Afghanistan: history repeating itself or a lesson to be learned?

Translated by Mariateresa Tauro

What happens when development is used as a security tool?

After 11 September 2001, the United States attempted to stabilise Afghanistan by combining military intervention, reconstruction and development assistance, believing that modernisation could bring security.

Afghanistan was not just a war on terrorism: it became a repeat of a familiar experiment, in which security objectives imposed from outside ended up conflicting with the needs, perceptions and dynamics of local communities.

The context and background to US intervention

Afghanistan became a country of significance in the dynamics of the Cold War after 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded the country to support a Marxist government. This invasion marked the beginning of a long period of conflict, characterised by mujahideen insurrections, supported by countries such as the United States. In 1989, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, leaving the country in the hands of rival factions. One of these, the Taliban, emerged as the most powerful group from 1996 onwards. The regime succeeded in ensuring a seemingly more stable situation, but raised serious concerns about respect for human rights, leading to international sanctions.

In the following years, Afghanistan gradually became an ideal state for hosting extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda, a militant terrorist organisation led by Osama bin Laden. Over time, these organisations managed to hide and train, using the country as a base for preparing terrorist attacks. The freedom granted to al-Qaeda paved the way for the US invasion in 2001. On 11th September 2001, members of al-Qaeda hijacked aeroplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, killing nearly 3,000 people.

In response, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom just one month after the attacks, focusing its efforts on capturing Osama bin Laden and overthrowing the Taliban government. According to the administration, the 11-September events represented the failure of the modernisation processes often used to interpret the pathologies of Middle Eastern societies exploited by terrorist organisations. The regime's inability to create stable economies had produced a generation of young men dissatisfied with existing conditions and therefore vulnerable to extremist ideologies. This reasoning is very similar to that applied to the case of South Vietnam: the difference lies in the ideological shift from communism to extremism.

From that moment onwards, the United States joined forces with international organisations to provide development aid and promote security in the country. In 2002, Afghanistan ranked among the bottom ten countries in the world in socio-economic terms and had virtually no human capital on which to build. The international community pledged over $5 billion in aid and began the difficult task of rebuilding a devastated country. However, the aid was not sufficient to meet Afghanistan's needs. US security and economic assistance between 2002 and 2004 amounted to $4.4 billion, but nearly two-thirds of this was allocated to economic assistance, leaving just over one-third for security.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

To compensate for the structural weaknesses of the Afghan government and following the lead of the United States, several countries established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs were conceived as a concrete application of the security-development nexus, in the form of hybrid civil-military units deployed in a conflict zone. The overall objectives of PRTs were to strengthen security, promote reconstruction, facilitate cooperation with NGOs and international organisations in the area, and assist local authorities in governance and other matters. Between 2002 and 2009, US-led PRTs were decisive in disbursing approximately $2.7 billion through the Commander’s Emergency Response Programme and other PRT-dedicated funds.

The first PRT was established in 2002 with the following objectives: extending the influence of the central government outside the capital; providing security cover for civilian agencies operating outside Kabul; facilitating information sharing; creating conditions for reconstruction; and implementing small-scale reconstruction projects. In 2009, when President Obama announced a troop increase, the army adopted the principles of counterinsurgency. Consequently, the PRTs shifted from inter-agency cooperation to a more distinctly military approach.

Programme results

On 14th April 2021, the President of the United States announced the complete withdrawal of US forces by 11 September of the same year. A few months later, the Taliban captured the capital with little or no resistance. Since then, economic and political instability has limited access to services throughout Afghanistan and hampered the ability of many families to meet basic needs. In 2024, approximately 23.7 million people, more than half of Afghanistan's population, were in need of humanitarian assistance. State-building and development efforts have clearly failed.

Several problems can be identified, rooted in a lack of consideration for the unique characteristics of this area. Firstly, structural problems were not adequately addressed. There was a lack of clear operational guidelines and no clear distinction between the roles of civilian and military components. This ambiguity in roles hindered the implementation of projects. The process was further compromised by a lack of sustainability: short-term planning left no room for follow-up activities, which were essential to the success of the operations. For instance, infrastructure projects such as electricity grids in small villages did not include ongoing maintenance plans, leading to failure after implementation. Corruption and mismanagement aggravated the situation, both during the construction phase and in relations with the local population. Furthermore, the resources provided by the supporting countries were insufficient to cover the actual needs of the operations, and high staff turnover compromised stability and the building of trust with local communities.

As in the case of South Vietnam, the United States and its allies failed to adapt to the needs and peculiarities of the territory. Top-down planning rarely involved Afghan authorities and local communities, inevitably leading to discrepancies between the objectives set and the real needs of the population. This perception also contributed to weakening national authority in the eyes of citizens. The insufficient understanding of cultural dynamics led to the root causes of instability being overlooked. Without dealing with them properly, it was impossible to resolve the security and development issues underlying the current difficulties. For example, the uneven distribution of funds among PRTs generated discontent and exacerbated tribal rivalries that had been a source of instability for decades.

The development associated with the military presence did not help the overall efforts. The local population perceived the PRTs as a foreign occupation force rather than as external aid. Strict security rules for team members did not allow for meaningful engagement with communities. People knew that it was American money, and many felt that the same corruption found in the Afghan government could also be found in the United States, in their companies and in their projects. This statement effectively sums up local discontent.

Decades after the first experiment in South Vietnam, the same problem is recurring. The attempt to win hearts and minds failed in its ultimate goal: to truly win the hearts and minds of the population.

Mondo Internazionale APS - Riproduzione Riservata ® 2025