The International Organization for Mediation: Beijing, the Global South and the challenge to the liberal order

Translated by Elena Ciullo

Last 30th May, around 30 countries joined China to sign the founding Convention of the International Organization for Mediation (OIMed), which will have its headquarters in Hong Kong and should become completely operational by the end of the year. The lack of western countries among signatory countries is striking, whereas the presence of many Global South countries mirrors the influence that Beijing has on these countries, among which Pakistan, Indonesia, Cuba and Byelorussia. In any case, the new organization mechanism is complementary to the others already existing, such as the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague, and will be based on the United Nations Charter. Even though the OIMed declares itself as formally compliant with the UN’s system, the UN has never played a role in its establishment.

The OIMed is an intergovernmental international organization, based on the voluntary resolution – and therefore not binding – of political and economic international disputes through legal mediation. The organization will deal with three types of cases: disputes among states, disputes related to international investments and transnational trade disputes. The prevalence of cases in the field of economy clearly indicates the operational profile of the organization, that seems particularly functional to Chinese interests, especially when it comes to the management of disputes that may arise in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In justifying the establishment of a new international organization, China has highlighted the insufficient representation of Global South countries in the current international legal system. The OIMed would then qualify as the contribution of emerging countries to it. According to official Chinese media, the establishment of the organization would prove the commitment of Beijing in favour of an international order based on the law and dialogue, in contrast to the zero sum logic, that, according to them, characterizes the western approach. In this context, the legal mediation promoted by the OIMed would represent a step towards an international order characterized by more flexibility, harmony and cooperation.

The foundation of the OIMed is part of thegreater attempt by the Chinese leadership to promote a reform of the global governance, a purpose that has marked the entire Xi Jinping presidency. The organization thus joins other initiatives promoted by Beijing with similar aims, though of greater media coverage, such as BRI and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

These initiatives raise questions about the legal foundations of the liberal order, without challenging its existence. The OIMed does not indeed explicitly contrast liberal principles, on the contrary, Chinese leaders highlight its full compliance with the system of the United Nations. This process of objection is part of a widespread dissatisfaction climate, shared by many countries outside China, when it comes to the current global order.

China wants to take advantage of these critical issues to promote a reorganization of the international order so that this can support its interests. Through organizations like the OIMed and other similar intiatives, Beijing goes beyond fostering cooperation, pursuing a greater aim: socializing partner countries to its own governance model, progressively spreading rules and practices inspired by its view of the international order.

This socialization process results in an increasing political convergence between these countries and Beijing, mirrored for example by the votes expressed by Global South countries within the UN, often aligned with the positions of the Popular Republic. In other words, the enhancement of the multilateral tools promoted by Beijing – from OIMed and the BRI to BRICS+ and regional cooperation platforms – not only contributes to consolidating its economic presence, but also enhances its legitimacy and credibility on an international level, especially among emerging countries. In this context, China is a privileged partner for many developing economies and this allows it to promote the entering of its companies in many growing local markets, increasing its influence and in the meantime enhancing the spread of its own global governance model. What strikes when it comes to the commitment of China within international organizations and minilateral mechanisms, which it promotes, is the complete exclusion of the United States from these contexts. This allows Beijing to autonomously control the agenda, pursuing its own interests without enduring direct pressure from Washington.

To conclude, while it is unlikely that the establishment of the OIMed will have an impact comparable to initiatives such as BRI or AIIB, and its effective impact on the international legal system is still to be assessed, its value must anyway be appreciated as part of a greater counter institutionalization phenomena promoted by China, which challenges the current international order in specific sectors. The way in which China legitimates this strategy is particularly relevant: leveraging on the limited representation on an international level of the Global South. Therefore, it presents itself as representative and defender of the interests of developing countries, that feel neglected or unsatisfied with the current international system. In this way, Beijing not only can be an alternative to the current order, but also attributes to its initiatives a positive legal value, painting them as necessary responses to the right needs of a great part of the world, that today claims more equity and representation. This contributes to creating consensus and legitimacy around its view, clearly distinguishing it from the status quo, perceived as unsuitable.