By Ente Berk Tenekeci
On the 12th day of the Islamist rebels' offensive, the new flag that put an end to a thirteen year-long civil war in Syria started to wave. Many analyses have discussed how the process evolved here and many more have tried to predict future scenarios since then. However, to define this very moment in the history of Syria we need to borrow another concept from anthropology, which is liminality. Simply put, the term is used to describe the passage where and when old certainties had lost their validity and new ones were not ready to come yet. Ambiguity and disorientation are distinguished characteristics of this transition moment. As these passages are commonly guided by “ceremony masters” in small-scale societies, the question arising now is whether HTS leader Mohammad al-Julani can undertake the role of ceremony master in Syria.
What brought the end of the Assad regime has developed rapidly and for many unexpectedly. The weakness of the regime became so visible when Iran’s support on the ground and Russia’s support from the air ceased to be enough. This remarked the date of the end of the sixty-one-year Ba’ath Pary and fifty-four-year reign of the Assads collapsed. The new situation after Bashar al-Assad’s flee to Moscow will certainly change the balance of power as regional actors intensify their efforts to fill the gap. Iran’s influence in the region is unlikely to be drastic for long years. Iran and its proxies in the region, primarily Hezbollah, are the prominent losers of the regime’s breakdown. Israeli troops already launched a cross-border operation which subsequently allowed it to “temporarily seize” the control of Golan Heights. From the perspective of Russia, such a rapid collapse of the long-backed Assad regime proves its limited capability to mount wars on two fronts. Vali Nasr wrote this week on Foreign Policy about the potential threat of Russia's losing the military bases in possession which are extending it to Africa. On the other hand, Türkiye, amidst the praise of Western media for President Erdogan, seems to have the best of the developments in the region. While the Foreign Minister of Türkiye, Fidan, has stressed Assad’s misusing of time that was given him after the Astana Process in 2016, Türkiye gained a strong position in Syria. Moreover, Türkiye’s asymmetric relationship with Russia which had leverage for Putin over Idlib dissolved. Nevertheless, as these regional developments reflect the smaller frameworks of broader international developments, they depend on this threshold moment of how Julani will be able to pass Syria into a new phase.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a moderate ISIS-evolved group of jihadists led by Mohammad al Julani, relies on local and national support and resources in a quite disciplined organization. As he has been disclosed to the media so far, we face pragmatic leadership. Controlled transition in which diplomatic ways with the remnants of the old regime are sought and revengeful actions are not
taken. Yet, the issue of the manageability of this situation becomes complex when the question of how the intertwined position of those who represent different worldviews in the shadow of broader political agendas of state-level actors muddies the water. Despite being a decisive actor in Syria, HTS is not the only one. Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces control the north side of the country where ongoing clashes are reported with Turkish-backed groups. The Euphrates River here is drawn as a dividing line between these groups. Turkish FM Fidan said last week that unless the SDF changes itself dialogue is not possible. Putting the sentence in this way can address a change of attitude rather than organizational structure and Türkiye certainly does want to leave an open door for dialogue. Since it is the integration of the army that also matters during this new state-building process, the monopoly of the force of the state must be handled before political integration. Syria has always been a country where regional competition among the cities, such as Aleppo and Damascus, was important. Therefore, territorial arrangements must be given priority before the form of government amidst the talks of establishing a federated state. Moreover, this liminal stage of Syria significantly depends on foreign investment and money flow to the country. For now, Julani looks like convinced Western and Gulf countries as he reflects an intention to reconcile with other religious and ethnic groups. However, it should not be forgotten that Julani was influenced by the Taliban in the past and would not give up easily ruling Syria by Sharia law. How strongly and precisely can this reconciliation be pursued is another question mark for the future of the region. Despite all the truculence and tortures of Bashar al-Assad, his regime used to hold a strong secular backline for Christians in Syria.
While the second term of Trump's administration is on the horizon, he made his intention not to intervene in "their war". However, expecting a complete withdrawal of the U.S. would be an exaggeration. At this point, the SDF will be an important instrument for U.S. foreign policy for preserving its interests but more importantly, for containing the influence of Iran. SDG, with respect to this, holds some critical oil resources in the east of the country. Yet, it should not be considered as major as some analysts argue due to the country’s inability to export this oil. Should the new government be able to settle the stability, it will still be quite difficult for it to find a global market and this renders its impact low. The further spotlight must be directed to both in-between confrontations and reconciliations of groups and their relations with state-level actors. How likely a withdrawal of Russia from the ports in Latakia will remain another factor for the future. The aftershocks of the end of the Assad regime should also be followed from the perspective of Türkiye’s domestic politics. The return of migrants to Syria will cause a change in politics that probable outcomes may extend until its relationship with the EU. If one thing is certain now it is the unknown of whether this liminal period will be destructive or constructive.
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References:
https://www.theguardian.com/wo...
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/10/syria-assad-turkey-erdogan-iran-geopolitics-middle-east-rivalry/