Sudan is approaching the third anniversary of the civil war that began in April 2023, a conflict that has devastated the country, destroyed critical infrastructure, and generated one of the most severe humanitarian crises of our time. What initially appeared to be an internal power struggle among military elites has gradually evolved into a complex war, fueled by historical rivalries, economic interests, and regional interference. Today, Sudan finds itself in a state of deep political and territorial fragmentation, while millions of civilians continue to suffer the consequences of a war that still seems far from over.
To understand the scale of the current crisis, it is necessary to retrace the historical and political context that led to the outbreak of hostilities. Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1956, Sudan has experienced a political history marked by profound instability. Over roughly seventy years, the country has undergone numerous military coups, periods of authoritarian rule, and prolonged internal armed conflicts. Many of these wars have taken place in peripheral regions of the state, often far from the capital, Khartoum. Tensions between the central government and marginalized regions have fueled conflicts that have primarily affected the southern part of the country and the western region of Darfur.
At the same time, over the decades a political system strongly influenced by the military apparatus has taken shape. The army and security structures have gradually assumed a central role not only in governing political power but also in controlling large sectors of the national economy. This system, characterized by a high concentration of resources in the hands of the military elite and a widespread network of political patronage, has helped create the structural conditions that would later favor the outbreak of the current crisis.
One of the key turning points for understanding the contemporary conflict dates back to the early 2000s, during the war in the Darfur region. At that time, the government led by President Omar al-Bashir relied on irregular militias known as the Janjaweed to fight rebel groups active in the western part of the country. These militias were accused by international organizations and independent observers of serious human rights violations, including massacres of civilians, forced displacement, and systematic violence against local populations.
In the years that followed, these militias were gradually integrated into state structures and reorganized into a new paramilitary force known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Although formally incorporated into the state’s security system, the RSF maintained an autonomous command structure and developed significant military and economic capabilities. Leading this force was Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, originally from Darfur and initially involved in the camel trade. Over time, Dagalo managed to become one of the most powerful men in the country, accumulating wealth and influence through control of the RSF and related economic activities.
President Omar al-Bashir strengthened the role of the RSF precisely to counterbalance the power of the regular army. The paramilitary militia was used as a sort of praetorian guard of the regime, capable of ensuring the president’s security even in the face of potential internal challenges from within the military apparatus. This strategy helped consolidate Dagalo’s power but also laid the groundwork for future rivalries within the state.
A turning point in Sudan’s recent history came in 2019, when the country was swept by an unprecedented wave of popular protests. The demonstrations began as protests against a severe economic crisis and rising living costs, but within a few months they evolved into a much broader political movement demanding the end of Bashir’s regime.
Faced with growing popular pressure, in April 2019 the military intervened, deposing the president and ending nearly thirty years of rule. After Bashir’s fall, a Sovereign Council led by the military was established to manage a transitional phase, with the stated goal of guiding the country toward a civilian system of government.
Within this new balance of power, two central figures emerged. On one side was General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces and chairman of the Sovereign Council. On the other was Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, who, thanks to his control of the RSF, had become one of the most influential actors in the country. Initially, the two leaders appeared allied in managing the political transition, but over the following years tensions between the army and the paramilitary militia began to grow.
The main issue concerned security sector reform and the future of the Rapid Support Forces. Various political and civilian actors argued for the need to fully integrate the RSF into the regular armed forces. For Dagalo and his supporters, however, such integration would have meant losing the military and economic autonomy they had built over the years. Negotiations on this issue dragged on without concrete results, while rivalry between the two military power centers continued to intensify.
In April 2023, tensions finally erupted. Armed clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces broke out in the capital, Khartoum, and quickly spread to other cities. Within days, the capital turned into a battlefield. Unlike previous wars, often fought in Sudan’s peripheral regions, this time the conflict directly struck the political and economic heart of the state.
The fighting led to the destruction of numerous government buildings, banks, and civilian infrastructure. Entire residential neighborhoods were hit by bombings and urban combat. The government was forced to temporarily relocate many of its activities to the port city of Port Sudan on the Red Sea, considered safer than the capital.
