Four years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: the ICC between arrest warrants and enforcement limits

Translated by Martina Marino

On 17 March 2023, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, for the war crime of unlawful deportation of Ukrainian minors to Russian territory, pursuant to Article 8 of the Rome Statute. It was the first time that such a measure had targeted the head of state of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

In March 2024, the same Chamber issued warrants against General Sergei Kobylash and Admiral Viktor Sokolov for directing attacks against civilian objects and causing disproportionate harm to the civilian population, conduct that may constitute war crimes, as well as for the crime against humanity of inhumane acts, pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute. In June 2024, arrest warrants were also issued against former Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. In total, the ICC has issued six arrest warrants in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, all against Russian nationals, none of which has yet been executed.

The 125 States Parties to the Rome Statute are required, under Article 59, to arrest and surrender to The Hague any individual present on their territory who is subject to a warrant. Since March 2023, Putin has conducted almost all of his diplomatic activity in non-signatory States: China, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Belarus, and several Central Asian countries. In August 2023, he was expected to attend the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, a State Party to the ICC, but ultimately participated only via video link after a South African court confirmed the obligation to proceed with his arrest should he enter national territory.

In September 2024, Putin travelled to Mongolia at the invitation of President Khürelsükh — his first visit to an ICC member State since the warrant was issued. Mongolian authorities did not carry out any arrest, citing economic reasons: Mongolia is heavily dependent on Russia for fuel and electricity. On 24 October 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber II formally issued a finding of non-cooperation, declaring Mongolia in breach of its obligations under the Statute and referring the matter to the Assembly of States Parties. The latter, lacking direct enforcement powers, acknowledged the decision and placed the issue of non-cooperation as a permanent item on its annual agenda.

The Mongolia case highlights a structural limitation of the system created by the Rome Statute nearly thirty years ago: the ICC has no enforcement mechanism of its own, and its ability to enforce arrest warrants depends entirely on the political will of States Parties. When such will conflicts with economic interests, legal obligations are set aside. The same occurred in the Almasri case and in the Netanyahu case.

At least two legal issues remain open. The first concerns the fate of the warrant in a potential negotiated settlement. In this regard, ICC prosecutors have clarified that the warrant against Putin would remain in force even in the event of a peace agreement including a general amnesty, as only a resolution of the UN Security Council could suspend the Court’s proceedings. The second concerns head-of-state immunity. Article 27 of the Rome Statute expressly excludes official capacity, including that of president, as a bar to the Court’s jurisdiction. However, this principle formally applies only to nationals of States Parties: since Russia has not ratified the Statute, the question remains whether this rule has acquired customary international law status and is therefore binding also on non-signatory States — an issue that international legal scholarship has not yet resolved conclusively.

Four years after the invasion, the ICC’s warrants in the Ukrainian context have led to no arrests. They have restricted Putin’s mobility, but without isolating him, and have demonstrated that international criminal law functions only when potential defendants cease to hold sufficient political and economic power to ignore it.

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