Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa: Italian - Ethiopian relations between local tensions and geopolitical challenges

Translated by Martina Ravasi

Last July the President of the Italian Republic confirmed and formalised Ambassador Sem Fabrizi early return to Rome “in derogation from the minimum presence on site”. Consequently, Fabrizi came back to Italy just after 9 months in Addis Ababa. There are two main versions behind his early return. The first one is supported by Il Fatto Quotidiano and Africa Express, whereas the second has been released by diplomatic press communications.

However, given the importance of that region for the Italian government, this situation has raised doubts and interest at the same time. Indeed, Italy is implementing Piano Mattei in the region for strategic and migratory reasons. On one hand, the aim of this project is supporting the infrastructural development of those countries concerned so as to stabilize them. On the other hand, in this specific case the aim is also to control migration routes in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, if we want to understand the difficulties behind this project we have to look into the Ethiopian geopolitical framework, which is complex for several reasons – from internal security to tensions with other States for sea access and control over water resources. We'll firstly focus on indiscretions concerning Ambassador Fabrizi’s return and then we’ll analyse the Ethiopian context to understand why diplomatic relations with Ethiopia are so important for the Italian foreign policy.

An insight of two versions

According to several press indiscretions, Fabrizi was expelled by the Ethiopian government since he was an “ungrateful person”. Thanks to some anonymous sources, such declarations make people believe that the particularly rigorous management methods of the embassy may have provoked tensions with the Ethiopian establishment or with those close to it.

However, this version is yet to be confirmed. On the contrary, some diplomatic sources affirm that the return of the ambassador was agreed between the parties involved due to private reasons of Fabrizi, who’s now waiting for new positions. Moreover, the low national media coverage and the lack of comments by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as the lack of official declarations by the Ethiopian authorities make it more complex to confirm the first version. Furthermore, unlike common discourse, according to the 1961 Convention of Vienna the expulsion of an ambassador doesn’t juridically imply a reciprocity in the expulsion. This concretely means that Rome isn’t forced to expel the Ethiopian ambassador, even though it can do so – in this case it would be a political case rather than a juridical one.

Italy and Ethiopia and the strategic importance of their bilateral relations

In spite of the doubts raised during recent events, diplomatic relations between Italy and Ethiopia are very close. Indeed, this country located in the Horn of Africa and is one of the main pillars of the Italian foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this sense, Piano Mattei is a concretisation of the Italian diplomatic aspirations in the Horn of Africa.

What does Piano Mattei consist in? It's a plan of huge investments for the realization of infrastructures aiming to improve the general conditions of those countries involved – in this case Ethiopia – in their most critical sectors. For instance, regarding the urban infrastructure and mobility sector, the focus is on the need to link all the areas of a territory. Supporting road infrastructures financially means first and foremost reconnecting rural areas, thus linking small producers to regional markets and cities. The water and agro-industrial dimensions are other crucial pillars too. In a high climate-vulnerable country, Piano Mattei aims to protect and valorise strategic industries. Modernizing irrigation, stock and coffee processing infrastructures means safeguarding small agricultures incomes, since coffee is a pillar sector for the Ethiopian export. Not to forget the Italian authorities' efforts in the social and health sectors, which are particularly relevant some in troubled areas of the country - such as Tigray. All these local measures are part of a wider background of huge hydroelectric projects, where Italian engineering has historically played a central role thanks to the Webuild group. Impressive projects – such as the Gibe III dam and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile – are the backbone of the whole Ethiopian electricity system. Therefore, the Italian course of action through Piano Mattei is addressed to the root causes of poverty and instability. The aim is to stabilize the countries involved as well as to decrease migrations originating from them. For Rome, assuring the survival of the Ethiopian State means preventing a massive humanitarian crisis from occurring, which would inevitably affect Northern African migration routes.

The internal framework, the Tigray war and the Fano and OLA armies

The Ethiopian political system is based on an ethnical federalism where power is shared among the ethnic groups of the country. Each ethnic group has a certain degree of autonomy, at least formally. This system has recently undergone a strong crisis due to permanent tensions between these social realities. Everything started with the Oromo Abiy Ahmed coming into office following the defeat of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which had governed Ethiopia for more than 30 years. The new political course of action was more unitary than TPLF, which defended the ethical federalism as stipulated in the Constitution of 1995. Therefore, due to this unitary political course of action tensions escalated.

