Israel and Turkey: From the Myth of a “Special Relationship” to Strategic Competition

Translated by Benedetta Calice

Relations between Turkey and Israel have historically been volatile ever since Israel’s establishment in 1948. Although Turkey recognized the State of Israel shortly after its establishment and normalized diplomatic relations with it, the idea of deepening those relations has never been a central priority on Turkey’s political agenda. During the Cold War, bilateral relations between the two countries were influenced by two main factors: their pro-Western stance during the bipolar US-USSR confrontation, and the Arab-Israeli conflict that shaped regional dynamics in the Middle East - with consequences that are still evident today.
Repeated attempts at rapprochement were systematically obstructed or interrupted due to recurring crises between Israel and regional actors, as well as pressure from the Turkish public, which has historically been sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s 12th and current president following the events of October 7, 2023, has consistently condemned Israel’s response to the Hamas attack, accusing Netanyahu and his government of using disproportionate military force with the specific aim of carrying out genocide. Whether this renewed interest in the Palestinian issue stems from Erdoğan’s political opportunism—aimed at solidifying his conservative and religious voter base, pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy in the region—or from a genuine concern for the rights of the Palestinian people, the outcome remains the same: Turkey’s increasingly harsh rhetoric has exacerbated tensions, leading the two states to view each other as strategic rivals.

Turkey and Israel: The Breaking Point

The Second Intifada (2000–2005) and the collapse of the regional peace processes serve as a telling illustration of the difficult coexistence between Turkey and Israel at the start of the new millennium. During that period, however, even though relations between the two countries were particularly strained, Turkey assured its Western partners of a minimal level of continuity in its relations with the Jewish state. This stance changed dramatically between 2009 and 2010, following a heated confrontation between Shimon Peres, then Israeli prime minister, and Erdogan at the Davos Forum in Switzerland. Confirmation of Turkey’s shift in stance came in the wake of the Mavi Marmara incident, in which the Turkish-backed Peace Flotilla was stormed by the IDF, resulting in the deaths of nine people. Officially, mutual recognition continued even after the incident, but major diplomatic relations froze almost completely; in practice, this shift had an impact on the political debates in both countries, where prominent figures and members of the respective governments viewed the other side as a useful political target against which to direct their nationalist rhetoric, with the aim of gaining greater domestic political support. Turkey’s shift in stance had significant consequences for Turkey itself in the following decade: the country experienced a period of growing isolation and a crisis of credibility in the eyes of its Western partners. Turkey’s populist rhetoric—and its support for resistance groups scattered throughout the region—were welcomed by a significant portion of the Arab public but, conversely, were viewed with suspicion by numerous governments in the region. Turkey’s support for Qatar—amid intense pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which accused Qatar of sponsoring “Islamic terrorism” in the region—led to the small Gulf nation’s exclusion from all forms of regional cooperation; Turkey’s refusal to recognize General Al-Sisi’s Egyptian government and the murder of Saudi dissident Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul inevitably contributed to deepening Turkey’s regional isolation. Meanwhile, Israel has benefited from the Gulf countries’ growing concern regarding Iran, which, beginning in 2016, has been a key factor in the gradual rapprochement between Israel and the various Gulf countries, culminating in 2020 with the Abraham Accords.

