Flaws and limitations in NATO’s Approach to space

Translated by Valeria D'Alessandro

As a military organization, NATO plays a fundamental role in integrating the aerospace dimension into its military structures. However, this ability is hindered by a lack of coordination among its allies, largely due to divergent perspective on security between the United States and EU member countries. These differences are particularly evident in how threats and strategic priorities are evaluated. For example, France and Germany have been reluctant to recognize China as a direct threat. Additionally, while NATO officially opposes militarization of space, both France and Germany have engaged in testing various aerospace-based weapon systems.

Moreover, while the European Union primarily focuses on developing independent aerospace capabilities, NATO theoretically possesses all the necessary resources to create aerospace weapon systems that could counter China and Russia’s anti-satellite threats. However, the EU’s aerospace capacities should not be a source of friction, but they should be viewed as complementary to NATO’s capabilities.

Within the alliance, there remains a lack of efficient mechanisms to foster mutual trust, which hampers the exchange of data and knowledge. The sharing of classified information is often constrained by national disclosure policies. Yet, overcoming these discrepancies is essential to ensuring collective safety.

Another challenge, is the inadequate number of satellites and spaceports, which are concentrated in the hands of a few member countries, leading to a disproportionate distribution. Additionally, common concepts related to aerospace are not shared uniformly among all allies. In this regard, NATO’s Space Center of Excellence in Toulouse could play a central role in addressing these issues by developing shared frameworks and providing consulting and training to member states. This would also help make the technical aspects of space more accessible to decision-makers, thereby improving their understanding of potential crisis scenarios.

Similarly, there is no clear definition of the circumstances under which Article 5 could be invoked. Furthermore, Article 6 of the Washington Treaty should be updated to extend the collective defense clause, to include responses to satellites attacks and to clearly define NATO’s limits in space. This would ensure that other competitors understand the serious consequences of such actions.

NATO could also play a significant role in revising the norms of space behavior, which are currently regulated mainly by international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). These regulations largely rely on soft laws, while the 1967 Outer Space Treaty has become considerably outdated due to its general provisions and lack of technological specificity. Notably, while the treaty prohibits the use of weapons of mass destruction in space, it does not ban the placement of other types of weapons. This ambiguity has contributed to a growing arms race and divergent interpretations of international principles.

Integrating commercial space solutions in military operation inevitably introduces risks. Companies providing these solutions must implement measures to protect their system and ensure operability during wartime. Additionally, relying on private companies exposes NATO to external factors, such as markets volatility, shifts in corporate objectives, and the risk that data collected by commercial satellites could be accessed by non-authorized entities. Therefore, NATO should absolutely assist private companies in adopting structures designed to mitigate these risks.

Future perspectives

Paradoxically, NATO is one of the most vulnerable actors of space, as its operative efficiency relies heavily on the capabilities provided by individual member states and public-private partnership. However, NATO plays a crucial role through its institutional power to harmonize perspectives, concepts and standards among its members. By fully integrating the space sector into its operational structures, assisting member countries in addressing external space threats, and facilitating intelligence exchange, NATO can reaffirm its importance for transatlantic security.

Due to the disproportioned distribution of aerospace capabilities among NATO allies – where only the United Stats, Germany, France and Italy have the ability to effectively deter potential aggressors – and the absence of a set of updated common rules, it is urgent to define and implement a strategy of Deterrence by Denial and Deterrence by Punishment. Additionally, effort must be made to support allies that lack space assets in developing a dual-use capacity.

Unlikely the euro-Atlantic bloc, Russia and China maintain strict state control over their economies and benefit from cheap labor, enabling them to response quickly to space development demands, in contrast to Western systems. While Russia invests heavily in anti-satellites (ASAT) technology and the activities of non-state actors, China has, since 2014, implemented a strategy to encourage private investments in the space sector, completing its BeiDou satellite navigation system, satellite communication (SATCOM) network, and a lunar exploration plan.

However, China’s primary objective is not to challenge U.S. leadership in space, but to enhance its prestige and gain dominance in information control, which could be used in political warfare, to sow discord and undermine American unity. As a result, the United States could reduce the risk of conflict by recognizing China as a major space power and pursuing cooperative relationships. Recognizing China as a formidable actor is essential, particularly as Russia and China’s in-orbit capabilities grew by 200% between 2015 and 2018, and by an additional 70% between 2019 and 2021.

It is also true that while authoritarian nationalism in Russia and China allows them to focus on internal objectives, it simultaneously limits innovation. Much of their progress has been driven by the theft of intellectual property. Despite their apparent prosperity, the vulnerability of these nations becomes evident during even brief periods of economic downturn.

In conclusion, NATO’s allies must strengthen their resilience, develop a shared strategic culture and agree on space actions that could justify invoking Article 5. Additionally, they should continue reinforcing cooperation with industrial partners and start-ups. Only through these measures will NATO maintain its success and achieve the necessary adaptability to navigate this new strategic era.

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