A less American Asia: effects and ambiguities of the New NSS

Translated by Jennifer Di Giacomo

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the second Trump administration, published in recent weeks, represents a significant formal and rhetorical shift in the United States’ positioning in East Asia, although its actual impact will ultimately have to be assessed through real-world developments in the coming years. At the level of official discourse, Washington appears intent on abandoning the narrative of China as a “systemic challenge” to democratic values; instead, China is redefined as an economic competitor with whom it is necessary to “rebalance” the accounts, while simultaneously maximizing commercial benefits through new agreements.

This approach, however, highlights the intrinsic tension in Trump administration’s approach to China. On the one hand, the goal is to maximize commercial gains; on the other hand, there is a push toward decoupling from the Chinese economy, generating a notable underlying ambiguity and a considerable degree of uncertainty.

While this new posture reassures Beijing about the stability of its regime—thanks to an implicit promise of non-interference in domestic affairs—it simultaneously opens a phase of uncertainty regarding regional leadership. China has responded to this evolution by adopting the doctrine of “fighting without breaking”: an approach aimed at resisting U.S. economic pressure while seeking to preserve a form of competitive coexistence, avoiding a total rupture that would be unsustainable for both actors.

Alongside this shift in narrative, the U.S. document is marked by significant omissions, including the complete absence of references to North Korea and Southeast Asia. From this perspective, Asia is reduced to a purely commercial battleground between two giants, overlooking the complex architecture of alliances and relationships that has historically guaranteed balance in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the lack of reference to Pyongyang signals a downgrading—at least at the rhetorical level—of the North Korean nuclear threat. This is a factor that could push long-standing allies such as Seoul and Tokyo to reconsider the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and to explore the development of autonomous defence capabilities.

A further source of concern for U.S. partners in Asia is Trump’s push toward so-called burden-shifting, establishing that Asian allies should no longer merely contribute, but instead be prepared to assume full responsibility for their own defence, relegating the United States to a purely subsidiary role. This is compounded by what appears to be a deliberate eclipse of international law within the document. By choosing not to reference the defence of the rules-based order and by omitting legal references to freedom of navigation, Trump redefines the American role in the region. The clearest example is the omission of the Philippines from the document: by ignoring a historically, the NSS signals that Washington no longer intends to act as the guarantor of international legality in the region, leaving internal regional balances to be determined solely by power relations.

Within this context of pronounced pragmatism, Washington’s position on Taiwan undergoes a reconfiguration, reflecting a shift from an approach based on the defence of democratic values to one focused on the island’s relevance as a technological asset. The document tends to privilege a functional framing of Taipei, emphasizing its centrality to global industrial security, particularly with regard to semiconductor production. Reference is also made to military security, insofar as Taiwan “provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and divides Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theatres.” Stability in the Taiwan Strait thus appears less tied to the promotion of a political model and more oriented toward the protection of a critical node in global supply chains, whose potential disruption would alter commercial balances in Beijing’s favour.

At the diplomatic level, this orientation is reflected in a significant lexical shift: the move from a commitment to “oppose” to merely “not support” unilateral changes to the status quo. Although the emphasis on the military resilience of the “First Island Chain” remains, this new formulation suggests a more cautious and less binding posture. U.S. commitment therefore appears to take on a predominantly instrumental nature, in which the protection of Taiwan is assessed on the basis of its military and industrial function, reducing the weight of the value-based dimension that had previously characterized the bilateral relationship.

Furthermore, the strategic reorientation toward the Western Hemisphere formalized in the so-called “Trump Corollary” foreshadows a potentially significant reallocation of political, military, and financial resources away from traditional theatres. This could result in a drain of assets and diplomatic capital previously devoted to the Indo-Pacific. If realized, this prospect would suggest a transition toward a management of regional balances largely delegated to local partners, reducing U.S. power projection to a function of overseeing only direct national interests and supply chains deemed essential.

In conclusion, U.S. strategy no longer appears aimed at showing the democratic model in Asia, but rather at maintaining a balance of power that prevents China from positioning itself as the sole arbiter of the region. According to the NSS 2025, such a scenario would constitute a direct threat to U.S. national security insofar as it would allow China to unilaterally dictate the terms of global trade. Consequently, American engagement in the Indo-Pacific is recalibrated into a role of strategic supervision, ensuring that regional competition remains multipolar and that no single actor can undermine the autonomy of trade routes or the economic integrity of the Western Hemisphere. It nonetheless remains understood that the effective scope of this highly symbolic document will ultimately have to be tested against real-world developments in the years to come.

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