“Framing the World” is an analytical column that offers in-depth analysis of key trends in international politics. The column is organized by geographic region—Asia, the Americas, Africa & MENA, and Europe—and each week features a thematic focus comprising several coordinated articles. The goal is to provide clear and accessible insights into major global developments through the collaborative work of the editorial team.
This and much more in the latest issue of FtW!
1. Moscow and Pyongyang: An Alliance That Goes Beyond the War in Ukraine
The growing closeness between Russia and North Korea can no longer be viewed merely as cooperation dictated by the immediate needs of the war in Ukraine. The recent intensification of military contacts between Moscow and Pyongyang points to the development of a more structured partnership, one that is potentially destined to endure in the medium term. Discussions regarding a military cooperation plan for the 2027–2031 period suggest, in fact, that the relationship between the two countries is not limited to the current phase of the conflict but is part of a broader strategy of political and military coordination. The bond has strengthened particularly since the signing, in 2024, of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which includes a mutual defense clause. Since then, the cooperation has taken on a concrete dimension: North Korea is said to have supplied ammunition, missiles, and thousands of soldiers in support of Russian forces, particularly in the Kursk region. In exchange, Pyongyang is said to have received economic, food, and energy assistance, as well as potential technology transfers. For a country that has been subject to heavy international sanctions for years, this relationship represents a significant opportunity to strengthen its international standing.
The key point, however, is not merely about the exchange of military resources. The war in Ukraine has offered North Korea a new strategic opportunity: to transform itself from an isolated actor into a useful partner for a major power. This increases Pyongyang’s room for maneuver and allows it to present itself as part of a broader front opposing the Western-led international order. For Moscow, too, North Korean support has value that extends beyond the battlefield. Russia demonstrates its ability to build alternative networks of cooperation, circumventing Western pressure and strengthening ties with countries willing to challenge the existing international order. In this sense, the Moscow-Pyongyang axis becomes a symbol of the growing fragmentation of the global order. The implications also extend to the Asia-Pacific region. If the cooperation were to include advanced military, missile, or satellite technology, North Korea’s strengthening could heighten concerns in South Korea, Japan, and the United States. The partnership between Russia and North Korea, therefore, not only affects the war in Ukraine but risks having lasting effects on regional and global security balances.
Luca Baldazzi
2. Germany Unveils Its New Military Strategy
On April 22, 2026, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius presented the first Military Strategy ever adopted by post-war Germany. This is not merely a procedural update, but the culmination of what Berlin calls the *Zeitenwende*: a historic turning point that transforms Germany from a “civilian power” into an armed pillar of European defense. Pistorius describes today’s world as “more unpredictable and dangerous” and identifies Russia as the primary threat to Euro-Atlantic security. Moscow is perceived not only as a conventional military adversary, but as an actor that systematically employs hybrid tools—such as cyberattacks, sabotage, and disinformation—to destabilize the West. In this context, with the United States’ gradual disengagement from Europe and President Trump’s threats to leave NATO, Germany agrees to assume the role of the Old Continent’s leading power, ready to defend its values independently.
The new military strategy moves away from the previous focus on strictly counting military assets to concentrate on operational capabilities. Minister Pistorius’s stated goal is to become Europe’s strongest conventional army through technological superiority. A central element is the development of what is known as “Deep Strike”—that is, the ability to precisely strike enemy infrastructure and command centers at great distances from the front lines. In addition to the Taurus missiles already in service, Germany will invest in the JASSM-ER system, integrated into the new F-35 fighter jets, which have an estimated range of around 1,000 kilometers. This is complemented by a plan for digitalization and the development of artificial intelligence, with the aim of speeding up decision-making in times of crisis.
However, this technological ambition must contend with a structural shortage of personnel. By 2035, Berlin aims to have 260,000 active-duty military personnel and 200,000 reservists. The reserve, in particular, is being radically reimagined: it will serve as a “bridge” between the armed forces and civil society. While prioritizing the volunteer model, the government has already introduced mandatory military conscription for citizens born in 2008 and does not rule out a return to conscription on a needs-based basis if the target numbers are not met. The transformation of the military sector will follow a precise roadmap: by 2029, operational readiness will be maximized; this will be followed by a massive increase in capabilities and the introduction of new weapons systems by 2035; and finally, by 2039, full technological superiority will be achieved through automation.
