Translated by Alessandra Fumagalli
Framing the World is a column of analysis that focuses on what happens in the international affairs. It is divided into geographical areas - Asia, America, Africa & MENA and Europe - and it focuses weekly on a theme made up of mixed contribution. It aims at giving clear and accessible approaches on the main global affairs, though a collective work of relation. This and even more in the last FtW! China-Taiwan: the political meaning about the meeting between Xi and, Cheng Li-wun, Taiwan’s leader opposition.
The last meeting in Pechino between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Kuomintang’s President Cheng Li-wun is a significant progress in the relationships between China and Taiwan, in a time full of growing tensions and a lack of political polarization. It is the first meeting between Xi and an in charge leader of the Taiwanese opposition in the last 10 years. Cheng has a sort of “peace’s mission”, aiming at reducing tensions between the two sides of the Strait, while Pechino is pressing military the isle, considered a part of its territory. During the summit, Xi highlighted the position of Pechino, saying that the “unification” between China and Taiwan is an inevitable result, underlining the need of reinforcing the bonds between the two sides of the Strait.
However, the leader of the opposition who is more likely to have stable relationships with Mainland China, underlined the importance of dialogue and the decrease in tensions, which is the opposite of the current Taiwanese situation. The summit is in a context characterised by a growing political and military pressure on Taiwan, but it also highlighted a complementary strategy of Pechino: together with its deterrence, China is still using political and diplomatic moves to influence the domestic Taiwanese dynamics. While it continues refusing the engagement with Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, depicting him as a “separatist”, the dialogue with the opposition seems functional to reinforce favorable actors to a more conciliatory approach, in order to create divisions in the isle’s political panorama. The consequences of this development are significant. The summit highlights the willingness of Pechino to open its means of communication, bypassing the current Taipei’s government. Generally, this confirms how the competition in the Strait of Taiwan doesn’t focus only on the military field, but also on the political and symbolic one. Since the risk of escalation is still high, pressure and selective diplomatic measures could become a central strategy towards Taiwan.
Beatrice Baroni
China’s Veto to UN resolution: the double choice of Pechino
Last week has given a clear portrait of the geopolitical Chinese strategy, between the intransigence of the international institutions and a selective and symbolic domestic diplomacy. On April 7th, the UN Security Council hosted a significant gridlock: China and Russia vetoed a measure, supported by 11 nations, which aimed at opening the Strait of Hormuz. Despite its vital importance to global trade and humanitarian aids, it is still closed due to a regional conflict.
Pechino’s reasons, expressed by the Chinese Ambassador Fu Cong, are not only procedural. China stated that the measure did not face the deep causes of the crisis, which have been identified with the United States and Israel attacks towards Iran on February 28th. According to Pechino, an unilateral sentence of Teheran and the authorization to the use of armed forces could have raised the military escalation rather than decrease it, underlining the fear that these kinds of orders can be misused for bigger interventions, as it has already happened in the past in Libya.
This is a paradoxical approach, if we consider that China is the greatest importer of energy in the world and it received about 40% of its oil from the Middle East. However, Pechino seems to prefer transactional diplomacy: immediately after one day after the veto, it has been announced the cease fire of 14 days between the USA and Iran, referred to as the negotiation with Chinese help.
Meanwhile, on April 10th, Pechino played a crucial political role on its regional front. The meeting between Xi Jinping and Cheng Li-wun, Kuomintang’s leader (KMT), has been the first summit with a leader of the Taiwanese opposition for ten years.
In conclusion, both the veto of April 7th and the meeting of April 10th represent a China which acts in different ways: on one hand it neglects the American influence in the international see routes, on the other hand it reinforces the selective communication ways to influence the domestic dynamics in Taiwan, affirming that the competition is not only military, but also symbolic and political.
Valeria Picciolo
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