Why the Mecca Joint Agreement Is Not the New NATO

Translated by. Chiara Lamedica

The recent collective defence pact, signed in Mecca on 7 August by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, fits into a regional context of growing instability, characterised by a veritable mosaic of threats. The cornerstone of the agreement is collective defence: the clause stipulating that an attack against one of the three countries constitutes an attack against all appears, at first sight, to echo Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance. It is precisely this apparent analogy that makes a closer comparison necessary. Four lines of argument help explain why the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement represents a security architecture fundamentally different from NATO: uncertainty over its degree of institutionalisation, the absence of a common enemy, divergent security perceptions, and the ambiguity surrounding its nuclear dimension. The fact that the three countries regard an attack against one of them as an attack against all is certainly an important indicator, but the political commitment should be accompanied by an institutional architecture to make it operational. Indeed, the credibility of the agreement will depend on the three countries’ ability to conduct joint exercises, coordinate intelligence, and, above all, manage a potential future crisis. Whether specific mechanisms have been envisaged for this purpose cannot be known, given that the text of the agreement has not been made public. Although no specific threats or actors to be countered have been identified, Iran represents one of the main security factors explaining the timing and significance of the agreement. Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that the three actors share the same security imperatives. Consequently, their mutual commitment to intervene could either serve as a deterrent or, conversely, provide the impetus for the escalation of hostilities on a broader scale. The agreement comes at a particularly uncertain and unstable moment, in which each of the actors involved is facing threats from multiple fronts and actors. The comparison with NATO is therefore misleading, since the Atlantic Alliance emerged in response to fears of Soviet expansionism: the enemy to be confronted was clearly identified, and the source of the threat was relatively predictable. By contrast, the security priorities of the three countries are highly diversified. Türkiye is seeking to move beyond its traditional role as a bridge between Europe and Asia, transforming its geographical position into a capacity for transregional strategic projection. The simultaneous membership of NATO and the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement represents a concrete expression of this ambition for transregional projection, which Israel, by contrast, views as a growing threat to be countered. These concerns were manifested in Israel’s recent attack on the Abu al-Duhur base in Syria, which Tel Aviv justified on the grounds of the need to prevent a possible Turkish military deployment in the area.

If Türkiye therefore views the pact as a further instrument through which to consolidate its strategic projection, Pakistan brings to it a concern of a fundamentally different nature: its rivalry with India. Relations between the two countries remain highly tense; Kashmir remains an unresolved issue in Pakistan-India relations, compounded by growing disputes over the management of water resources. In theory, Pakistan’s presence introduces a dimension of nuclear deterrence into the pact. It is not clear, however, whether and to what extent Pakistan’s deterrence could be extended to the other two signatories, since the text does not clarify the concrete obligations arising from the mutual defence commitment. This issue takes on particular significance in light of the precedent set by nuclear sharing within NATO. However, it is difficult to envisage a similar arrangement without far-reaching consequences in the context of the Mecca pact. Türkiye already hosts US tactical nuclear weapons, while any deployment of Pakistani nuclear capabilities in Saudi Arabia would introduce an entirely new element into the region’s strategic balance, already characterised by deep tensions and growing latent nuclear competition. It is precisely this ambiguity that highlights how far the pact remains from NATO’s integrated and institutionalised architecture. Yet it is Saudi Arabia’s position that offers the broader key to understanding the significance of the agreement. The most recent developments in relations between Riyadh and Washington highlight the need to rely on additional security guarantees in the face of multiple threats and uncertainty over the willingness of the United States to play an active role in every regional crisis. Riyadh does not appear intent on replacing its longstanding strategic partnership with Washington, but rather on complementing it with additional security guarantees. Ultimately, rather than signalling the emergence of a new NATO, the pact appears to reflect the signatories’ need to expand their room for manoeuvre in an increasingly uncertain strategic environment: Türkiye’s transregional projection, Pakistan’s deterrence, and Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of greater security diversification thus converge in a new form of cooperation that, in its embryonic phase, cannot yet be compared to any existing structure.

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