Susanna Fazzi
3. Mercenaries or Victims of Human Trafficking? How Russia Recruits Foreign Fighters
Since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has recruited an increasing number of foreign mercenaries to offset heavy losses on the battlefield. The recruits come from over 130 countries, including Central Asia, as well as Syria, Cuba, Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Cameroon, Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, and many others. According to the Coordination Center for the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Ukraine, by March 2026 the total number of foreign recruits in the Russian military had reached at least 27,000. By the end of 2026, Russia plans to recruit another 18,500 foreign nationals: a rapidly growing figure that reflects a deliberate and institutionalized strategy, far beyond the mere use of volunteers.
The report *Fighters, Mercenaries, or Victims of Human Trafficking?* — the result of a joint investigation conducted by Truth Hounds, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law (KIBHR), and published on April 29, 2026 — provides an overview of the process and, above all, a legal analysis of “predatory recruitment.” The document examines the legal status of these individuals and assesses both their individual and state responsibility. Most foreign recruits fall into the category of ordinary combatants; some may fall under the legal definition of “mercenaries” and face prosecution for participating in hostilities; others may be victims of trafficking. Based on nine months of research and interviews with prisoners of war, the report concludes that Russia organized and oversaw a global human trafficking system, a transnational crime.
The report concludes: “Russia has built a global recruitment system that targets individuals in situations of economic, social, or legal vulnerability: undocumented migrants, prisoners, precarious workers, or even foreign students.” In Russia, migrant workers from Kazakhstan were offered military contracts as an alternative to detention or deportation. In sub-Saharan Africa, Nepal, Yemen, and Cuba, they were promised well-paid civilian jobs—in construction, security, or cleaning—and Russian citizenship. Upon arrival in Russia, however, the recruits were instead sent to the front lines. Up to 20% of these fighters do not survive the first four months of service, and some report mistreatment and humiliation by fellow soldiers or commanders, speaking of exploitation and abuse. “Many of them knew, to some extent, what they were getting into. But some were also deceived or coerced. In any case, it is a state that has exploited them as part of its war machine and sent them to the most dangerous positions on the front lines.”
Giuliana Cătălina Băruș
4. “The Return of the Nuclear Age”: This is how Macron announced France’s new strategic deterrence plan.
“The world has become a more dangerous place. (...) We must strengthen our nuclear deterrent (...) and rethink our strategy starting from the heart of Europe.” This is how President Macron began his speech at the military base in Ile Longue last March. The military base and a large nuclear submarine served as the backdrop for the announcement of France’s new nuclear deterrence plan. The French president announced his intention to expand the nuclear arsenal, with the aim of renewing the national defense policy, which is necessary to respond to a historic moment of great uncertainty.
The strategy has been dubbed “forward deterrence” and would primarily involve an exponential increase in nuclear warheads, the launch of a new nuclear-powered submarine, the development of early-warning systems—including space-based ones—and the strengthening of air defense and long-range missile capabilities. The expansion of nuclear forces responds to the need to appear stronger, the President said, to deter potential threats through the prospect of even greater and more destructive retaliation. The plan also includes a secrecy clause, with the decision not to disclose the exact figures of the nuclear arsenal, nor what national red lines might trigger a nuclear response. Russia and North Korea are cited in the President’s speech as potential threats of our time, precisely because of their unpredictability, while references to nuclear powers such as India, Iran, and China are used as a pretext to warn of the return of a new “era of nuclear weapons.”
What the plan does not clarify, however, is the extent of the European Union’s and European allies’ involvement. Macron’s reference to supposed “European and continental interests” to be defended—emphasizing that French national security cannot be entirely separated from the European dimension—seems to leave the door open to a European expansion. Despite this vagueness, Germany and the United Kingdom have already been confirmed by Macron himself as key partners in the new deterrence strategy: they will participate in joint exercises and strategic summits. Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark were also mentioned in the speech, but without any details being provided regarding their level of involvement or role within the plan.
Macron was keen to emphasize that, despite the explicit involvement of European allies, any future decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons will remain the sole prerogative of France, with no sharing of decision-making power or sovereignty. This clarification appears to distance itself from the idea of a European nuclear umbrella, ruling out any direct involvement by Brussels from the outset. In any case, the plan represents an unprecedented development in the current landscape, raising questions about its competition with today’s NATO nuclear umbrella. Amid a climate of growing crisis, with President Trump increasingly critical of NATO and threatening to withdraw U.S. troops from European bases, the new French-made deterrent could potentially be a more appealing alternative, perhaps capable of providing the necessary impetus for the creation of a much-discussed common European defense.
Francesca Rosti
Framing The World is a project conceived and created through the collaboration of a team of associates at Mondo Internazionale.