Translated by. Chiara Lamedica
On 18 October, Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius announced that the country’s authorities had successfully foiled an arson attack targeting satellite infrastructure linked to Starlink services. The attack was thwarted precisely because, for approximately a month, all sites hosting antennas and equipment used by Starlink on European soil had been under close surveillance. The incident in Lithuania was, in fact, the third of its kind. The first act of sabotage took place on 23 September in the village of Wola Krobowska, approximately 40 kilometres from the Polish capital, Warsaw, where a Starlink ground station was set on fire. Polish authorities described the incident as an overt act of Russian sabotage, allegedly carried out by a criminal organisation operating in Germany. The incident occurred at an already tense moment for Polish authorities, who, during the same period, had to order the evacuation of several border crossings along the Ukrainian border due to increasingly aggressive Russian attacks moving closer to the Polish frontier.
The second attack on Starlink infrastructure on European soil occurred during the night of 9–10 October, near the Bulgarian capital, Sofia. The incident resulted in the destruction of three satellite antennas used for Starlink communications and damage to a further eight. In this case, too, national authorities identified links to German organised crime, allegedly acting on Russian orders, and launched a sabotage investigation. A Bulgarian MP, however, described the fire as yet another act of Russian hybrid warfare on Bulgarian soil. The incident took place just days after the attack on 13 October, when two merchant vessels were struck by drones while sailing in Bulgarian waters in the Black Sea. One vessel sank, and 11 people were reported missing. The incident further exacerbated existing tensions between European countries and Russia, as the escalation continued with another attack on merchant vessels in Romania on 15 October.
Satellites and Hybrid Warfare: Why Starlink Is Under Attack
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Starlink, the company owned by Elon Musk, has played a crucial role in shaping the course of the war. Through Starlink’s satellite communication services and the use of Starshield, SpaceX’s advanced telecommunications system designed for military purposes, Ukraine has gained a significant advantage on the battlefield. Satellite systems have been used not only to maintain communications in areas where ground-based infrastructure has been destroyed by bombing, but also to guide long-range drones with precision, using signals that are more secure than radio transmissions, which are more vulnerable to enemy interference and jamming.
The strategic importance of Starlink communications for Ukraine’s defence has made the satellite network a target of Russian attacks since the very beginning of its deployment in Ukrainian territory in February 2022, immediately after the outbreak of the conflict.
Starlink currently operates more than 10,000 active satellites in orbit, providing a service with no real global equivalent. The strategic importance of SpaceX’s satellite infrastructure, including its military applications, and the role the private company has come to play in shaping the balance of power in the conflict have demonstrated that space has become the new frontier of defence. The implications of satellite telecommunications in the conflict have influenced not only Russian policy developments but also those of European countries.
Satellite telecommunications provided by Starlink and its advanced counterpart, Starshield, constitute a strategic technology that is essential to military and government operations. Dependence on a private company for access to these services represents a major vulnerability for national governments, particularly given the close ties between SpaceX, Elon Musk and US politics.
For this reason, as early as 2020, Russia began developing its own low Earth orbit satellite constellation in an effort to build a system comparable to Starlink, but under Russian control. The project, named Rassvet (the Russian word for “dawn”), achieved its first orbital launches in 2023. There are currently 37 active satellites, although Russia plans to deploy more than 900 satellites in orbit by 2035. Once operational, the Rassvet system would not only provide internet coverage across Russia’s vast and remote territories, but also help overcome the disadvantage caused by the country’s restricted access to Starlink services. An independent system could potentially be made available to other countries that are denied access to Starlink as well.
The return of war to European soil has made the pursuit of strategic technological autonomy a priority—and an urgent necessity—for the European Union, too. Approximately one month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission published the European Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, an action plan encompassing a range of policies designed to strengthen Europe’s common defence. For the first time, the strategy identified space as a strategic domain for the Union’s security, thereby accelerating research and the development of dual-use and military technologies, while also promoting greater autonomy in the production of space-related infrastructure and services.
As part of its efforts to achieve strategic autonomy in orbit, the European Commission has also proposed the development of a satellite communications system comparable to Starlink, but under European ownership. The project, known as IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite), is intended, like its US counterpart, to provide both civilian services and military communications.
The project envisages the launch of its first satellites by 2029 and will comprise a constellation of approximately 350 satellites, with a budget of around €15 billion in European public funding. The system is being developed by the SpaceRISE consortium.
The EU’s New Approach to Space Defence
The development of IRIS² is part of a broader European programme aimed at ensuring the resilience and security of EU territory through space-based capabilities. Growing Russian hostilities in Europe, coupled with uncertainty over NATO’s ability to guarantee a prompt and reliable European defence, have prompted efforts to develop military capabilities, which are among the priorities pursued by the European Commission and EU Member States.
The role of space technologies in strengthening European defence became increasingly evident with the establishment of the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS), created in 2019 and further reinforced during the second term of the European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen, which began in 2024. Under the leadership of Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, the Directorate-General has already contributed to significant developments in the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, including the 2025 Space Act, designed to strengthen the competitiveness of Europe’s space economy, and the new Space Threat Response Architecture, a common defence mechanism intended to protect space technologies and services against emerging threats both in orbit and on the ground.
Today, space is no longer merely a frontier for exploration; it has become vital infrastructure underpinning essential services, the functioning of the global economy, telecommunications and national security. The new space race has consequently taken on a distinctly strategic dimension: controlling orbital capabilities means shaping the development of new technologies and ensuring the cyber resilience needed to counter modern hybrid threats.
In the face of escalating conflicts and growing acts of sabotage on European soil, the European Union can no longer rely on private actors or external powers to provide such critical capabilities. To safeguard its interests, Europe must accelerate the transition towards sovereign space infrastructure, including programmes such as IRIS², while continuing to develop cutting-edge technologies. Only through full technological and operational autonomy in space will it be possible to address vulnerabilities on the ground and ensure the long-term sovereignty and security of the European Union as a whole.
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