Translated by Federica Conti
An unnatural silence envelops Marjeh Square in Damascus in the hours of curfew. For fourteen years, the portraits of Bashar al-Assad observed each angle with the firmness of a regime that considered itself eternal. Today, hanging on those walls are images of a new flag and the manifesto of the Syrian transitional government. But beneath the fresh paint, there are the cracks of a fragmented country that might cause the collapse of the entire “New Syria” building.
December 2025 was a decisive moment. The rapid fall of the regime left the world with beated breath, but 2026 is demonstrating that defeating a dictator is easier than building a new State. At the center of this political experiment is Ahmed al-Sharaa, the man who guided the final insurrection and who is now seeking to transform himself from a warlord into a statesman
The enigma of Ahmed al-Sharaa: from militant to moderate?
The metamorphosis of Ahmed al-Sharaa (previously known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) is one of the most controversial case studies in the politics of the decade. In Damascus, al-Sharaa is not wearing the uniform anymore, but Western civil clothes. He speaks about plurality, protection of minorities (including Christians and Alawites), and an economy open to the liberal market.
However, his government of transition is a delicate equilibrium. On one hand, the government has to please radical Islamist leaders that form its military power; on the other hand, the government has to reassure international donors - the European Union and monarchies of the Gulf primarily - that the billions of dollars promised for reconstruction won’t finish in the coffers of a new theocracy.
"Al-Sharaa is trying to reach what Talibans were not able to achieve: obtain international acknowledgement without renouncing the Islamic identity," explains a European diplomat in Damascus. “But his authority ends where the checkpoint of local militias begins.”
The liquid insurgency: the return of ISIS
While Damascus is trying to acquire an institutional tone, in the central part of the Syrian Desert, an old nightmare is transforming its form. The Islamic State (ISIS) does not want to administer a city or gain money. It has also abandoned the idea of a “local Caliphate", aiming at what is known as “Liquid insurgency”.
Taking advantage of the absence of power caused by the collapse of the regular Syrian army and the partial withdrawal of the Russian forces, ISIS organized itself into lethal, invisible, and mobile units.
- Strain tactics: flash attacks against humanitarian aid.
- Economic war: sabotage of new electrical infrastructure financed by foreign investors.
- Rural recruitment: ISIS exploits the resentment of Bedouin clans that feel left out of reconstruction plans focused on big cities.
The shadow of the Caliphate is no longer a red line on the map, but an atmosphere of terror that is preventing the resumption of trade between Syria and Iraq, effectively isolating entire eastern provinces from Damascus's control.
The Mosaic of Influences: Turkey, Israel, and the Kurds
Syria in 2026 is not a sovereign country in the traditional sense, but a battleground for regional interests. The map of its zones of influence recalls the fragmentation of medieval principalities, but with drones and ballistic missiles.
Turkey involvement
Ankara is the main "godfather" of the new order in Damascus. President Erdogan has invested enormous capital to establish a security zone in northern Syria, aiming to resettle millions of refugees and, simultaneously, block the autonomy aspirations of the Kurdish YPG. For Turkey, a Syria led by al-Sharaa represents a unique commercial opportunity, but also a military liability that risks turning into a new Vietnam.
Israel’s red lines
To the south, Israel watches with a mixture of relief and paranoia. The disappearance of Iranian and Hezbollah influence from the Golan Heights border is a strategic victory for Jerusalem. However, uncertainty over who truly controls the South of the country (Daraa and Quneitra) keeps the IDF on high alert. "Do we prefer a known enemy like Assad or an unpredictable chaos dominated by Sunni militias?" is the question echoing through the halls of Israeli power.
The Kurdish case
In the northeast, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to maintain a quasi-independence, protected by a residual US presence. But with the new government in Damascus claiming sovereignty over the oil resources of Deir ez-Zor, tensions between Kurds and Arabs are at dangerous levels. The risk of a fratricidal civil war between the anti-Assad opposition is the real landmine for the peace process.
Syrian society: divided between trauma and hope
There is not only geopolitics, but there are the Syrian people. A generation that only knew war, trying to learn the meaning of a “normal life”. In the universities of Damascus and Aleppo, young people discuss politics openly for the first time, but with prudence. They know that the secret police of Assad does not exist anymore, but they also know that the secret services of GTS are everywhere.
The biggest challenge is reconciliation. How can people who fought against rebels and those who were part of the government army be reconciled? The government of al-Sharaa announced the formation of a commission for the “truth and the forgiveness”, but many people fear it is only a means for transversal revenge that causes bloodshed in the rural areas every night.
Mondo Internazionale APS - Riproduzione Riservata ® 2026
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L'Autore
Chiara Bertolotto
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MENA Siria ISIS ricostruzione economica governo Assad minaccia asimmetrica crisi idrica