Between Civil Cooperation and Nuclear Latency: The US-Saudi Arabia agreement and regional balances

On July 22, 2026, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement introducing as the beginning of a long-term energy and technological partnership. The agreement could allow Riyadh to develop its own nuclear program with the support of US companies and technologies. Its significance, however, extends beyond the future construction of power plants. The key issue is determining what capabilities Saudi Arabia will be able to acquire throughout the fuel cycle. A program based on purchasing reactors and fuel from abroad would have different implications than the development of domestic expertise in uranium enrichment, a technology that can be used both to produce civilian fuel and, at much higher levels, material for weapons.

There is no evidence to suggest that Riyadh has already decided to acquire nuclear weapons. Greater technological autonomy, however, could over time bring Saudi Arabia closer to this option, strengthen its negotiating power, and influence its standoff with Iran. In the twelve months following the signing, through the summer of 2027, the publication of the full terms, congressional review, and the establishment of verification mechanisms will reveal whether the agreement will keep the Saudi program within strict limits or facilitate its gradual nuclear autonomy.

Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Program: between strategic autonomy and regional competition

The official Saudi Position places nuclear energy as part of the Kingdom’s energy and economic diversification strategy. Cooperation with Washington is expected to facilitate access to technology, build expertise, and support the development of a civilian nuclear industry. These objectives are concrete, but they do not fully capture the political significance of the program: compared to renewables, nuclear energy requires complex infrastructure and specialized knowledge that can translate into prestige, autonomy, and the ability to exercise influence. 

This dimension is particularly evident in the relationship with Iran. The progress of the Iranian program does not make a Saudi nuclear arms race inevitable, but it does increase the value Riyadh places on developing such capabilities. In this regard, the interests of the two partners converge only partially: Washington aims to keep the program within a technological and regulatory framework over which it can exert influence, while the Kingdom seeks to expand its negotiating leverage by turning to alternative suppliers, particularly China. Beijing, however, remains an incomplete option, as it can offer technology and assistance but cannot replace U.S. security guarantees.

Institutional Framework and Implementation Constraints

The 123 Agreement, so referred to the section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, establishes the legal framework necessary for Washington to authorize the transfer of nuclear materials, components, and technologies to another country. The signing does not, therefore, automatically imply the start of construction of reactors, but creates the conditions for future industrial, scientific and technical cooperation.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the package includes the main agreement, a bilateral safeguards agreement, two side letters, and a separate document regarding additional verifyability measures. Since the full texts have not yet been published, the central issue of the agreement remains unclear: in this context, as already mentioned, it is not possible to determine with certainty what limits have been placed on uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel, the two most sensitive activities from a nonproliferation standpoint.

Added to this uncertainty regarding the content is uncertainty regarding implementation: the signing, in fact, does not make the agreement immediately effective, as the package must still be reviewed by Congress. The process is further complicated by the political condition set by Donald Trump, under which Washington will not proceed without Saudi Arabia’s accession to the Abraham Agreements. Riyadh’s position, which continues to make normalization with Israel contingent on concrete progress toward a Palestinian state, this makes it obvious that nuclear cooperation is linked not only to technical and regulatory issues but also to broader regional political balances.

Nuclear Latency And Regional Stability

The concept of nuclear latency allows for an interpretation of the agreement that does not conflate the acquisition of capabilities with the political decision to build a weapon. A state can, in fact, develop expertise, infrastructure, and access to sensitive materials while formally remaining within a civilian program; what changes is the time required to convert these resources into a military capability, should the leadership choose to do so. Latency describes an intermediate state, in which technical possibilities expand while the program’s stated purpose remains civilian and international obligations continue to be formally observed. In this sense, the central issue is not current motivation, but the availability of options.

According to Reuters, the agreement would not require the United Arab Emirates to make the concession it had agreed to and would include a study on possible cooperation in this area; Donald Trump, however, has stated that there will be no enrichment. Until the full texts are published, it will not be possible to determine whether this activity has been excluded, postponed, or subject to specific conditions.

If Riyadh were to deliberately keep that option open without crossing the military threshold, the program could come close to a nuclear hedging strategy. In this context, international verification would serve not only a legal function but also a strategic one: to increase transparency regarding the capabilities developed and to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the program. The gap between an advanced civilian program and a nuclear posture capable of influencing the regional balance will therefore depend on the credibility of these verifications.

Three possible scenarios

The ambiguities of the agreement do not dictate a single, predetermined outcome. Over the next twelve months, the management of enrichment, the scope of verifications, and the political stability of the deal could shape three possible trajectories:

The first one is about a controlled cooperation. Once Congressional review and political hurdles are cleared, the most sensitive stages of the fuel cycle are excluded or postponed. Riyadh acquires civil technology, expertise, and assistance to build its program. Stricter verifications allow Washington to maintain its leverage over the program and mitigate proliferation risks.

A second trajectory would lead to a gradual Saudi autonomy.

Cooperation would begin in the least sensitive sectors without definitively resolving the issue of enrichment; in the meantime, specialized personnel, infrastructure, and certain stages of the fuel cycle would enhance national capabilities. This would not result in immediate proliferation, but rather in a strengthening of Riyadh’s latent capabilities and negotiating power, making a nuclear hedging strategy more realistic in its dealings with Iran

Finally, there is the possibility of a political stalemate.  Opposition in Congress, disagreements over enrichment, or a deadlock regarding Israel-Palestine normalization paralyzes the agreement's implementation. In this event, Riyadh would have an incentive to turn to alternative suppliers, particularly China, reducing the United States' ability to influence the program. However, alternative technologies would not replace the political and security guarantees offered by Washington.

Implication for the regional balance

The agreement represents far more than an energy deal: it is a litmus test of the United States' ability to support the development of a Saudi civil nuclear program without relinquishing control over its technological and regulatory framework. For Riyadh, cooperation offers an opportunity to bolster its regional standing, broadening its maneuvering room both in its rivalry with Iran and in its relations with various international suppliers.

The ultimate significance of the agreement will depend less on the immediate possibility of proliferation than on how US support, Saudi ambitions, and non-proliferation requirements are reconciled. If the program is embedded within a credible system of constraints and verifications, Washington can consolidate its influence and curb the risk of new competitive dynamics. But, on the other hand, if the ambiguity remains unresolved, nuclear latency could become a permanent geopolitical bargaining chip and a source of ongoing uncertainty, making the Middle Eastern security order far more fragile.

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