of strategic responsibilities. 

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