The fragile understanding between Iran and North Korea on nuclear power

Translated by Jennifer Di Giacomo

The U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure on June 22nd, 2025, thanks to Israeli support as part of Operation Midnight Hammer, has reignited tensions in the Middle East and, at the same time, catalysed strong reactions far beyond the region. Among the first to condemn the action was North Korea, which expressed firm solidarity to Tehran, that denounces a “flagrant violation of national sovereignty” and accuses Washington of undermining global stability.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry's statement, published by the KCNA news agency, few hours after the attack, recalled the harsh tones of the Cold War, calling the U.S. operation “a barbaric and criminal act” that confirms “the need for every sovereign State to equip itself with adequate deterrent capabilities to ensure its security.”

Beyond the rhetoric, the Iranian case brings back into focus the fragile and complex relationship between Iran and North Korea. Both considered two authoritarian, internationally isolated regimes that share hostility toward U.S. hegemony, but differ deeply in their strategic ambitions, regional positioning and management of their own nuclear program.

The connection between Tehran and Pyongyang is not the result of chance. Since they established diplomatic ties in 1973, North Korea and Iran have cooperated, with one particularly noteworthy period: the transfer of weapons by North Korea to Iran during the 1980-88 war with Iraq. In subsequent years, the two partners continued to cooperate in military and nuclear fields.

It was the tightening of U.S. policy that served as a catalyst for cooperation. With Donald Trump's arrival in the White House in 2018, the situation changed dramatically: the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA - the 2015 Iran nuclear deal - brought Tehran-Washington relations back to an all-time low, while also fuelling convergence with Pyongyang.

The year 2020 represented a further turning point. The killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani by an American drone, that reinforced in both regimes the belief that the only real insurance against Western military intervention was a solid nuclear capability. In response, North Korea stepped up its ballistic missile tests and Iran gradually exceeded its imposed limits on uranium enrichment while formally maintaining its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Two nuclear trajectories, two logics of survival

Despite some symbolic convergence, the two countries are on deeply different nuclear paths.

• North Korea is now a de facto nuclear power: since withdrawing from the NPT in 2003, it has realized six atomic tests and developed ballistic missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory. North Korea's nuclear program has a clear deterrence function: ensuring the survival of the regime and preventing a forced change at the top. As reiterated by Kim Jong-un in numerous speeches, nuclear weapons are “the backbone of national security” and the basis for any possible negotiations with outside powers. It is for this reason, according to Joung Kyeong-woon, a senior researcher at the Seoul Defense Forum, that the DPRK cannot be attacked: “we are essentially held hostage by its artillery, which is much more easily used than nuclear weapons.”
• On the other hand, Iran has chosen a more ambiguous strategy. Although it has developed advanced technical capabilities, it continues to remain officially within the non-proliferation regime. The goal is not to acquire the bomb, but to position itself as a “threshold” power, ready to acquire it quickly if necessary, and obtaining it would certainly be a source of national pride. In this way, Tehran exerts strategic pressure on regional adversaries-Israel and Saudi Arabia-and maintains a negotiating edge with Western powers.

The motivations are different: while for Pyongyang the nuclear power is an existential guarantee, for Tehran it is primarily a regional geopolitical tool, useful for consolidating influence in the Levant area, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Gulf.

According to the Lowy Institute, cooperation between Iran and North Korea should be read more as a tactical convergence than a true strategic alliance. Both share hostility toward the United States and a history of economic and diplomatic isolation, but they tend to avoid direct involvement in each other's crisis theatres. In other words, the friendship between Tehran and Pyongyang is dictated by logics of convenience and a common enemy, not for deep ideological affinities.

In recent months, these differences have become more apparent. According to an Asia Times survey, North Korea is becoming Russia's favourite partner, at the expense of Iran. Kim Jong-un has forged a mutual assistance pact with Moscow and provided weapons systems used in the Ukrainian conflict. Tehran, remained close to the Kremlin, but continues to move more cautiously so as not to completely undermine diplomatic channels with Europe.

In conclusion, North Korea's reaction to the Iran attack once again shows how the two countries, though united by isolation and nuclear ambitions, remain on distinct paths. One aims for regime survival through atomic deterrence; the other seeks to consolidate its regional hegemony by maintaining calculated ambiguity.

Rather than allies, Iran and North Korea are reluctant partners, forged by external pressures and a structural distrust of the U.S.-dominated international order. An alliance out of convenience rather than conviction.

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