The Origins of a Strategic Competition

Since the beginning of the new millennium, Turkey has increasingly focused on developing its own strategy that would free it from the influence of the dominant Western Bloc during the Cold War. The United States, concerned about the possibility of an irreparable rift among its regional partners, has consistently sought—albeit with little success—to mediate relations between the two countries. However, the polarization of the two states’ strategic and political positions has not abated; on the contrary, in the wake of the Arab Spring, the growing Islamist movement led by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood has gained momentum. Ankara’s stance was conciliatory toward these emerging political realities, which represent a new wave of democratization, as it aspired to a leadership role in the new regional order. The Turkish government (led by the AKP) sought to present itself as a model: an Islamist-inspired party capable of governing a modern and economically prosperous state. It is therefore not surprising that Turkey has become a safe haven for many activists and militants from Islamist-inspired groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood following the coup that brought Al-Sisi to power in Egypt, or that it has offered protection to members of Hamas, which Erdogan has previously described as a movement for liberation from the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. But why does this ideological affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood and its many offshoots exist? The reason is simple: Erdogan and much of his party’s leadership trace their roots to the “Milli Görüş” (National Vision) movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan in the 1970s, which shared—albeit with some nuances—the same worldview as the Muslim Brotherhood: Islam not only as a private faith, but as an alternative political, social, and economic system to both Western capitalism and socialism. By virtue of this ideology, the Arab Spring represents the culmination: the strategic consolidation of the alliance between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, in which Turkey envisions itself as the leader of the Ummah (the entire Islamic community). Since the Arab Spring, however—perceived as a destabilizing “earthquake” for Israel’s security—tensions between the two countries have steadily increased, creating the perception of a Turkish threat within Israeli power circles that could, in the future, become more significant than current concerns regarding Iran and its nuclear program.

Turkey as an Immediate and Growing Threat?

According to a document from the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) titled "Turkey under Erdoğan: An Emerging Immediate Strategic Threat" the main reasons why Turkey poses a growing threat—as defined with reference to the Nagel Committee, the official body responsible for defending Israel’s strategic interests—are outlined: its presence in Syria, its support for Hamas, and its increasingly expansionist foreign policy both in the Mediterranean and beyond the region’s borders. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024, Turkey has gained significant influence within the leadership of the new government. For Israel, the risk is that Syria will effectively become a “proxy” for Ankara. Furthermore, the deployment of Turkish air defense systems on Syrian territory threatens to limit the Israeli Air Force’s operational freedom. The report highlights the deep ideological and political ties between Erdogan and Hamas. During negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza and the release of hostages under the Trump administration, Erdogan sought to position Turkey as a guarantor and pushed to deploy Turkish forces to Gaza as part of a multinational force. The Israeli government opposed this proposal, arguing that a Turkish presence—given its evident ties to Hamas—would prevent the organization from being disarmed. Also in the wake of the events in Gaza, in April 2024, Turkey severed its main economic ties with Israel, even blocking commercial transit routes through the Palestinian Authority or third countries, and prohibiting ships from docking in each other’s ports. Furthermore, according to the report, projects aimed at influencing Arab-Muslim communities in East Jerusalem—with the goal of radicalizing anti-Israeli sentiment—risk destabilizing the country from within. Finally, the document cites Turkey’s strategy of expansionism in the Near and Far East, such as the “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan), through which Ankara claims vast maritime zones in the eastern Mediterranean, directly opposing natural gas exploration projects and logistical and economic corridors such as the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) - a mega-project for an infrastructure and economic corridor announced at the 2023 G20 summit and supported by Israel, Greece, and Cyprus - and viewed by Turkey, which is effectively excluded from this agreement, as an attempt at Israeli encirclement - or Turkey’s military presence, driven by a neo-Ottoman agenda, in strategic areas such as Qatar and Somalia to project its power into sensitive geopolitical regions.

Mutual provocations or an inevitable conflict?

In conclusion, despite the current thaw in relations, the rivalry between Turkey and Israel has historically been confined to conventional military contexts. Turkey’s membership in NATO and the historic Israeli-U.S. alliance make a direct conflict unlikely in the near future; rather, the competition will manifest itself through constant provocations, threats, and political opportunism. This dynamic includes Turkey’s partial retreat from its unconditional support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which culminated in the expulsion of several activists—a move driven by economic pressures and the desire to break out of regional isolation by normalizing relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The only real strategic variable is represented by the recent military operations by the United States and Israel against Iran. If this action were to structurally weaken the regime in Tehran, the perception of an Iranian threat in the region would fade. This would have a twofold effect: on the one hand, it would make Israel a less indispensable security partner for the Gulf monarchies; on the other, it would eliminate a crucial geopolitical rival for Turkey in the race for regional hegemony.

Mondo Internazionale APS - Riproduzione Riservata ® 2026.