The conflict in the Tigray region, which lasted from 2020 to 2022, left behind a dramatic reality, with more than 600,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of displaced people still suffering from poverty. The crisis broke out when the central government postponed national elections due to COVID-19, thus pushing the Tigray establishment to organize regional polls autonomously. Since Addis Ababa considered these polls illegitimate, escalation became inevitable when the Tigray army assaulted the base of the Northern Command, thus causing a military intervention by Addis Ababa. During the first phase of the conflict, the federal army, supported by the Eritrean army and the Amhara Fano army, occupied Macallè - the Tigray regional capital – and most of the territory. In the meantime, the Tigray army was reorganized in the Tigray Defense Forces, and they managed to counter the occupation and pushed south until they threatened the federal capital. The situation was turned around again thanks to a massive number of drones by Turkiye and the UAE in support of the federal government, which managed to take control of the territories and imposed a humanitarian and economic embargo. The UN and some ONG firmly condemned this embargo. Although the Pretoria Agreements in 2022 declared the conflict over, a real stability is still far away to be reached for two reasons. The first one is that the Eritrean troops are still deployed in border areas. The second one is that there are still unsolved disputes about Western Tigray, which is still under control of the Amhara army. At the same time, tensions moved to the Amhara region, which is historically linked to the establishment of the country. Moreover, in spite of their previous collaboration against Tigray, in 2023 Addis Ababa and the Fano army drifted apart from each other due to a federal measure aiming to dismantle special regional forces. Amhara perceived this decision as an attempt to weaken them compared to the Oromo and Tigrine ethnic groups. The result was another wave of tensions, and a state of emergency was imposed on some key cities – such as Gondar, Bahir Dar, and Lalibela. Against this background there’s also the Oromia issue, where the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) is active. In 2018 this group separated from the OLF front after refusing peace agreements and they formalized their own guerrilla in 2020. The OLA – labelled as a terroristic group by the government – continues its war for the Oromo self-determination and refuses any dialogue with the federal government. Their posture is uncompromising even though the current Ethiopian Prime Minister comes from their ethnic group. These internal tensions make Italy’s cooperation with Ethiopia more complicated, as they negatively affect the main purpose of Piano Mattei.

Migrations and the main regional tensions

In Ethiopia there are millions of displaced people due to recent internal conflicts. Indeed, it is estimated there are 4 million of them in the whole country. On top of that, there are massive migrations across Ethiopia towards Northern Africa and the Mediterranean area. Moreover, the main regional tensions that have recently involved Ethiopia for the Red Sea access and the realization of the GERD dam on the Nile are destabilizing the region.

The access to the Red Sea, which is hampered due to the geographic position of Ethiopia, has always been one of the main Ethiopian foreign policy goals. The recent agreement with Somaliland regarding the use of Berbera harbour provoked a severe reaction from Somalia, thus exacerbating the already existing tensions in the region. Indeed, the Somali federal government considers Somaliland as part of its sovereign territory. For this reason, Somalia defined the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland an aggression and a severe violation of its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, and they declared the agreement juridically invalid. Moreover, Mogadishu expelled the Ethiopian ambassador and threatened to chase the Ethiopian troops working in peacekeeping operations against Al-Shabaab. Lastly, Somalia reached military agreements with Turkiye and Egypt with an anti-Ethiopian perspective.

The GERD dam on the Nile – which is necessary to Ethiopia to differentiate its energy supplies – raised much criticism and caused diplomatic tensions with Egypt and Sudan. The former has openly stated that this infrastructure is a concrete threat to its own national interests, while the latter is in the middle between two potential situations. On one hand, Sudan can really benefit from the dam, since it regulates the river’s floods and guarantees a steady water flow that facilitates agricultural activities. On the other hand, Sudan is afraid that an uncoordinated water flow management by Ethiopia might put at risk its dams and the security of those populations living along the river. On top of that, Egypt has often claimed its historical rights based on the 1929 and 1959 treaties stipulated during the colonial period. According to these treaties, Egypt controlled most of the Nile water and it had a veto power on any infrastructural project. Ethiopia has always rejected these agreements since it has never been involved. Additionally, Ethiopia claims its right to exploit those water resources on its territory. Italy is trying to play a mediation role, balancing between supporting the stabilisation of Ethiopia and safeguarding its relations with other actors in the region.

Final considerations

Ethiopia remains a fundamental piece of the African international arena and its stabilisation requires a diplomatic model capable of looking beyond single emergencies. The core point is balancing long-term structural interventions with a deep understanding of ethnic rivalries and local geodynamics. From this point of view, the apparent media disinterest towards the news of Ambassador Fabrizi’s return may be quite unusual, thus fuelling journalistic indiscretions which are still to be officially confirmed.

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