As the months passed, the devastation of Khartoum became increasingly evident. When international journalists were able to visit parts of the capital after certain areas were recaptured by the army, they found a city deeply scarred by war. The runways of the international airport were littered with unexploded ordnance, and passenger terminals were severely damaged. Many government buildings were blackened by fire, while numerous institutional offices had been looted or destroyed.
The presidential palace was also too damaged to be used, and several foreign diplomatic missions showed clear signs of fighting. In some cases, even the bulletproof windows of buildings had been pierced by gunfire during clashes between the two rival armed forces.
Alongside the destruction of state infrastructure, the war has triggered a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions. Millions of civilians have been forced to flee their homes, creating one of the largest displacement crises in the world. In many areas, access to food, clean water, and healthcare has become extremely difficult, while humanitarian organizations have reported severe obstacles in delivering aid.
As the conflict continued, fighting also spread to the western region of Darfur. In this area, the city of El Fasher became one of the main military targets of the Rapid Support Forces. After months of siege, in October 2025 the city was captured by paramilitary forces. In the days following its fall, numerous reports emerged of large-scale violence against the civilian population.
According to a report by the United Nations Independent Mission, the events in El Fasher bear what were described as the “hallmarks of genocide.” The document refers to mass killings, systematic sexual violence, and campaigns of ethnic cleansing against non-Arab communities in the region.
The assault on the city did not come as a surprise to the international community. Humanitarian organizations, investigative journalists, and research centers had repeatedly warned of the risk of an imminent massacre. Some Western government agencies had also received information about the buildup of RSF forces around the city. In 2024, the United Nations Security Council even adopted a resolution calling for an end to the siege. However, these initiatives failed to prevent the city’s fall and the violence that followed.
Over time, the Sudanese conflict has also taken on an increasingly pronounced geopolitical dimension. Several UN expert reports and journalistic investigations have raised concerns about external support received by the Rapid Support Forces. In particular, the United Arab Emirates has been accused by multiple parties of providing weapons, logistical support, and funding to the paramilitary group.
According to some investigations, RSF supply networks have used various regional transit corridors, including routes passing through Libya, Chad, Somalia, and Ethiopia. The possibility that RSF fighters are trained in camps near the Ethiopian border has also been mentioned in some journalistic inquiries.
The Sudanese government has also reported the entry of drones from Ethiopian territory into its airspace, describing it as a violation of national sovereignty. At the same time, Sudan has become one of the indirect arenas of geopolitical competition in the Red Sea, one of the world’s most important trade routes.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two key actors in the region, have developed different strategies in the Horn of Africa in recent years. While Riyadh tends to prioritize strengthening state institutions and political stability, Abu Dhabi has pursued a more assertive policy based on controlling strategic ports, mineral resources, and relations with local military actors.
At the beginning of 2026, the Sudanese government attempted to signal a return to normality. Prime Minister Kamil Idris stated that 2026 could become the “year of peace,” announcing the gradual return of government institutions to the capital, Khartoum.
A symbolic moment of this attempt at normalization occurred on February 1, when a Sudan Airways aircraft landed at the capital’s international airport with about 160 passengers on board. It was only the second commercial flight to arrive in the city since 2023. Passengers were welcomed with hugs and photographs, in what many interpreted as a sign of hope.
However, despite these symbols of normality, the war continues to rage in several regions of the country. According to military sources, the Sudanese army is preparing to launch a new large-scale offensive against the Rapid Support Forces. Some analysts believe this strategy may be facilitated by a possible weakening of external support for the RSF, linked to geopolitical tensions in the Gulf.
In this context comes the recent military operation announced by the Sudanese armed forces in the North Kordofan region. According to military sources, the army has recaptured the city of Bara, the second largest in the state, after a series of intense airstrikes against RSF positions within the city.
If confirmed, the recapture of Bara would represent a significant military development. However, many observers believe that such episodes will hardly be sufficient to bring the war to an end. The root causes of the conflict—political rivalries, competition for control of economic resources, regional divisions, and external interference—remain largely unresolved. As long as these dynamics continue to shape Sudanese politics, there is a risk that the country will remain trapped in a conflict destined to persist for a long time.
Mondo Internazionale APS - All rights reserved ®2026
Share the post
L'Autore
Angelo Salzano
Categories
Tag
MI framing the world africa subsahariana Sudan war