Vietnam's Strategic Hamlet Program: a tale of hopes and obstacles

Translated by Silvia Toro

What happens when development is used as a safety tool?
In the Sixties, the United States attempted to conquer “hearts and minds” in Vietnam through programs of modernization and territorial control, convinced that development and stability could progress together. The result was the Strategic Hamlet Program, one of the most ambitious attempts to apply the safety–development nexus in the field.

The Vietnam War it was not just a conflict; it became a laboratory that made clear the tensions between security objectives and real needs of local population.

What happens when development is used as a security measure?

In the 1960s, the United States attempted to win the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people through modernization programs and territorial control. They were convinced that development and stability could progress together. The result was the Strategic Hamlet Program, one of the most ambitious attempts to apply the development-security nexus in practice.

The Vietnam War was not just a conflict; it became a laboratory that revealed the tension between security objectives and the real needs of the local population.

The context and premises of the US intervention

In 1954 North Vietnam defeated the French Colonial Administration of Vietnam. On the occasion of the Geneva Accords, Vietnamese territory was divided along the Seventeenth Parallel. North of the line, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was created, governed by the Vietnamese Communist Party. To the South, the State of Vietnam was established and ruled by Emperor Bao Dai. This division was thought of as temporary, in anticipation of the national elections, scheduled for 1956 that would determine the future of a unified Vietnam. The prime minister of the State of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, however, began to face opposition even within his own territory, by the guerrilla forces known as the Viet Cong. In October of 1955 Diem proclaimed himself President of the Republic of Vietnam after holding a referendum only in South Vietnam.

Government officials' widespread use of corruption and intimidation in the fight against communist insurgents pushed the South Vietnamese population into the ranks of the Viet Cong. In 1959, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam called for the overthrow of the Diem government.

The insurgents’ effort became official in 1960, with the creation of the National Liberation Front (NLF). The NLF gained its strength in the discontent of the rural population and, in the early sixties, seriously questioned Diem's ability to gain the support of the citizens.

This situation appeared critical to the United States government. The territory was seriously at risk of succumbing to the spread of communist ideology. After all, one of the key ideas that guided U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was the so-called “domino theory”. If a state in Southeast Asia fell victim to communist infiltration, neighboring states would collapse, creating a domino effect. On the other hand, U.S. government officials were already convinced that economic growth and technological progress would counteract the expansion of communist ideology. For this reason, the Diem regime could count on the Western support from the beginning.

The Strategic Concept for South Vietnam and the Strategic Hamlet Program

In 1961, W. W. Rostow visited Vietnam to understand why the local population supported the insurgents. He discovered that the Viet Cong fight against the regime of Diem turned out as attractive for the younger people not so much because of the underlying communist ideology, but mostly because it offered them a sense of belonging and potential possibilities for personal advancement. This was due to dissatisfaction with the conditions of a rural country in the midst of a transition to modernization. This made them feel uprooted and lacking landmarks.

Based on these considerations, the President of the United States asked Roger Hilsman, the head of State Department intelligence, to draw up a “Strategic Concept for Vietnam”. Hilsman was greatly inspired by Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson's contribution to the counterinsurgency in Malaya, and Thompson later became the head of the British Advisory Mission in South Vietnam from 1961.

The Strategic Concept for South Vietnam was made official on February 2, 1962. It consisted of three distinct stages, that combined military, economic and social measures. Step One aimed to address the security and development of high priority areas: Rural villages easily infiltrated by the Viet Cong. Step Two extended these practices to densely populated areas. Step Three aimed to eliminate the presence of the Viet Cong in South Vietnamese territory, while ensuring permanent protection. The plan’s underlying assumption reflects the red thread of US foreign policy at the time: security concerns were addressed through development measures aimed at fostering modernization.

Stage One of the plan formed the basis of the Strategic Hamlet Program. As determined by Hilsman, U.S. forces and the Diem's government were tasked to creating "strategic village zones" that were less vulnerable to Viet Cong infiltration. The South Vietnamese army was responsible for patrolling and ensuring that the insurgents did not threaten the population of those villages. Then, the Civil Action Teams, composed of professionals from sectors such as education, medicine, and public administration, would intervene. The objective was to help build the village on an adequate socio-political foundation. Efforts were directed not only at securing villages, but also at broader goals of state-building and development. As Hilsman himself stated: “The problem posed by the Viet Cong is a political and not a military problem; or, more accurately, it is a civic action problem.”

Program Results

Implementation began in 1962. The United States Agency for International Development financed the operations with $ 300,000 to compensate the population for the loss of property due to resettlement. Of the 210 households, only 70 moved voluntarily, while the remaining 140 were displaced, after being threatened with the use of armed force. In the first three months of the program, only 7% of the intended beneficiaries had moved to the villages. The operation’s failure culminated in the U.S.-backed coup that overthrew Diem in 1963. Despite the claims contained in the Research Memorandum by Deputy Director of the Office of Intelligence and Research, Denney:

- First, forced resettlement created serious problems in building support among rural populations. The South Vietnamese were forced to abandon their ancestral homes to be moved to new villages, far from their own lands. This displacement broke ties and traditional practices, causing discontent among the population;

- In addition, the villages were not adequately supported by military forces, leaving the population exposed to the Viet Cong’s raids. Despite the training and support provided by the United States, Diem's military apparatus proved incapable of protecting the villages.

Both the issues, initially related to people’s well-being and survival, quickly turned into mistrust towards these efforts and pushed some to join the Viet Cong cause.

This sense of disenchantment was fueled by corruption and mismanagement documented within the Diem government. His efforts to enlist the support of the population were unsuccessful due to the practices of his own officials, both in the capital and in the villages. Since the citizens were not guaranteed resources for these reasons, they were once again “indirectly pushed” into the ranks of the insurgents. Additionally, the inadequate defense of the villages led to frequent NLF raids and infiltration, further aligning the peasants with the Viet Cong.

Conclusion

The attempt to conquer “hearts and minds” failed in its ultimate goal: To win the hearts and minds of the population. The Vietnam was not only a war: it was also an unfinished lesson in how development and security can easily conflict with each other.

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